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ABSTRACT 
Politicians utilize tax policy investment incentives to foster economic growth and 
stimulate investment.  On December 21, 2005, President Bush signed the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, otherwise known as the GO Zone Act.  The GO Zone Act 
provided tax incentives to stimulate economic growth and assist in the recovery and 
rebuilding efforts.  This research evaluates the economic impact of tax policy investment 
incentives provided by the GO Zone Act of 2005.  Congress continues to use tax 
incentives to stimulate economic growth even though empirical research on the impact of 
incentives is inconclusive. 
Prior literature supporting the neoclassical theory of investment behavior suggests 
that tax investment incentives that reduce the cost of capital should increase investment 
spending and spur economic growth.  The purpose of the research is to assess the 
effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives at the regional level and to examine 
whether these regional incentives create economic growth within policy coverage areas at 
the expense of the surrounding regions. Specifically, this study addresses the following 
research questions: 
1) Do tax policy investment incentives promote economic 
growth and spur business investment spending at the  
regional level? 
 
2) Are regional tax policy investment incentives a zero-sum  
game, where growth in one local area comes at the  
expense of reduced growth in other local areas? 
 
 vi 
The research questions are tested utilizing linear mixed-effects modeling, multiple 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and binary logistic regression on a matched 
sample panel data set using observations from 2002 through 2008. 
 Results indicate that the regional tax policy investment incentives provided by the 
GO Zone Act did not generate significant increases in key economic indicators included 
in this study.  These tax incentives were intended to accelerate capital spending and spur 
economic recovery, but do not appear to have had the desired impact.  In addition, the 
results do not indicate that the tax incentives provided by the GO Zone Act has had a 
statistically significant negative impact on the surrounding region. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 Tax policies in the United States are typically implemented to generate revenue 
for the government, however Congress has often used tax policy incentives to motivate 
spending and promote economic growth.  Economic theory states that a decline in the 
total cost of productive assets would spur an increase in the quantity demanded, 
because, all else equal, lowering the cost of any item increases the quantity demanded 
of that item (U.S. Congress 2007).  Basically, lowering the cost of an asset is an 
incentive to invest more and to produce more.  Tax incentives, such as bonus 
depreciation, tax-exempt bond financing, and investment tax credits, have been used by 
Congress to stimulate business spending.  Empirical research on the impact of tax 
incentives on economic growth has proven to be inconclusive, even though Congress is 
still implementing tax incentives to stimulate economic growth. 
 In the fall of 2005, the Gulf Coast region of the United States was severely 
damaged by multiple hurricanes.  On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck land 
and caused significant damage in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.  On September 
23, 2005, Hurricane Rita made landfall along the coastlines of Texas and Louisiana, 
causing additional damage to the already devastated Louisiana.  Hurricane Wilma made 
several landfalls in mid-October 2005, devastating parts of the Yucatán Peninsula and 
southern Florida.  Wilma set numerous records for both strength and seasonal activity.  
It was only the third Category 5 storm to develop in October.  In response to these 
natural disasters, Congress developed new laws to provide disaster relief to the 
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hurricane victims and tax recovery measures to stimulate the economic recovery of the 
region. 
 On September 26, 2005, President Bush signed the Katrina Emergency Tax 
Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA).  This Act attempted to provide immediate assistance and 
tax relief to the victims of Hurricane Katrina.  On December 21, 2005, President Bush 
signed the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, otherwise known as the GO Zone Act.  
The GO Zone Act extended the tax provisions of KETRA to the areas affected by 
Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Wilma and provided additional tax incentives, such as 
bonus depreciation and tax-exempt bond financing, to stimulate economic growth and 
assist the recovery and rebuilding efforts.   
The GO Zone Act established regions, or zones, to determine which areas were 
entitled to use the new tax relief policies.  The term „GO Zone‟ refers to the region 
affected by Hurricane Katrina and includes the same areas designated as the „core 
disaster area‟ by KETRA, which covered certain parishes in Louisiana and certain 
counties in Mississippi and Alabama; see figure 1.1 for a map of the Katrina GO Zone.
1
  
The GO Zone, or core disaster area, encompasses the area determined by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to be eligible for either individual only or 
both individual and public assistance from the Federal Government.  The term „Rita GO 
Zone‟ refers to the region affected by Hurricane Rita and covers southern Louisiana and 
southeastern Texas.  The term „Wilma GO Zone‟ referred to the region affected by 
Hurricane Wilma (southern Florida).  The primary focus of this research is the „GO 
Zone‟ region resulting from Hurricane Katrina, namely Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
                                                 
1
 According to IRS Publication 4492, the Katrina GO Zone region (core disaster area) includes 31 
parishes in Louisiana, 49 counties in Mississippi, and 11 counties in Alabama.  See Appendix A for a 
complete list of the counties and parishes utilized in this dissertation. 
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Alabama.  This research attempts to quantify the economic impact of the tax incentives 
included in the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 and to determine whether these tax 
incentives stimulated economic growth in the affected region. 
 
Figure 1.1 – The GO Zone Core Disaster Area2 
 
 
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 provided tax incentives for businesses 
and individuals to encourage rebuilding, rehabilitation, and investment in hurricane 
stricken areas.  In addition, the GO Zone Act provided technical corrections to prior 
laws, extensions for certain expiring tax provisions, and tax relief for military 
                                                 
2
 Source Rothman and Altieri (2006). 
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personnel.  Key tax provisions of the GO Zone Act included the following: (1) bonus 
first-year depreciation allowance, (2) increased Section 179 deduction, (3) extension of 
the carryback period from two years to five years for net operating losses from GO 
Zone related casualty losses, (4) tax-exempt bond financing for the GO Zone, (5) 
advanced refunding for certain tax exempt bonds, (6) partial expensing for demolition 
and clean-up costs, (7) increased low-income housing credit cap, (8) increased 
reforestation expenses, (9) increased rehabilitation tax credit, (10) expansion of Hope 
Scholarship and Lifetime Learning Credit for students in the GO Zone, (11) temporary 
suspension of limits on charitable contributions and additional charitable giving 
incentives, (12) employee retention credit, (13) employee housing allowance and 
employer credit, (14) penalty-free retirement plan distributions, and (15) extended tax 
deadlines.  This research primarily focuses on the use of tax incentives intended to 
increase capital spending and spur economic growth, such as bonus depreciation, 
increased expense deductions, and investment tax credits.  The business tax incentives 
provided by the GO Zone Act are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs. 
Title I of the GO Zone Act provided detailed explanations of the tax incentives 
intended to spur business capital spending and promote economic growth.  Bonus first-
year depreciation is one of the primary tax incentives in the GO Zone Act, and it allows 
an additional first-year depreciation deduction equal to 50 percent of the adjusted basis 
of qualified Gulf Opportunity Zone property.  In order for property to qualify for the 
additional first-year depreciation deduction, it must meet all of the following 
requirements: first, the property must be such that the general rules of the Modified 
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) apply with (1) an applicable recovery 
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period of 20 years or less, (2) computer software other than that which is covered by 
Section 197, (3) water utility property (as defined in Section 168(e)(5)), (4) certain 
leasehold improvement property, or (5) certain nonresidential real property and 
residential rental property; second, substantially all use of such property must occur 
within the Gulf Opportunity Zone and in the active conduct of a trade or business by the 
taxpayer in the Gulf Opportunity Zone; third, the original use of the property in the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone must commence with the taxpayer on or after August 28, 2005 (in 
addition, it is intended that additional capital expenditures incurred to recondition or 
rebuild property, the original use of which in the Gulf Opportunity Zone began with the 
taxpayer, would satisfy the “original use” requirement; see Treasury Regulation 
sec.1.48-2 Example 5); finally, the property must be acquired by purchase (as defined 
under Section 179(d)) by the taxpayer on or after August 28, 2005 and placed in service 
on or before December 31, 2007 (for qualifying nonresidential real property and 
residential rental property, the property must be placed in service on or before 
December 31, 2008, in lieu of December 31, 2007) (Joint Committee on Taxation 2005, 
14).  
A more generous Section 179 deduction allowance is an additional tax incentive 
provided by the GO Zone Act.  Under this provision, the $100,000 maximum amount 
that a taxpayer may elect to deduct under Section 179 is increased by the lesser of 
$100,000, or the cost of qualified Section 179 Gulf Opportunity Zone property for the 
taxable year. The provision applies with respect to qualified Section 179 Gulf 
Opportunity Zone property acquired on or after August 28, 2005, and placed in service 
on or before December 31, 2007. Thus, in addition to the $100,000 maximum cost of 
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any Section 179 property (including property that also meets the definition of qualified 
Section 179 Gulf Opportunity Zone property) that may be deducted under present law, a 
taxpayer may elect to deduct up to $100,000 more of the taxpayer's cost of qualified 
Section 179 Gulf Opportunity Zone property, resulting in a maximum deductible 
amount of $200,000 of qualified Section 179 Gulf Opportunity Zone property.  The 
$100,000 present-law portion of this amount is indexed for taxable years beginning 
after 2003 and before 2008, so the total may be greater than $200,000 after taking 
indexation of this portion into account (Joint Committee on Taxation 2005, 16).  
The GO Zone Act also provides businesses with various investment tax credits 
intended to promote capital spending.  The Act increases the rehabilitation tax credit 
from 20 to 26 percent, and from 10 to 13 percent, respectively, of the credit under 
Section 47 with respect to any certified historic structure or qualified rehabilitated 
building located in the Gulf Opportunity Zone, provided that the qualified rehabilitation 
expenditures with respect to such buildings or structures are incurred on or after August 
28, 2005, and before January 1, 2009 (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2005, 20).  The 
GO Zone Act also provides employers with a housing allowance credit of up to $600 
per month per employee and expands the KETRA employee retention credit.  This 
provision provides a credit of 40 percent of qualified wages (up to a maximum of 
$6,000 per employee) paid by an eligible employer to an eligible employee.  An eligible 
employer is any employer (1) that conducted an active trade or business on August 28, 
2005, in the core disaster area and (2) with respect to which the trade or business 
described in (1) is inoperable on any day after August 28, 2005, and before January 1, 
2006, as a result of damage sustained by reason of Hurricane Katrina 2009 (Joint 
7 
 
Committee on Taxation 2005, 50).  The Congressional Budget Office (2006) estimates 
that tax benefits related to the GO Zone Act will amount to about $4 billion in 2006, $3 
billion in 2007, and $2 billion over the years from 2008 to 2015 (Richardson 2006).  
The major tax provisions generating these tax benefits will be the 50 percent bonus 
depreciation, the Section 179 expensing, and the broadening of the employee retention 
tax credit to all companies regardless of size (Richardson 2006). 
 
Tax Policy Investment Incentives 
Federal tax policies often have involved tax incentives intended to increase 
capital spending by businesses and promote economic growth.  Accelerated 
depreciation was introduced in 1954, followed by the investment tax credit in 1962.  
Those who framed the 1954 Internal Revenue Code characterized it as a comprehensive 
revision undertaken “to remove inequities, end taxpayer harassment, and lower tax 
barriers to economic growth” (Schindler 1959, 616).  Within this framework, 
accelerated depreciation was designed “to assist modernization and to promote 
industrial expansion which in turn would foster increased production and a higher 
standard of living” (Schindler 1959, 616).   
In 1981, the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) provided sharp 
increases in depreciation benefits; however, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed 
accelerated depreciation and the investment tax credit.  The Job Creation and Worker 
Assistance Act of 2002 and the Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 both 
provided depreciation tax incentives of some kind in the year of acquisition of a long-
lived asset.  The American Jobs and Creation Act of 2004 extended many of these 
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incentives through December 31, 2005.  The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 provided 
additional depreciation incentives and increased the Section 179 deduction, and the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 extended them.  Congress intended 
for these incentives to promote capital investment and to generate economic growth.     
Such frequent use over the past 50 years suggests that Congress believes that tax 
incentives are an effective tool for promoting capital investment and economic growth.  
The theory behind the use of tax incentives is that by providing businesses with 
accelerated tax deductions and other investment tax credits; the cost of capital needed to 
purchase new investments is reduced through the time value of money.  The 
Congressional House Committee relied on this theory when implementing the Job 
Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 and the Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2003.  The committee felt that bonus depreciation incentives would stimulate 
equipment purchases and foster economic recovery by increasing employment and 
expanding business opportunities (U.S. Congress 2003).  However, despite the 
continued use of tax investment incentives by policy-makers, empirical evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of tax incentives is inconclusive.
3
  
 
Statement of Research Problem and Hypothesis 
This research evaluates the economic impact of tax incentives provided by the 
Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005.  Tax policy incentives included in the Act, such as 
bonus depreciation and an increased Section 179 deduction, were intended to spur 
capital investments by businesses and promote economic growth within the core 
                                                 
3
 Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the history of tax policy initiatives and of prior empirical 
research on their effectiveness. 
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disaster area.  This research studies the economic impact of these incentives at the 
county level in the affected regions, controlling for other relevant explanatory variables, 
such as government funded housing programs and the location of commercial casinos.  
The purpose of the research is to assess the effectiveness of tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level and to identify statistically significant variables that can 
be utilized to predict economic growth at the county level.  Additionally, the research 
examines whether these regional tax policy investment incentives create economic 
growth within policy coverage areas at the expense of the surrounding regions.  
Specifically, this research addresses the following research questions: 
1) Do tax policy investment incentives promote economic 
growth and spur business investment spending at the  
regional level? 
 
2) Are regional tax policy investment incentives a zero-sum  
game, where growth in one local area comes at the  
expense of reduced growth in other local areas? 
 
Research Design and Methodology 
This research utilizes linear mixed-effects modeling, multiple ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression and logistic regression to identify the significant variables that 
distinguish differences between GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties and standard 
empirical models to analyze the impact of these variables on the surrounding counties.  
The research questions are analyzed with a matched sample panel data set using data 
from 2002 through 2008 to test whether tax policy investment incentives are effective at 
the regional level and to determine the impact of these incentives on the surrounding 
regions.  A panel data set consists of a time series for each cross-sectional member in 
10 
 
the data set.
4
  Observing the same units or subjects over time has several advantages 
over cross-sectional data or even pooled time series cross-sectional data (Wooldridge 
2009).
5
   
The first research question examines the impact of tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level and whether these incentives promote economic growth.  
Research question 1 will be analyzed with the following dependent variables at the 
county level: annual industry earnings, manufacturing industry earnings, construction 
industry earnings, per capita income, personal income, average wages per job, median 
household income, total employment for all industries, total manufacturing 
employment, total construction employment, housing unit estimates, and the number of 
building permits issued annually.  Each dependent variable will be analyzed 
individually with mixed effects modeling procedures for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-
2008) and for the three-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2002-2004); 2005 will 
not be included in either combined sample due to the fact that it overlaps both groups.  
Annual changes for each dependent variable covering 2003 through 2008 will be 
calculated and subsequent statistical procedures will be performed on these values.  The 
year over year changes for each dependent variable will be analyzed individually with 
OLS regression procedures on an annual basis for the period covering 2003 through 
2008 and will also be analyzed individually for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) 
and for the two-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2003-2004); 2005 will not be 
                                                 
4
 The key feature that distinguishes panel data from pooled time series cross-sectional data is that panel 
data tracks the same variable for the same cross-sectional units (in this case counties) over a given period 
of time.  
5
 Having multiple observations on the same unit or subject allows for the control of certain unobserved 
characteristics of the dependent variable, in this case counties and parishes.  A second advantage of panel 
data is that they often allow researchers to study the importance of lags in behavior or the result of 
decision making. 
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included in either combined sample due to the fact that it overlaps both groups.  The 
independent variable used for research question 1 will be a dichotomous variable 
created for GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties in the sample.  
The second research question examines whether tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level are a zero-sum game, where economic growth created by 
incentives come at the expense of the surrounding regions.  Research question 2 will be 
analyzed with many of the same economic indicators implemented in research question 
1, except that research question 2 will examine the percentage change in each of these 
variables at the county level and attempt to determine if any increases in the affected 
core disaster area are offset by decreases in the surrounding counties.  In addition, 
research question 2 will be analyzed with binary logistic regression utilizing specific 
key economic indicators implemented in research question 1, however this model will 
consider all of the variables simultaneously to determine if statistically significant 
differences exist between GO Zone counties and non-GO Zone counties.   
 
Importance of the Research 
Economists often recommend fostering capital investment spending and 
promoting economic growth by providing tax incentives, such as accelerated 
depreciation and the investment tax credit.  Tax incentives designed to spur investment 
are a major component of tax policy.  Since the early 1950s, Congress has enacted tax 
policies that provide investment incentives for businesses.  Prior empirical research 
examining the effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives has proven to be 
inconclusive.     
12 
 
Most prior empirical research studies in this area have been cross-sectional 
studies based on industry-, firm-, or asset-level data and not typically tested at the 
regional level.  Steinnes (1984) examined regional economic development and 
concluded that the use of pooled-time-series-cross-sectional data provides more 
accurate results when compared with research that only examines cross-sectional data 
for one time period.  According to Wooldridge (2009), utilizing pooled cross sections 
from different years is an effective way of analyzing the effects of government policy.  
This research addresses these issues by utilizing a matched sample panel data set at the 
county level. 
 In general, counties are the smallest geographical regions for which significant 
data are available, and, to date, very little, if any, empirical research has been performed 
on the effectiveness of tax investment incentives using real-world economic data at the 
county level.  The GO Zone Act provides the opportunity to research the effectiveness 
of tax-policy incentives on capital investment and economic growth at the county level 
over a finite period of time covering 2006 through 2008.  According to Richardson 
(2006), Hurricanes Katrina and Rita may provide the ultimate test for tax policy in the 
United States.  The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) and, 
especially, the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 give economists an opportunity to 
evaluate the effectiveness of tax policy (Richardson 2006).   
The matched sample implemented in this research also allows the impact of tax 
incentives on surrounding regions to be examined.  Multiple researchers have stated that 
regional tax incentives are potentially a zero-sum game where benefits provided to one 
region come at the expense of surrounding areas and that tax incentives do not produce 
13 
 
growth at the regional level, but simply shift spending from one area to another with no 
net gain.
6
  This research minimizes some of these issues addressed by prior empirical 
research and provides evidence of the effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives 
at the regional level and shows the impact of these incentives on surrounding regions.     
 
Underlying Theory 
In 1958, Modigliani and Miller developed a theory of investment behavior based 
on a firm‟s cost of capital.  One of the conclusions reached by Modigliani and Miller 
was that any investment project worth undertaking should raise the value of the firm; 
the return on the project, therefore, should be greater than the marginal cost of capital 
(1958).  Modigliani and Miller also concluded, ceteris paribus, that a firm acting in the 
best interest of its stockholders would prefer investments that provided more income 
compared to less income and that the principal concern when considering investment 
decisions should be the marginal cost of capital.  Based on these conclusions, tax 
incentives that lower a firm‟s marginal cost of capital for certain types of investments 
should make these investment opportunities more attractive when compared with 
options that are not eligible for these same tax incentives. 
Hall and Jorgenson continued the research on the theory of investment behavior 
incorporating the cost of capital when they studied “the relationship between tax policy 
and investment expenditures using the neoclassical theory of optimal capital 
accumulation” (1967, 391).  Hall and Jorgenson wanted to test the simple E.C. Brown 
(1955) argument that “businessmen in pursuit of gain will find the purchase of capital 
goods more attractive if they cost less” (1967, 391).  Hall and Jorgenson (1967) 
                                                 
6
 See Bartik (1994) and Liard-Muriente (2007). 
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concluded that tax policies were highly effective in changing the level and timing of 
investment expenditures and that tax policies had important effects on the composition 
of investments.  Hall and Jorgenson provided the first empirical results concerning the 
theory of investment behavior and provided the foundation for research studying the 
impact of tax incentives on investment behavior. 
The key element of the neoclassical theory of investment behavior is the 
expected user cost of capital, which can be viewed as the current dollar “rental price” of 
one unit of capital for a single period (Chirinko 1986).  The neoclassical model of 
investment “assumes that tax rate reductions will increase investment by lowering the 
rental price of capital” (Bosworth 1985, 6).  Neoclassical theory of investment behavior 
suggests that tax incentives such as investment tax credits and bonus depreciation 
should reduce the cost of capital and increase capital spending on long-lived assets.  
Based on the theory of investment, the tax incentives provided in the GO Zone Act 
should lower a firm‟s marginal cost of capital in the qualifying locations, thus 
increasing capital investments and promoting economic growth.  
 
Results 
The first research question examines the impact of tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level and whether these incentives promote economic growth.  
Research question 1 was tested with the following dependent variables at the county 
level: annual industry earnings, manufacturing industry earnings, construction industry 
earnings, per capita income, personal income, average wages per job, median household 
income, total employment for all industries, total manufacturing employment, total 
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construction employment, housing unit number estimates, and the number of building 
permits issued annually.  Results indicate that the regional tax policy investment 
incentives provided by the GO Zone Act did not generate significant increases in key 
economic indicators included in this study.  These tax incentives were intended to 
accelerate capital spending and spur economic recovery, but based on research findings, 
they do not appear to have had the impact desired by Congress.  Based on the combined 
data analysis from all the models tested with linear mixed effects modeling and multiple 
regression procedures, statistical evidence supporting the effectiveness of regional tax 
policy investment incentives does not exist.  The conclusion is drawn, therefore, that the 
tax policy investment incentives provided by the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 
have had no significant impact on economic growth in the affected region.  
The second research question examines whether tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level are a zero-sum game, where economic growth created by 
incentives come at the expense of the surrounding regions.  Research results provided 
some tentative evidence supporting the zero-sum game theory; however, these results 
were not significant at the alpha level equal to 0.05.  Based on the multiple regression 
data analysis from all of the models tested for research question 2, statistically 
significant evidence supporting the zero-sum game theory does not exist.  The 
conclusion is drawn, therefore, that the tax policy investment incentives provided by the 
Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 have had no significant impact on economic growth 
in the surrounding region. 
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Contributions of the Study 
This research quantifies the impact of tax policy investment incentives provided 
by the Gulf Opportunity Act of 2005 on investment behavior in the GO Zone core 
disaster area.  The majority of prior empirical research on tax policy investment 
incentives was performed using firm-level data or by creating models to determine the 
effectiveness of tax policy incentives.  This research adds to the existing literature 
concerning the effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives by using real-world 
county-level economic indicators to test the impact of tax policy investment incentives 
at the regional level.  This research also provides evidence of the impact that regional 
tax policy investment incentives have on the surrounding areas, helping to determine 
whether regionally tailored tax incentives have a significant impact on the intended 
beneficiaries or are simply a zero-sum game that shifts spending from one geographic 
location to another.    
 
Limitations of the Study 
As with all forms of research, some limitations are inherent in archival empirical 
research.  Archival empirical data for the affected region make this study possible but 
also limit the ability to generalize these results to other regions.  In addition, empirical 
research utilizing real-world data can be prone to internal validity issues that exist due 
to lack of environmental controls and other possible causal factors.  The purpose of this 
research is to determine whether tax policy investment incentives have an impact on 
economic growth at the regional level and to determine the impact on surrounding 
regions.  Therefore, explanation and generalization are not the primary factors of this 
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research study.  The time limitation of the study and the temporary nature of the tax 
policy investment incentives impose additional limitations on any findings.  Even 
though the most current available data were used, these tax policy investment incentives 
were temporary, and Friedman‟s permanent income hypothesis indicates that investing 
patterns may not change with temporary reductions in tax burdens (Meghir 2004).  
Also, these temporary investment incentives may have shifted capital investment 
spending forward in time, which would indicate a temporary investment change with no 
significant long-term impact on economic growth.  Future studies covering tax policy 
investment incentives could help to clarify some of these temporary and time-related 
limitations. 
 
Organization 
 The following chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows.  Chapter 
Two includes a literature review of the prior empirical work related to tax incentives 
and their economic impact.  This chapter also includes a history of depreciation-related 
tax incentives utilized in the United States.  Chapter Three provides the research 
questions and the methodology used to analyze the impact of tax incentives on the 
economic growth of the GO Zone.  Chapter Four explains the results of the dissertation.  
Chapter Five summarizes the conclusions and limitations of this study. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Economists often recommend increasing capital investment spending by 
reducing the cost of capital through tax incentives such as accelerated depreciation and 
the investment tax credit.  Tax incentives designed to spur investment are a major 
component of tax policy.  According to Coen (1968), tax incentives for investment 
purposes are thought to stimulate capital expenditures in two ways.  First, by reducing 
the amount of taxes paid on income from assets, or by changing the timing of the tax 
payments in favor of the future, “tax incentives increase the after-tax rate of return on 
capital.  Second, by reducing tax liabilities, tax incentives increase a firm‟s cash flow 
(after-tax profits plus depreciation charges for tax purposes), which is one measure of 
internal funds available for investment and is thought by some to be an important 
determinant of investment expenditures” (Coen 1968, 200). 
 The empirical debate is not centered on whether the cost of capital influences 
investment – even economists who are skeptical about the wisdom of using tax 
legislation to stimulate investment agree that the cost of capital affects investment (U.S. 
Congress 2007, 3).  The debate is centered on the relative sensitivity of investment to 
changes in the cost of capital (U.S. Congress 2007, 3).  The conclusions drawn by 
researchers examining the sensitivity of investment to changes in the cost of capital are 
affected by the assumptions, the methods of analysis, and the statistical techniques used 
by the researchers.  Therefore, there are sizable bodies of research on both sides 
concerning the effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives.   
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Since the early 1950s, Congress has enacted tax policies that provide investment 
incentives for businesses.  Bonus depreciation and/or accelerated depreciation, along 
with investment tax credits and increased Section 179 expense deduction allowances, 
have been very popular incentives used by Congress in the past few decades.  The vast 
majority of empirical research concerning the effectiveness of tax-policy incentives has 
implemented some form of the user-cost-of-capital model developed by Hall and 
Jorgenson (1967), which maps changes in depreciation rates or tax credits created by 
tax policy to the user‟s cost measure of the marginal incentive to invest in new assets.  
These tax incentives are designed to increase capital spending and promote economic 
growth.  Prior empirical research concerning the impact of these tax policy incentives 
has provided inconsistent results on the actual effects that these incentives create. 
The remainder of this literature review consists of three sections.  The first 
section provides a review of the history of tax policy incentives implemented in the 
United States for the purpose of increasing capital spending and promoting economic 
growth.  The second section provides a review of the results of prior empirical studies 
that examine the impact of various tax policy incentives on capital investment 
decisions.  The final section provides a review of the literature that supports the use of 
the variables and methods selected for this study of tax policy incentives on capital 
investment decisions.  
 
The History of Tax Investment Incentives 
 Historically, the primary tax policy incentives used to increase capital 
investment and spur economic growth have been investment tax credits, various 
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adjustments to depreciation, and/or increased Section 179 election to expense 
deductions.  According to Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), a tax system should not favor 
one type of input over another; otherwise, economic inefficiency will result.  Current 
depreciation rules violate this concept by creating economic distortions caused by the 
difference between true economic depreciation and the depreciation allowance for tax 
purposes.  Depreciation rules introduce a non-optimal tax on capital due to the time-
value of money because firms do not receive the full benefit of depreciation in the year 
of purchase.  For example, according to Cohen et al. (2002), depreciation policies create 
the following inequities: (1) for 7-year tax life assets, each dollar of equipment spending 
is allowed a deduction worth only 84 cents in present value, (2) for 5-year equipment, 
the current deduction is worth 88 cents, and (3) for 3-year equipment, the current 
deduction is worth 94 cents.  Since the value of the depreciation deduction is lower than 
the true expense amount, the cost of investing is higher, which could decrease 
investment and reduce economic activity.  Assuming a 42 percent corporate tax rate (35 
percent federal plus 7 percent state and local tax rate), the cost of the new investment 
under current law relative to expensing is: 11.5 percent higher for 7-year equipment, 8.7 
percent higher for 5-year equipment, and 4.3 percent higher for 3-year equipment 
(Cohen et al. 2002).  Based on the numerical evidence alone, tax-policy incentives that 
reduce the tax on investment activity should almost certainly increase investment 
spending and spur economic growth. 
Since the early 1900s, a depreciation deduction has been part of corporate 
income tax policy.  The modern-day income tax began with the ratification of the 16
th
 
Amendment and the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913.  The Revenue Act of 1913 
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permitted “a reasonable allowance for exhaustion, wear and tear of property arising out 
of its use in business” (Kern 2000, 147).7  Tax policies concerning depreciation have 
been changed many times in the past century.  According to Kern (2000), the 
motivations for these frequent changes are attributed to: proper income measurement, 
raising revenue, encouraging capital formation, or ensuring a neutral tax system.   
In the early part of the 20th century, financial managers were allowed to 
exercise considerable judgment with regard to the amount of depreciation that was 
expensed on their income statements for financial reporting and on how much 
depreciation they deducted for income tax purposes.  In 1920, the Treasury first issued 
Bulletin F, leaving the determination of the amount of depreciation to the taxpayer 
based on judgment and experience, with final approval by the Commissioner (Kern 
2000, 148).  After 1920, the amounts of depreciation allowances increased dramatically.  
According to Kern (2000), by 1931, the amount of depreciation deductions claimed 
exceeded corporate taxable income, prompting the Treasury to issue a revised Bulletin 
F that attached a preliminary study that gave "probable useful lives" for over 2,700 
different kinds of industrial assets.  Even with this updated guidance, determining the 
depreciation deduction amount remained at the discretion of the taxpayer. 
In 1934, the Treasury Department issued Treasury Decision 4422, which 
required taxpayers to furnish a schedule showing their calculations of depreciation 
expense to substantiate their depreciation deductions and also required taxpayers to 
allocate the cost of an asset over its useful life using the straight-line or units-of-
production method (Kern 2000).  Prior to 1934, the burden of demonstrating that a 
                                                 
7
 The corporate excise tax enacted as part of the Corporate Excise Tariff Act of 1909 also allowed a 
reasonable allowance for the depreciation of property. 
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taxpayer had misstated income by improperly calculating his depreciation expense fell 
on the Internal Revenue Service.  However, in 1934 this policy was changed and for the 
first time the burden of proof shifted from the government to the taxpayer. 
In 1942, the Treasury Department issued a second revision of Bulletin F (also 
known as IRS Publication 173) that recommended useful lives for over 5,000 assets 
used in 57 different industries and activities (IRS 2005).  The Treasury's estimates of 
useful lives, however, were based on the timeframe that covered the Great Depression 
of the 1930s when businesses tended not to replace their obsolete assets very frequently, 
which caused the useful-life estimates listed in the revised Bulletin F to generally be 
longer than an asset's actual useful life (Kern 2000).  This disparity between actual and 
useful-life estimates resulted in tax depreciation deductions being less than what was 
considered economically justifiable depreciation and this policy continued until 1954 
(Kern 2000). 
A major shift occurred concerning depreciation tax policy with the enactment of 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.  For the first time, Congress, rather than the 
Treasury, determined allowable methods for calculating the depreciation deduction, and 
this represented the first time that Congress considered using tax depreciation as an 
economic incentive for stimulating investment (Kern 2000).  The tax law change in 
1954 allowed businesses to use any method of depreciation as long as it was both 
applied consistently and did not exceed twice the straight-line rate of depreciation, 
which included the double-declining-balance method.   
Congress believed that the pre-1954 depreciation system acted as a barrier to 
investment; Congress, therefore, implemented the double-declining balance method of 
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depreciation in 1954 hoping to stimulate investment while conforming to sound 
accounting principles by using realistic estimated useful lives (House of Representatives 
1954).  Congress also believed that the pre-1954 "tax depreciation methods might 
depress business capital expenditures below the level needed to keep the economy 
operating at high levels of output and employment" (House of Representatives 1954, 
22).  Thus, the 1954 tax policy changes were designed to provide incentives for 
investment.   
In 1958, the Small Business Tax Revision Act of 1958 was passed by Congress, 
and it provided an additional incentive to stimulate capital investments by allowing 
small businesses to deduct up to 20 percent of the cost of property in the year of 
purchase as an immediate expense election, which is similar to the Section 179 
deductions allowed today (Congressional Record 1958).  By 1962, depreciation 
procedures grouped assets by industry of use and reduced the write-off periods, which 
allowed more generous deductions.   
In addition to the new depreciation guidelines implemented in 1962, a second 
tax policy incentive was implemented to stimulate investments.  The Revenue Act of 
1962 introduced the investment tax credit (ITC) for the first time. This investment tax 
credit was equal to seven percent of the cost of a qualifying asset in the year of 
acquisition.  Unlike a deduction, a credit is a dollar-for-dollar reduction of a taxpayer‟s 
tax liability.  Congress also considered the possibility of using more accelerated 
methods of depreciation in lieu of the investment tax credit; however this idea was 
discarded because Congress believed that realistic depreciation rules did not provide 
sufficient incentive to spur economic growth (Kern 2000).  Congress believed that the 
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credit was "preferable to higher depreciation charges because the latter tends to distort 
income accounting" (Committee on Finance 1962, 12).  Apparently, Congress did not 
wish to deviate drastically from accounting and economic concepts of income in order 
to stimulate capital investment. 
The investment tax credit represented a landmark in terms of tax incentives for 
investment.  President Kennedy advocated enacting the credit to stimulate capital 
formation, and he believed that higher levels of capital formation would raise 
productivity, keep people employed, and alleviate a serious balance of payments 
problem (House of Representatives 1962, 31).  Congress echoed his sentiments by 
stating that the objective of the credit was "to encourage modernization and expansion 
of the Nation's productive facilities and thereby improve the economic potential of the 
country, with resultant increase in job opportunities and betterment of our competitive 
position in the world economy" (Committee on Finance 1962, 11). 
In 1966, inflationary pressures caused the temporary suspensions of the 
investment tax credit and accelerated depreciation allowances.
8
  The suspensions were 
short-lived, as they were lifted by President Johnson in 1967.  Inflationary problems 
reappeared in 1969, and the investment tax credit was repealed by the Reform Act of 
1969.  Congress believed that the investment tax credit contributed directly to 
inflationary pressures and caused wide fluctuations in investment; hence, “eliminating 
the credit would help reduce inflation and help keep the rate of change in investment on 
a more steady path” (House of Representatives 1969, 178).   
                                                 
8
 H.R. 17607 suspended the credit effective 10/10/66 to 12/31/67.  H.R. 6950 lifted the suspension 
effective 3/10/67. 
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the United States economy was facing slow 
growth, high inflation, and high unemployment, so Congress took action once again.  
The Revenue Act of 1971 introduced the Class Life Asset Depreciation Range System 
(ADR), which replaced the previous depreciation procedures with new guidelines and 
also reinstated the investment tax credit. The investment tax credit and new depreciation 
guidelines enacted in 1971 were designed to be "large enough to stimulate the economy 
and yet not so large that they create a new wave of inflationary pressure" (Committee 
on Finance 1971, 71).  The ADR system provided new guidelines used to define the 
useful life of an asset.  Congress hoped to simplify the administration of depreciation 
rules with these new guidelines; at the same time, the ADR increased the number of 
asset classes from 75 to 132 (Committee on Finance 1971). 
The United States was facing extremely high levels of unemployment in 1975, 
leading Congress to introduce the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.  The Tax Reduction Act 
of 1975 provided a temporary increase in the investment tax credit and was designed to 
restore economic growth and to move toward full employment (Kern 2000).
9
  Congress 
expected the tax revisions to "help revive the economy and increase employment 
without adding significantly to inflationary pressures" and believed that the increase in 
the tax credit would create more jobs, increase productivity, reduce inflation, and 
improve the U.S. balance of payments (House of Representatives 1975, 7).  The Tax 
Reform Act of 1976 extended the temporary increase in the investment tax credit until 
December 31, 1980, and the Revenue Act of 1978 made the increase in the investment 
tax credit permanent, effective January 1, 1981 (Kern 2000). 
                                                 
9
 The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 increased the ITC from 7% to 10% for qualified property acquired 
before January 1, 1977. 
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The next major shift occurred with the introduction of the Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), which introduced the Accelerated Cost Recovery System 
(ACRS) and modified the investment tax credit.  This new ACRS system classified 
depreciable assets into one of four recovery classes (3-year, 5-year, 10-year, and 15-
year)
10
 and was drastically different from previous depreciation methods.  Historically, 
Congress had been concerned that depreciation guidelines were in accordance with 
accounting and economic principles.  With ERTA, simplifying tax rules and 
encouraging investment seemed far more important than conforming to accounting 
practice for financial reporting (Kern 2000, 157).  According to Kern (2000), Congress 
had multiple reasons for making such drastic changes, including the following: (1) they 
concluded that prior depreciation and investment tax credit provisions did not provide 
the investment stimulus that was considered essential for economic expansion; (2) they 
believed that the prior law was unnecessarily complicated; and (3) they concluded that 
the real value of depreciation deductions had declined because of inflation.  Between 
1982 and 1985, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), the 
Deficit Deduction Act of 1984, and the Imputed Interest Act of 1985 all made minor 
changes to the tax policies developed by ERTA, but nothing of great significance.
11
 
The next major tax legislation was the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which included 
major shifts in depreciation policy and repealed the investment tax credit.  The Act 
modified ACRS, resulting in the creation of the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (MACRS).  MACRS lengthened the useful lives of certain assets, expanded the 
                                                 
10
 Typically the majority of assets fell into the 3-year or the 5-year class; the 10-year class and the 15-year 
class were reserved for a few specialized assets.  All depreciable realty had a 15-year recovery period. 
11
 TEFRA required a taxpayer to reduce the depreciable basis of property by one-half of the investment 
tax credit taken on the property.  The other Acts lengthened the recovery period for realty and made other 
small changes. 
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number of property classes, and added the half-year convention to simplify calculations 
in the first and last year of a property‟s recoverable life.  MACRS was designed to 
"provide for more neutral depreciation treatment across diverse assets" (Joint 
Committee on Taxation 1986, 10).  Once again, Congress returned to the thought 
process that recovery periods should more closely reflect the actual useful lives of 
depreciable assets (Kern 2000). 
Congress passed the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, and this law 
lengthened the nonresidential realty recovery period from 31.5 to 39 years.  With this 
piece of legislation, Congress had turned full circle toward having depreciation reflect 
"proper" income measurement with regard to depreciable real property (Kern 2000).  
Congress felt that depreciation deductions did not match the economic lives of property.  
In order to measure more accurately the economic income derived from using 
nonresidential realty, the recovery period was increased to 39 years (House of 
Representatives 1993, 625-626). 
The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 was an economic stimulus 
bill that was enacted in part due to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  After 
these tragedies, Congress needed to promote capital investments that would foster 
business expansion and generate employment opportunities (Committee Report 2003).  
The Act allowed an additional first-year depreciation deduction equal to 30 percent of 
the adjusted basis of qualified property, subject to the general rules regarding whether 
an item is deductible.
12
  This additional first-year depreciation deduction is also 
commonly referred to as “bonus depreciation” or “partial expensing” throughout the 
                                                 
12
 The Act basically allowed 30 percent of investment occurring during a three-year period following 
September 11, 2001 to be expensed and written off immediately, instead of following normal 
depreciation guidelines.  
28 
 
literature.  In order for property to qualify for the additional first-year depreciation 
deduction it must meet all of the following requirements: first, the property must be 
property to which the general rules of MACRS apply with (1) an applicable recovery 
period of 20 years or less, (2) water utility property (as defined in Section 168(e)(5)), 
(3) computer software other than computer software covered by Section 197, or (4) 
qualified leasehold improvement property; and second, the original use of the property 
must commence with the taxpayer on or after September 11, 2001 (Joint Committee on 
Taxation 2002, 3).  This bonus depreciation incentive was the first major change in 
investment tax policy since the Tax Reform Act of 1986. 
The Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 provided additional tax 
investment incentives for businesses to spur economic growth.  The Act increased the 
first-year depreciation deduction enacted by the Job Creation and Worker Assistance 
Act of 2002 from 30 percent to 50 percent on qualified property.  In order to qualify for 
the additional depreciation deduction, the property had to be acquired after May 5, 
2003, and before January 1, 2005.  The Act also increased the Section 179 expense 
deduction allowance through January 1, 2005, basically doubling the base amount of 
$100,000 for qualifying property.  In 2005, Congress passed the Gulf Opportunity Zone 
Act of 2005 that extended these accelerated bonus depreciation deductions and Section 
179 deduction incentives, in addition to other tax credits, for certain regions of the 
United States devastated by hurricanes.
13
  The economic impact these tax investment 
incentives had on the affected regions is the focus of this research. 
                                                 
13
 The tax investment incentives provided by the GO Zone Act are discussed in detail in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation. 
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The Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 was signed into law during February 2008, 
with the intended purpose of mitigating the economic recession. The Act provided 
recovery rebates for individuals and tax incentives for business investment.  It contained 
two primary business investment incentives, an increased Section 179 expense 
deduction, and a bonus depreciation incentive.  The maximum Section 179 expense 
deduction was increased to $250,000, and the phaseout threshold for the deduction was 
increased to $800,000 for tax years beginning during 2008.  Also, an additional first-
year depreciation deduction equal to 50 percent of adjusted basis was allowed for 
qualifying property placed in service after December 31, 2007, and before January 1, 
2009 (Jones 2008). 
In early 2009, Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009, as a direct response to the economic crisis then facing the United States; it was 
intended to spur economic activity and investment in long-term growth.  According to 
Section 3 of the Act, this legislation was meant to accomplish the following: (1) 
preserve and create jobs and promote economic recovery, (2) assist those most impacted 
by the recession, (3) provide investments needed to increase economic efficiency by 
spurring technological advances in science and health, (4) increase investment in 
transportation, environmental protection, and other infrastructure that will provide long-
term economic benefits, and (5) stabilize State and local government budgets, in order 
to minimize and avoid reductions in essential services and counterproductive state and 
local tax increases (House of Representatives 2009).  The Act extends by one year the 
50 percent bonus depreciation deduction available for qualified property and the 
increased Section 179 expense amount enacted by the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. 
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The following table summarizes the tax investment incentives covered in this literature 
review. 
 
Table 2.1 – The History of Tax Investment Incentives 
 
Legislation/Action Change Rationale 
Corporate Excise 
Tariff Act of 1909 
Depreciation first appeared. Provide a reasonable 
allowance for the 
depreciation of property. 
Revenue Act of 1913 Depreciation first appeared 
as part of the income tax. 
Permit a reasonable 
allowance for exhaustion, 
wear and tear of property 
arising out of its use in 
business. 
Treasury first issued 
Bulletin F (1920) 
Determination of 
depreciation left up to the 
taxpayer. 
To provide guidance. 
Revised Bulletin F 
(1931) 
Provided "probable useful 
lives" for over 2,700 
different kinds of industrial 
assets. 
To provide guidance. 
Treasury Decision 
4422 (1934) 
Required taxpayers to 
furnish a schedule showing 
their calculations of 
depreciation expense 
deduction. 
To provide guidance. 
Revised Bulletin F 
(1942) (aka IRS 
Publication173) 
Treasury Department 
recommended useful lives 
for over 5,000 assets used in 
57 different industries. 
To provide guidance. 
Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 
Allowed businesses to use 
any method of depreciation 
as long as it was both 
consistently applied and did 
not exceed twice the 
straight-line rate of 
depreciation. 
Economic incentive for 
stimulating investment. 
Small Business Tax 
Revision Act of 1958 
Immediate expense election 
first introduced (similar to 
Section 179 expense 
deduction). 
Provide assistance for 
small businesses. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Revenue Act of 1962 Introduction of the first 
investment tax credit (7%). 
Stimulate capital 
formation and raise 
productivity. 
H.R. 17607 (1966) Suspend investment tax 
credit. 
To reduce inflationary 
pressures. 
H.R. 6950 (1967) Suspension lifted. To stimulate growth. 
Reform Act of 1969 Repealed investment tax 
credit.   
To reduce inflationary 
pressures. 
Revenue Act of 1971 Introduced the Class Life 
Asset Depreciation Range 
System (ADR) and 
reinstated the investment tax 
credit. 
To stimulate the 
economy. 
Tax Reduction Act of 
1975 
Provided a temporary 
increase in the investment 
tax credit (7% to 10%). 
Restore economic 
growth. 
Tax Reform Act of 
1976 
Extended temporary 
increase through 1980. 
To stimulate growth. 
Revenue Act of 1978 Made investment tax credit 
increase permanent. 
To stimulate growth. 
Economic Recovery 
Tax Act of 1981 
Introduced the Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System 
(ACRS) and modified the 
investment tax credit. 
To stimulate growth and 
simplify depreciation 
guidelines. 
Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 
1982 
Reduced depreciable basis if 
full investment credit taken. 
To scale back 1981 
provisions. 
Deficit Deduction Act 
of 1984 
Extended real property lives 
from 15 to 18 years. 
To reduce deficit. 
Imputed Interest Act 
of 1985 
Extended real property lives 
from 18 to 19 years. 
To reduce deficit. 
Tax Reform Act of 
1986 
Repealed the invesment tax 
credit.  Introduced the 
Modified Accelerated Cost 
Recovery System 
(MACRS). 
To provide for more 
neutral treatment across 
diverse assets. 
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Table 2.1 – Continued 
Revenue 
Reconciliation Act of 
1993 
Extended the nonresidential 
realty recovery period from 
31.5 to 39 years. 
To measure more 
accurately economic 
income from such 
property. 
Job Creation and 
Worker Assistance Act 
of 2002 
Additional first-year 
depreciation deduction equal 
to 30 percent of the adjusted 
basis of qualified property. 
To promote capital 
investments and generate 
employment 
opportunities. 
Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 
2003 
Increased the first-year 
depreciation deduction from 
30 percent to 50 percent on 
qualified property and 
increased the Section 179 
expense deduction. 
To stimulate growth. 
Gulf Opportunity Zone 
Act of 2005 
Extended 50 percent bonus 
depreciation and increased 
Section 179 expense 
deduction.  Also provided 
numerous investment 
credits. 
To promote capital 
investments, generate 
employment 
opportunities, and to spur 
economic growth in 
hurricane affected areas. 
Economic Stimulus 
Act of 2008 
Additional first-year 
depreciation deduction equal 
to 50 percent of the adjusted 
basis of qualified property 
and increased Section 179 
expense deduction. 
To promote capital 
investments and 
economic growth. 
American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 
Extended provisions of 
Economic Stimulus Act of 
2008. 
To spur economic activity 
and invest in long-term 
growth. 
 
  
Empirical Studies of the Impact of Tax Policy Incentives on Capital Investments 
 In 1962, E.C. Brown wrote an article discussing the investment process and the 
impact that fiscal policy could potentially have on it.  Brown (1962) discusses the 
modified depreciation adjustments of 1954, and the potential impact of the tax credit 
recommended by the Kennedy Administration, a tax credit intended to stimulate 
investment in plant and equipment.  Brown discusses the differences between 
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depreciation adjustments and tax credits and analyzes the potential impacts these tax 
incentives could have on investment behavior.  Brown (1962) concludes that 
investment-stimulating devices, such as depreciation adjustments and investment tax 
credits, are a fascinating chapter in fiscal policy and deserve detailed study.  Brown 
urges research in this area and he states, “If economists are to be useful to those 
designing policy, it behooves us to press on with our study of investment decisions to 
give them breadth and depth comparable to our knowledge of consumer behavior” 
(Brown 1962, 344). 
Prior to the 1967 article, “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior” by Hall and 
Jorgenson, very little, if any, empirical research concerning the impact of tax policy 
incentives had been performed.  The purpose of their research was to study the 
relationship between tax policy and investment expenditures using the neoclassical 
theory of optimal capital accumulation (Hall and Jorgenson 1967). Hall and Jorgenson 
examined the effects of accelerated depreciation methods adopted in 1954 and the 
investment tax credit of 1962.  They also investigated the depreciation guidelines of 
1962 and considered the hypothetical effects of adoption of first-year write-off in 1954 
as an alternative to accelerated depreciation.   
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) used data on investment expenditures for structures 
and equipment separately, for both manufacturing and non-farm, non-manufacturing 
sectors of the U.S. economy for the years 1929-63.  Based on their research findings, 
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) concluded that the effects of accelerated depreciation were 
very substantial, especially for investment in structures, and that the depreciation 
guidelines of 1954 were significant with respect to investments in equipment.  Hall and 
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Jorgenson (1967) also concluded that the effects of the investment tax credit of 1962 
were dramatic and left no doubt about the impact of tax policy on determining 
investment behavior.  Their overall conclusions were “that tax policy is highly effective 
in changing the level and timing of investment expenditures” and “that tax policy has 
had important effects on the composition of investment” (Hall and Jorgenson 1967, 
392). 
Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) extended the prior research by studying the theory 
of corporate investment behavior based on the neoclassical theory of optimal capital 
accumulation in more detail.  The neoclassical theory of corporate investment behavior 
assigns an important role to the cost of capital and also considers the rate of change of 
the price investment goods.  Changes in this price result in capital gains and losses that 
must be included in the calculation of economic profit or loss; holding all else constant, 
a high rate of change of prices of investment goods should provide an incentive to use 
more capital, while a low rate of change should serve as a disincentive (Jorgenson and 
Siebert 1968). The price of capital depends on the cost of capital, the price of 
investment goods, the rate of change in the price of investment goods, and the tax 
structure (Jorgenson and Siebert 1968, 1130).  Under this theory, the firm chooses a 
production plan that will maximize its value.  Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) evaluated 
the effects of inflation on the level of investment, along with other determinants, 
including the cost of capital, the level of prices on investment goods, and the tax 
structure. 
Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) attempted to avoid biases that could arise from 
inappropriate homogeneity assumptions by analyzing the data using both time series 
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and cross-sectional models.
14
  Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) developed two alternative 
versions of the neoclassical model of investment.  In the first model, the rate of change 
of the price of investment goods is assumed to influence investment decisions directly.  
The second model assumes that the rate of change of the price of investment goods is 
transitory and without direct effect on investment behavior.  These two models were 
used to evaluate investment behavior for 15 large manufacturing firms from a wide 
variety of industry groups.  Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) concluded that inflation does 
have an impact on investment and should be taken into account when performing 
research, but they also supported previous research and concluded that the theory of 
corporate investment behavior based on the neoclassical theory of optimal capital 
accumulation does suffice to explain corporate investment behavior. 
Coen (1968) performed research based on the accelerated depreciation 
incentives implemented in 1954, the investment tax credit of 1962, and the tax rate 
reductions provided by the Revenue Act of 1964.  This research utilized two models to 
investigate the influence of tax incentives on investments.  These models provided 
results that contradicted the earlier findings of Hall and Jorgenson.  According to the 
model developed by Coen, a reduction in the user cost of capital will produce a one-shot 
increase in the desired stock of capital (Coen 1968, 209).  Policies that produced an 
estimated $5.1 billion in tax savings in manufacturing from 1954 through mid-1962 
increased manufacturing capital expenditures by only $2.0 billion during the same 
period, and policies that produced an estimated $8.6 billion in tax savings from mid-
1962 through the third quarter of 1966 increased expenditures by only $2.8 billion 
                                                 
14
 Prior research (Kuh 1963) had shown that cross sections for successive years did not provide a stable 
explanation of investment behavior. 
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(Coen 1968, 210).  Coen (1968) concluded that the performance of the tax incentives 
has been disappointing but does admit that a decisive judgment on the effectiveness of 
tax incentives is impossible unless one is willing to accept the merits of his two 
investment models. 
Taubman and Wales (1969) studied the impact of investment tax subsidies in a 
neoclassical growth model, in particular the 1962 tax credit and the switch from 
straight-line depreciation to accelerated depreciation.  This study developed a new 
model but does incorporate the research methods used by Jorgenson and by Coen.  
Taubman and Wales (1969) concluded that although output is higher after 1962 than 
would have occurred with no tax incentives, the overall impact of these tax incentives 
falls short of their intended results. 
A study by Chisholm (1974) examines the effects of tax policy investment 
incentives on the optimal replacement decisions for farm machinery.  This study 
develops a discrete time period model for evaluating the impact of tax incentives on 
investments and then applies the model to a case study on the optimal replacement ages 
for farm tractors in Australia.  Results indicated that the removal tax policy investment 
incentives did substantially increase the optimal replacement age for farm machinery, 
providing evidence that tax policy does influence investment behavior.
15
    
Coen (1975) attempted to examine the economic impact of depreciation using a 
new approach: an indirect method that attempted to infer patterns of economic 
depreciation from the behavior of actual capital expenditures in 21 manufacturing 
industries.  Results showed that accelerated depreciation methods increased the present 
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 Chisholm (1974) did note that results indicated that changes in the time pattern of the tax-deductibility 
of depreciation will in general have only minimal influence on optimal replacement decisions. 
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values of tax depreciation relative to economic depreciation by about ten percentage 
points.  In general, Coen‟s findings indicated that tax depreciation incentives do have a 
positive impact on investment behavior.   
Brimmer and Sinai (1976) used simulations based on the 1975 Data Resources, 
Inc. (DRI) quarterly econometric model of the United States to study the effects of 
several tax proposals, including increasing the investment tax credit and instituting an 
inflation allowance for depreciation.  Each tax subsidy tested in their research raised 
business fixed investment, the stock of plant and equipment, and the production 
capacity of the economy as measured by potential gross national product (GNP).  
Results also indicated that depreciation investment incentives were superior relative to 
the investment tax credit.  Brimmer and Sinai (1976) concluded that tax reform would 
bring a significant improvement in capital formation and business liquidity, but tax 
incentives were not necessarily the most effective strategy for accomplishing these 
tasks.  Brimmer and Sinai (1976) believed “A more effective strategy could be the 
pursuit of macro-economic policies designed to raise aggregate demand and reduce the 
excessively high level of unemployment” (307).         
Parker and Zieha (1976) studied the impact of the temporary increase of the 
investment tax credit introduced by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.  They developed a 
measurement model to determine the extent to which the Act compensated for the 
recent changes in the rate of inflation experienced in the United States.  Their purpose 
was to measure the overall incentive toward capital investment provided by these tax 
provisions under various rates of inflation.  Parker and Zieha (1976) applied their 
measurement model to 572 cases representing various combinations of investment 
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credit rates, asset lives, and rates of inflation.  Results indicated that increasing the rate 
of investment credit from seven percent to ten percent was not sufficient to offset the 
penalty resulting from tax accounting on an historical cost basis, given recent inflation 
experience in the United States.  However, the results also indicated a sizeable 
difference in the benefits yielded depending on an asset‟s useful economic life. 
Rennie (1977) examined how the cost of capital influenced investment 
expenditures in privately owned class A and B electric utilities.
16
  This study adopted 
the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation developed by Hall and 
Jorgenson and researched the impact of the 1954 accelerated depreciation allowances, 
the investment tax credit of 1962, and the subsequent suspension, re-instatement, and 
repeal of the investment tax credit in 1966, 1967, and 1969 respectively.
17
  His research 
found that accelerated depreciation from 1954 resulted in a reduction of the cost of 
capital of 7.67 percent, causing a 22.4 percent increase in production plant expenditures 
from 1957 through 1969.  Rennie (1977) also determined that the 1962 investment tax 
credit reduced the rental cost of capital by 2.57 percent and increased the capital stock 
by 12.72 percent from 1965 through 1969.  This study found that the suspension of the 
investment tax credit in 1966 resulted in decreases of capital stock, the 1967 re-
instatement resulted in subsequent increases, and the repeal of 1969 resulted in 
decreased amounts.  Based on his research findings, Rennie (1977) concluded that tax-
policy incentives did indeed affect the amount and timing of fixed investments in the 
private class A and B electric utility industry. 
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 Privately owned class A and B electric utilities produced 76.4 percent of all electricity sold in the 
United States during 1969 (Rennie 1977). 
17
 Rennie‟s study also includes analysis of other tax policy issues during this period not related to this 
study. The analysis of these issues has not been incorporated in this review. 
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Coen and Hickman (1984) studied the long-run effects of tax-policy incentives 
based on simulations using the Hickman-Coen Annual Growth Model.  This model was 
designed to study U.S. economic growth for intermediate and long-run time periods, 
and analyze business investment, among other items.  This study considered four 
separate scenarios involving changes in tax policies.  Coen and Hickman (1984) 
concluded that changes in personal income taxation do not have permanent effects on 
economic activity, but that the outcome is strikingly different for a tax-policy incentive 
directly affecting business investment.  Their results indicated that depreciation 
liberalization under the 1981 tax act raised the level of long-term growth by over one 
percent and that these tax-policy incentives also foster a permanently higher level of 
productivity.   
Bosworth (1985) investigated the impact of the tax policy changes that occurred 
in 1981 and 1982 on investment expansion in the early 1980s.  Overall, investment 
spending increased during the sample period.  The increases, however, were not 
correlated with the asset categories receiving the largest tax incentives.  Results showed 
no correlation between the investment growth in certain asset categories and the relative 
tax incentives for each category.  Bosworth (1985) noted that office equipment and 
automobiles accounted for almost 93 percent of the growth in this study, but the 
legislation of 1981 and 1982 provided no changes or incentives for automobiles, and 
they actually decreased the rates on computers.  Results indicated that depreciation 
allowances can greatly increase cash flow in the short run, but have a smaller effect on 
the price of an asset over its lifetime.  Bosworth (1985, 34) stated that his results “need 
not imply that the neoclassical model of investment behavior is wrong in its focus on 
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changes in the price of capital”.  Overall, Bosworth (1985) believed that the tax system 
has become so complex that tax policy incentives intended to promote certain activities 
may result in far different outcomes in practice. 
Chirinko (1986) examined the relationship between tax policy and business 
investment using four different classes of investment models included in previous 
research.  Chirinko reviews the theory, key assumptions, and empirical results generated 
by these four classes of investment models.  He stated that prior research has shown a 
significant relationship between tax policy and investment behavior, but he believed 
these results to be based on assumptions that arguably led to upward biases.  Chirinko 
(1986) concluded that investment behavior may respond to tax policy incentives, but 
that significant supporting empirical evidence has yet to be generated. 
Shapiro (1986) studied the impact of the cost of capital within the framework of 
the neoclassical theory of investment.  This study uses U.S. private business firm-level 
data for the period 1955 to 1983.  Shapiro (1986) concluded that investment and the 
cost of capital are either uncorrelated or only weakly correlated, but that investment and 
output are strongly correlated.  His observation that investment and output are strongly 
correlated while the cost of capital has little correlation with investment weighs against 
the neoclassical model.  Other researchers in this area, however, have noted that 
correlation is not causation, and that weak correlation does not imply that changes in 
taxation have no effect on investment.  Olivier Blanchard commented that the weak 
correlation could have stemmed from “omitted variable bias” between user cost and an 
omitted productivity variable that makes the correlation appear insignificant (Shapiro 
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1986, 155).  Blanchard also explained how the small correlation could result from other 
factors, such as the small variance in user cost. 
Halvorsen (1991) researched the effects of tax policy on investment in 
agriculture.  This study uses aggregated annual time-series data covering 1955 through 
1978.  The effects of tax policy on agricultural investment during the sample period are 
investigated by simulating demand equations for equipment and structures using actual 
rental prices as well as the rental prices that would have existed under three alternative 
tax policy scenarios (Halvorsen 1991).  Halvorsen (1991) concluded that tax policy 
incentives over the sample period did increase agricultural spending on equipment and 
structures, giving support to the impact of tax incentives.   
Auerbach and Hassett (1992) derived and estimated models of investment 
behavior and studied how tax policy investment incentives impacted this behavior.  
Their estimates suggested that tax policy incentives that lower the user cost of capital 
have played an important role in investment behavior, particularly for investment in 
machinery and equipment.  Auerbach and Hassett (1992) concluded that tax policy 
changes affect the level and pattern of investment significantly, although their impact 
has not always been a stabilizing factor.  They believed that further work was needed to 
explore the various impacts that tax policies could have on investment behavior before 
any definitive conclusions could be drawn.  
Cummins and Hassett (1992) analyzed disaggregated firm-level investments 
impacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the 
investment tax credit and generally extended depreciation lifetimes, both of which could 
potentially impact capital investments.  Cummins and Hassett (1992) found strong 
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evidence of the impact of tax policy on investment and concluded that there is a 
significant relationship between the cost of capital and equipment investment.  They 
also concluded that there was a strong relationship between the cost of capital and 
structures investment.  
Davis and Swenson (1993) studied the impact of tax incentives on the demand 
for capital investments by developing controlled laboratory markets.  Prior research, 
such as Chirinko (1986), had noted the difficulties in this area of econometric research 
caused by the numerous estimations needed, including (1) purchase cost of a unit of 
capital, (2) financial cost of capital, net of inflation, (3) rate of depreciation, (4) rate of 
income taxation, (5) rate of investment credit, (6) net cost of debt finance, and 
numerous other estimations.  According to Davis and Swanson (1993), the difficulties 
in calculating proper estimates for these variables highlight the general limitations of 
econometrics in certain settings.  They chose, therefore, to create a laboratory model to 
eliminate these restrictions.  The results of their experiments did not support the 
neoclassical prediction that depreciable asset investment will increase in response to tax 
policy incentives, such as accelerated depreciation or investment tax credits.
18
  The 
experimental results indicated that the demand for investment was unresponsive to tax 
incentives because equipment suppliers captured the tax benefits for themselves by 
increasing the prices of the depreciable assets.  
Clark (1993) examined the effects of tax incentives on aggregate investment 
behavior and focused exclusively on investment in durable equipment.  Clark believed 
that the long-run attitude of investors would be better served by a stable policy, rather 
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 Davis and Swenson (1993) note that their results provide no evidence regarding real-world dollar 
responses to investment, but provide insight into the theory of investment behavior nevertheless. 
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than by ever changing tax-policy incentives.  Clarke (1993) concluded that the 
investment tax credit was not appropriate for short-run fine tuning of fiscal policy.  
Clark‟s evidence indicated that changes in the investment tax credit had only minimal 
and delayed effects on equipment investment and that an investment tax credit is 
unlikely to have socially beneficial effects.   
A study by Wasylenko (1997) analyzed the state of the literature concerning the 
role of taxation on economic development.  Wasylenko (1997) noted that policymakers 
believed that tax incentives influenced economic behavior, and historical evidence had 
shown that government tax policy often included incentives intended to foster growth.  
However, researchers have struggled over the past 20 years to determine the extent to 
which tax policy incentives influence the level and distribution of employment and 
investment, particularly in state and local regions.  The majority of studies relating 
economic development to tax policy can be said to use ad hoc empirical specifications, 
so, at best, these studies demonstrated statistical association rather than showing the true 
nature of the relationship between tax policy and economic development (Wasylenko 
1997).    Wasylenko (1997) believed that the results from previous research in this area 
were driven by variations in the data, changing time periods, as well as other factors.  
Wasylenko (1997) concluded the results were not very reliable and changed depending 
on the variables included in the model and/or the time period analyzed.  
Goolsbee (1998) examined the estimated response of real investment to changes 
in the cost of capital created by tax policy incentives.  His findings indicated that much 
of the benefit of investment tax incentives does not go to investing firms but rather to 
capital suppliers. According to Goolsbee (1998), a ten percent investment tax credit 
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increases equipment prices 3.5-7.0 percent, so a large part of the subsidy's reduction in 
the effective purchase price of equipment for investing firms is simply lost to the capital 
suppliers.  Goolsbee (1998) stated, “Only about 60 percent of investment subsidies go 
to the buyers, with the remaining 40 percent going to capital suppliers” (138).  Overall, 
results indicated that investment spending was responsive to investment tax policy, but 
in the short run, the increased demand for investment mainly increased capital goods 
prices rather than quantities.  Goolsbee (1998) claimed these results indicated that 
investment tax subsidies might provide largely unintended benefits for capital suppliers.                                     
A study by Hassett and Hubbard (1998) examined whether investment tax 
incentives were blunted by changes in prices of capital goods.  This study explored this 
topic by estimating the extent to which industrialized countries are price takers in the 
world market for capital goods.  Results from the study indicated that most countries, 
including the United States, face a highly elastic supply of capital goods, suggesting 
that the effect of investment incentives on the price of investment goods is small.  
Therefore, tax policy investment incentives were likely to result in real investment 
rather than simply being dissipated in changes in capital-goods prices. 
A later study by Goolsbee (2000) examined the potential bias arising from 
measurement error in the cost of capital and the impact this bias could create when 
studying the impact of investment incentives.  Using panel data on different types of 
capital equipment and the econometric methods of Griliches and Hausman (1986), 
Goolsbee (2000) tested for the presence of measurement error in the tax term and 
calculated the implied size of such an error, and he examined how important the 
measurement error is for conventional estimates of investment.  Findings provided 
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direct evidence of measurement error in the tax component of the cost of capital 
accounting for about 20 percent of the tax term's variance.   After correcting for the 
error, Goolsbee (2000) concluded that taxes significantly affect both prices and 
investment and that conventional results may be off by as much as a factor of four. 
Cohen et al. (2002) examined the effects of the bonus depreciation incentives 
provided in the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002.  This study utilized 
the results derived from prior research, such as Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and 
Auerbach and Hassett (1992), to evaluate the impact of the law on the marginal cost of 
equipment investment and whether the temporary nature of the incentive increased or 
decreased the stimulus associated with the tax reduction.  Results indicated these tax-
policy provisions significantly increase the incentive to invest in equipment.
19
  Cohen et 
al. (2002) also found that the temporary nature of the incentives provided more 
immediate stimulus than a permanent tax cut would have for base case parameters, but 
they stated that this conclusion was not theoretically robust.  
A study by Desai and Goolsbee (2004) examined the related issues of capital 
overhang and taxes using data at the industry, the asset, and especially the firm level.  
More specifically, they studied whether over-investment in the 1990s caused the low 
investment of the 2000s and whether investment spending in the 2000s became less 
sensitive to prices.  They hoped to determine why the tax-policy incentives provided in 
2002 and 2003 seemed to have been ineffective in restoring investment to normal 
levels.  Desai and Goolsbee (2004) found little correlation between the investment 
boom of the 1990s and the investment declines of the 2000s, and they found evidence of 
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 Cohen et al. modeled these tax incentives as a complete surprise, but noted that many firms may well 
have anticipated them in advance, which would have likely restrained investment prior to enactment. 
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small investment increases in various industries.
20
  Desai and Goolsbee (2004) 
concluded that these minimal increases were not evidence that tax-policy incentives 
were ineffective.  Rather, the short-run effect of the incentives was simply too small to 
counteract the double-digit declines that occurred in the 2000s. 
Goolsbee (2004) studied the impact that tax policy investment incentives can 
have on the quality composition of capital goods that firms purchase.  Detailed data on 
farming, mining, and construction machinery suggested that this impact is economically 
important.  Goolsbee (2004) concluded that increased capital investment spending 
generated by tax policy investment incentives appeared to be driven by firms shifting to 
higher quality capital goods rather than buying larger numbers of existing capital 
vintages, allowing suppliers to reap some of the gain through higher prices from tax 
benefits intended to increase output.  Goolsbee (2004) even goes as far as stating that 
“all” of the increase in investment from tax subsidies comes from an upgrade to higher 
quality purchases and not from quantity increases (521).  In addition, Goolsbee (2004) 
believed that this quality response was specifically tied to tax policy because increases 
in investments for other purposes did not generate the same effect. 
A study by Miller et al. (2008) researched the impact of the bonus depreciation 
incentives of 2002 and 2003 on capital expenditures in the general aviation market, 
which includes all aviation other than commercial and military aircraft.  This study 
attempted to quantify the impact of bonus depreciation incentives on the manufacture 
and delivery of general aviation aircraft in the United States.  This research was 
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 In the comments section of this paper reviewer Kevin Hassett states, “the authors have favored some 
extreme assumptions that are not supported by their empirical work, all aligned in a manner to make the 
tax cuts seem ineffective. A more balanced assessment of the recent impact of the tax reforms would 
certainly be more favorable” (Desai and Goolsbee 2004, 339). 
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performed using sample data from the general aviation industry, provided by GAMA 
(an international trade association representing 56 of the world‟s leading aircraft 
manufacturers), covering 1987 through 2005.  Results from Miller et al. (2008) revealed 
that bonus depreciation incentives did not have a statistically significant impact on the 
shipment of general aviation aircraft in the United States.  The results, however, 
indicated that the bonus depreciation incentives contributed to a significant shift in the 
sales mix of general aviation aircraft manufactured from piston to turbine aircraft.  
Basically, the bonus depreciation incentives did not significantly increase the number of 
aircraft purchased, but the incentives did cause investors to purchase more expensive, 
higher quality aircraft.   
House and Shapiro (2008) studied the effects of temporary investment tax 
incentives using a model to determine the impact of investment subsidies, specifically 
examining the bonus depreciation allowances included in the 2002 and 2003 tax bills.  
This study used quarterly data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) covering 
1959 through 2006.  House and Shapiro (2008) found that temporary investment tax 
incentives did alter the timing of investment decisions, and they concluded that bonus 
depreciation incentives passed in 2002 and then increased in 2003 had a powerful 
impact on the composition of investment.  Capital that benefited substantially from the 
tax policy saw sharp increases in investment, with no evidence that market prices 
increased due to the policy.  The general results held for only the specific circumstance 
of a sufficiently temporary change in the cost of purchasing capital goods; however 
calculations showed that even changes in tax policy that last for several years can be 
safely modeled as temporary.  
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Hulse and Livingstone (2010) examined the effect on capital expenditures of 
bonus depreciation tax incentives that were enacted as part of the 2002 and 2003 Tax 
Acts.  This study used quarterly firm-level data covering 1990 through 2006.  After 
controlling for many previously documented determinants of capital expenditures, 
results indicated that capital expenditures during bonus depreciation‟s availability were 
greater than those during the time it was not available.  However, Hulse and 
Livingstone (2010) noted that other results indicated that bonus depreciation had an 
insignificant effect on capital expenditures, and these mixed findings persisted through 
several sensitivity analyses.  Overall, Hulse and Livingstone (2010) interpreted their 
results as weakly supportive evidence that Congress attained its goal of stimulating 
capital spending.   
 
Conclusion 
The research studies covered in this literature review analyzed the impact of tax 
policy incentives on capital spending utilizing various techniques.  The majority of prior 
empirical studies in this area has been based on firm-level data and tested using some 
form of econometric model or regression equation.  However, there have been a few 
studies that used other methods, such as controlled laboratory experiments and case 
studies.  The overall results, while still inconclusive, tend to show that tax policy 
incentives do have a positive impact on capital spending and economic growth.  Tax 
policymakers continue to use investment incentives to spur capital spending and foster 
economic growth, regardless of the lack of conclusive evidence about their 
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effectiveness.  The following table summarizes the empirical research findings covered 
in this literature review. 
 
Table 2.2 – Prior Studies on the Impact of Tax Policy on Capital Investments 
 
Study Conclusion 
Hall and Jorgenson 1967 Tax policy is highly effective in changing the level 
and timing of investment expenditures and tax 
policy has had important effects on the composition 
of investment expenditures. 
Jorgenson and Siebert 1968 Inflation does have an impact on investment and 
should be taken into account when performing 
research, but also concluded that the theory of 
corporate investment behavior based on the 
neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation 
does suffice to explain corporate investment 
behavior. 
Coen 1968 Tax policy incentives had been disappointing and 
resulted in only minimal increases in investment of 
capital expenditures. 
Taubman and Wales 1969 Tax policy incentive output is higher in the new 
state than would have occurred with no tax 
incentives, however the overall impact of these tax 
incentives falls short of their intended results. 
Chisholm 1974 Tax policy incentives did substantially change the 
optimal replacement age for farm machinery, 
providing evidence that tax policy does influence 
investment behavior. 
Coen 1975 Accelerated depreciation methods increased the 
present values of tax depreciation relative to 
economic depreciation by about ten percentage 
points, indicating that tax depreciation incentives 
do have an impact on investment behavior. 
Brimmer and Sinai 1976 Tax reform would bring a significant improvement 
in capital formation and business liquidity; however 
tax incentives are not necessarily the most effective 
strategy to use to accomplish these tasks. 
Parker and Zieha 1976 Increasing the rate of investment credit from 7 
percent to 10 percent was not sufficient to offset the 
penalty resulting from tax accounting on the 
historical cost basis, given recent inflation 
experience in the United States. 
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Table 2.2 – Continued 
Rennie 1977 Tax policy incentives did indeed affect the amount 
and timing of fixed investments in the private class 
A and B electric utility industry. 
Coen and Hickman 1984 Depreciation liberalization under the 1981 tax act 
raised the level of long-term growth by over one 
percent and these tax policy incentives foster a 
higher growth rate and a permanently higher level 
of productivity. 
Bosworth 1985 The tax system has become so complex that tax 
policy incentives intended to promote certain 
activities may result in far different outcomes in 
practice. 
Chirinko 1986 Investment behavior may respond to tax policy 
incentives, but significant supporting empirical 
evidence has yet to be generated. 
Shapiro 1986 Investment and the cost of capital are either 
uncorrelated or only weakly correlated, but 
investment and output are strongly correlated. 
Halvorsen 1991 Tax policy incentives over the sample period did 
increase agricultural spending on equipment and 
structures, giving support to the impact of tax 
incentives. 
Auerbach and Hassett 1992 Tax policy changes have played a significant role in 
affecting the level and pattern of investment, 
although this impact on investments has not always 
been a stabilizing factor. 
Cummins and Hassett 1992 Tax policy has a strong impact on investment and 
there is a significant relationship between the cost 
of capital and equipment investment; also that there 
is a strong relationship between the cost of capital 
and structures investment.  
Davis and Swenson 1993 Tax policy incentives are not effective; their results 
indicated that demand for investment was 
unresponsive to tax incentives because equipment 
suppliers captured the tax benefits for themselves 
by increasing the prices for the depreciable assets. 
Clark 1993 Changes in the investment tax credit have had only 
minimal and delayed effects on equipment 
investment and an investment tax credit is unlikely 
to have socially beneficial effects. 
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Table 2.2 – Continued 
Wasylenko 1997 Prior studies in this area demonstrated statistical 
association rather than showing the true nature of 
the relationship between tax policy and economic 
development and that the results from previous 
research studies were not very reliable and were 
driven by variations in the data, changing time 
periods, and other factors. 
Goolsbee 1998 Investment spending is responsive to investment 
tax policy, but in the short run the increased 
demand for investment mainly increases capital 
goods prices rather than quantities.   
Hassett and Hubbard 1998 Tax policy investment incentives are likely to result 
in real investment rather than simply being 
dissipated in changes in capital-goods prices. 
Goolsbee 2000 After correcting for the measurement error in cost 
of capital, tax policies significantly affect both 
prices and investment. 
Cohen et al. 2002 Tax policy provisions significantly increase the 
incentive to invest in equipment and the temporary 
nature of the incentives provided more immediate 
stimulus than a permanent tax cut. 
Desai and Goolsbee 2004 Tax policy incentives created small investment 
increases in various industries, however the short-
run effect of the incentives was simply too small to 
counteract the double-digit declines that occurred in 
the 2000s 
Goolsbee 2004 Increased capital investment spending generated by 
tax policy investment incentives appeared to be 
driven by firms shifting to higher quality capital 
goods rather than buying a larger number of their 
existing capital types. 
Miller et al. 2008 Bonus depreciation incentives did not have a 
statistically significant impact on the shipment of 
general aviation aircraft in the United States; 
however, the results indicated that the bonus 
depreciation incentives did contribute to a 
significant shift in the sales mix of general aviation 
aircraft from piston to turbine aircraft. 
House and Shapiro 2008 Temporary investment tax incentives do alter the 
timing of investment decisions and bonus 
depreciation incentives passed in 2002 and then 
increased in 2003 had a powerful impact on the 
composition of investment. 
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Table 2.2 – Continued 
Hulse and Livingstone 2010 Capital expenditures during bonus depreciation‟s 
availability were greater than those during the time 
it was not available.  Results are considered weakly 
supportive evidence that Congress attained its goal 
of stimulating capital spending. 
 
 
 
Significant Variables in the Tax Incentive and Capital Investment Relationship 
 The literature concerning the effectiveness of tax investment incentives is 
extensive, and the majority of empirical research performed on the topic has been based 
at the industry level, the firm level, or the asset level.  In general, counties are the 
smallest geographical regions for which significant amounts of data are available, and 
to date very little, if any, empirical research has been performed on the effectiveness of 
tax investment incentives using real-world economic data at the county level.  The Gulf 
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 provides an opportunity to research the effectiveness of 
tax policy incentives on capital investment and economic growth at a more micro level.  
The research studies in the following paragraphs examined economic growth and/or 
capital investments and were based at the regional or county level.  These research 
studies will provide the foundation for selecting variables at the county level used to 
measure economic growth in this dissertation. 
 A study by Chang (1979) used the closing of Brookley Air Force Base in 
Mobile, Alabama, as a unique opportunity for testing the feasibility of developing a 
small area econometric forecasting model.  The econometric forecasting model 
developed by Chang (1979) was a simultaneous equation system that included 
numerous variables, such as: lagged manufacturing investment, output by the 
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manufacturing sector, output by the construction sector, employment, population, wage 
income, personal income, retail sales, and a time variable, just to name a few.
21
  Chang 
extracted many of the variables used in his research from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis‟ Regional Economic Information System (REIS).  The econometric 
forecasting model developed by Chang proved to be quite accurate in predicting local 
variables such as population, total employment, and personal income.  The forecasting 
model developed by Chang became the basis for long-run revenue and growth 
forecasting and other financial plans for the City of Mobile. 
 Carlino and Mills (1987) explored the determinants of population and 
employment densities by analyzing data from the 1970s, using numerous variables, 
covering more than 3,000 counties across the United States.  This study analyzed the 
change in total population density, total employment density, and manufacturing 
employment density, along with other variables, including taxes per capita, median 
family income, median education levels, and interstate highway density to determine 
factors contributing to economic growth.  Carlino and Mills (1987) mentioned that they 
would have liked to include variables concerning local amenities, such as natural and 
recreational resources, but the data were not available at the county level. 
 According to Wasylenko (1997), the most common measures of economic 
development and growth are income, employment, investment, plant expansions, plant 
relocations and plant “births”.  He noted that studies done before 1980 generally used 
aggregate employment or employment growth data and analyzed a single period of 
cross-sectional observations, showing the importance that policymakers attach to jobs 
and job growth in their states or local regions.  Income levels, income growth, and 
                                                 
21
 A complete list of variables used by Chang (1979) is available on page 439 of his research paper. 
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investment measures have been used less frequently in studies of state and local 
economic development, but personal income is not necessarily a good measure of 
economic activity at the local level because this information can include income from 
other sources produced outside the region (Wasylenko 1997).  Wasylenko believed that 
wage or salary data could be used as a measure of location-specific economic activity, 
and he also noted that investment data were difficult to obtain for local regions.  
Wasylenko (1997) also noted that other control variables typically were included in 
research studies, such as taxes, public expenditure variables, and environmental factors, 
along with indicators of market size, such as population and per capita income, which 
were generally included to represent local demand.  
 Wheeler (2001) studied how growth disseminates geographically by examining 
the correlation structure of rates of growth in county-level economic activity.  He 
estimated growth rates at the county level over a period of time covering 1984 to 1994 
using four different measures: population, employment, income, and earnings.  He 
extracted the variables for his research from the Bureau of Economic Analysis‟s 
Regional Economic Information System (REIS).  Changes in total earnings and 
employment are place-of-work measures, whereas changes in total personal income and 
population are place-of-residence measures.  Wheeler (2001) focused his research at the 
county level for numerous reasons, including: counties are relatively small, they form a 
geographic partition of the country, and they offer a useful unit of analysis when 
examining geographic patterns of growth in the United States.  Results from the 
Wheeler (2001) study indicated that there seemed to be systematic variation in a 
county‟s growth rate with respect to its population size; stating that large counties grow 
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more slowly on average.    
 In an attempt to describe a more comprehensive regional economic growth 
model, Monchuk et al. (2007) examined some of the forces that underlie economic 
growth at the county level.  This study examined economic growth in the Midwest from 
1990 to 2001 in a cross-section of 787 counties in Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Iowa, 
Missouri, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.  Researchers make note 
of other popular measures of economic growth at the county level, including population, 
employment, and per capita income growth.  These researchers considered a large 
number of growth-related variables in the specification of their model.  Empirical 
estimation results indicated that amenities, state and local tax burdens, population 
density, amount of primary agriculture activity, and demographics have important 
impacts on economic growth (Monchuk et al. 2007). 
Carruthers and Mulligan (2008) examined the process of growth and change 
within American metropolitan areas by estimating a series of regional adjustment 
models.  According to the researchers, regional development and growth happens in two 
interconnected ways: via demand-induced growth, which is driven by economic 
opportunity, and by supply-induced growth, which is driven by personal preference.  
Demand-induced growth occurs when firms require additional labor, causing a greater 
demand for workers.  Supply-induced growth occurs when people move from one place 
to another for reasons that do not have anything to do with employment, causing an 
increase in the supply of labor.  The traditional two-equation regional adjustment model 
examines population and employment changes over time.  Carruthers and Mulligan 
(2008) expanded the traditional two-equation framework by adding a third variable, 
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average annual wage, to the system.  Their research examined the rate of change over 
time for population density, employment density, and average annual wage to measure 
economic growth.  The empirical models developed in this study were tested with data 
for 831 counties representing 329 metropolitan areas over a period covering 1982 
through 1997.  Results were significant, and the explanatory power of the models was 
consistent with other regional adjustment models.   
 Deller (2008) examined regional economic growth that is focused on available 
amenities.  This research relied, in part, on the National Outdoor Recreation Supply 
Information System (NORSIS) dataset developed and maintained by the USDA Forest 
Service‟s Southern Research Station.  As a result of the 1998 Resource Planning Act, 
the Forest Service maintains an extensive county-level dataset documenting facilities 
and resources that support outdoor recreation activities. This dataset contains over 300 
separate variables ranging from population density, the proportion of county acres in 
each of cropland, forest, pasture/range-land, mountains and water surface, employment 
and income levels in recreational industries, and the number of public libraries (Deller 
2008).  Among numerous amenity measures used by Deller (2008) to research growth 
rates at the county level, he included the following historical measures of economic 
growth as variables: per capita income, employment, population, unemployment rate, 
education, local taxes, and percentage of population employed by state and local 
government.    
 Numerous other studies have been performed that examined economic growth 
regionally.  Goss and Phillips (1994) examined economic growth at the state level and 
used employment growth over time as a proxy to measure economic growth.  Steinnes 
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and Fisher (1974) estimated a model of intra-urban location and used numerous 
variables in their model including the following: manufacturing employment, non-
manufacturing employment, median income, race, college faculty, property tax rate, and 
other factors.  Helms (1985) examined the effects of state and local taxes on economic 
growth and included variables such as population density, education, highways, wages, 
and multiple types of taxes in his research.  Courant (1994) urged researchers to “don‟t 
just count jobs” when measuring economic development and that variables such as 
average growth rate of state product, employment growth, changes in per capita income, 
value of business building permits, and other factors should be considered when 
explaining economic growth.  Peavy (2007) analyzed regional employment and 
concluded, among other items, that the percentage of the civilian labor force in a county 
that is white has a positive and significant effect on both manufacturing and total 
employment.   
Steinnes (1984) examined regional economic development using many of the 
previously mentioned variables and concluded that the use of pooled time series-cross-
sectional data with a lagged dependent variable provides more accurate results when 
compared with research that examined only cross-sectional data for one time period.  
Bartik (1994) noted that success in one area could cause negative results in other areas, 
explaining that job growth in one local area will, in part (not necessarily totally), come 
at the expense of reduced job growth in other local areas.  Liard-Muriente (2007) also 
noted that regional development policies could be described as a zero-sum game, with 
local job reshuffling as the outcome.  After all, if one area accomplishes growth, it may 
be at the expense of another area.  Therefore, when examining economic growth, 
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researchers should consider the impact of surrounding regions.       
 
Criterion Variables 
 Research question 1 addresses the impact of tax policy investment incentives at 
the regional level and whether these incentives promote economic growth.  Based on 
the relevant literature, research question 1 will be analyzed with the following 
dependent variables at the county level: annual industry earnings, manufacturing 
industry earnings, construction industry earnings, per capita income, personal income, 
average wages per job, median household income, total employment for all industries, 
total manufacturing employment, total construction employment, housing unit 
estimates, and the number of building permits issued annually.  Each dependent variable 
will be analyzed individually with mixed effects modeling procedures for the GO Zone 
timeframe (2006-2008) and for the three-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina 
(2002-2004); 2005 will not be included in either combined sample due to the fact that it 
overlaps both groups.  Annual changes for each dependent variable covering 2003 
through 2008 will be calculated and subsequent statistical procedures will be performed 
on these values.  The year over year changes for each dependent variable will be 
analyzed individually with OLS regression procedures on an annual basis for the period 
covering 2003 through 2008 and will also be analyzed individually for the GO Zone 
timeframe (2006-2008) and for the two-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2003-
2004); 2005 will not be included in either combined sample due to the fact that it 
overlaps both groups.  The independent variable used for research question 1 will be a 
dichotomous variable created for GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties in the sample.  
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This research does not analyze all potential variables that have been used by prior 
empirical studies to evaluate economic growth, but the selected variables should 
provide more than sufficient evidence to determine whether or not the regional tax 
incentives provided by the GO Zone Act have impacted the affected region.     
Research question 2 addresses whether tax policy investment incentives at the 
regional level are a zero-sum game, where economic growth created by incentives are at 
the expense of the surrounding regions.  Research question 2 will be analyzed with 
many of the same economic indicators implemented in research question 1, except that 
research question 2 will examine the percentage change in each of these variables 
individually at the county level and attempt to determine if any increases in the affected 
core disaster area are offset by decreases in the surrounding counties.  In addition, 
research question 2 will be analyzed with binary logistic regression utilizing many of 
the variables simultaneously to determine if statistically significant differences exist 
between GO Zone counties and non-GO Zone counties. 
 
 
Control Variables 
After a natural disaster strikes, the governor of the affected state makes a request 
to the president for disaster assistance.  The president must then decide whether to 
declare the state or region a disaster area.  If the president issues a disaster declaration 
under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 
Act (the Stafford Act), disaster assistance is then administered through various federal 
programs.  Only after the president has declared a disaster can the government give 
disaster assistance.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) determines 
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the level of relief funding for specific areas, but Congress determines further 
appropriations in cases requiring large amounts of funding beyond FEMA‟s allocated 
budget (Garrett and Sobel 2003).  
In response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, Congress provided about $130 
billion in disaster recovery assistance, including about $19.7 billion in Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds for assistance in rebuilding permanent 
housing (GAO 2010).  The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
provided Louisiana and Mississippi, the two states most affected, with the majority of 
these supplemental CDBG funds, which were to be used in part for housing recovery 
(GAO 2010).  The Louisiana Road Home Homeowner Program was designed to 
provide a one-time compensation grant payment, up to a maximum of $150,000, to 
eligible homeowners whose primary residence was damaged by the 2005 Gulf Coast 
hurricanes and who wished to (1) repair or rebuild their home, (2) purchase another 
home in Louisiana, or (3) sell their home and relocate outside of the state (GAO 2010, 
52).  After the 2005 hurricanes, Congress made $13.4 billion available to Louisiana for 
disaster recovery, of which Louisiana allocated $11.5 billion to the Road Home 
Homeowner Program (GAO 2010).   
The Mississippi Homeowner Assistance Program was designed to provide a 
one-time grant payment, up to a maximum of $150,000, to eligible homeowners who 
lived outside of the flood plain and suffered flood damage to their primary residence as 
a result of Hurricane Katrina (GAO 2010, 52).  Congress made $5.5 billion available to 
Mississippi for disaster recovery, of which Mississippi allocated $1.96 billion to the 
Mississippi Homeowner Assistance Program (GAO 2010).  Mississippi‟s Homeowner 
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Assistance Program was made available to residents in the state‟s four coastal counties 
(Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, and Pearl River), while the Louisiana Road Home 
Homeowner Program provided funds in numerous parishes, including six non-GO Zone 
counties.
22
  
Therefore, when appropriate and when available, data for these grants provided 
for housing recovery will be used as an independent control variable.  The GAO (2010) 
noted, however, that the funds were not always used for their intended purpose and the 
response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita highlights the need to re-evaluate how housing 
assistance for homeowners and rental property owners is delivered after a disaster.  
Therefore, the data used as independent control variables may not have been actually 
spent as intended. 
Whether disaster assistance is always provided to the most deserving areas is a 
debatable topic.  Government officials in charge of agencies such as FEMA will cater to 
those who determine their budgetary allocations, rather than to the individuals they are 
supposed to serve (Sobel and Leeson 2006).  Politicians have the incentive to help 
themselves by distributing the money in ways that will benefit their political careers 
(Sobel and Leeson 2006).  Garrett and Sobel (2003) examined the impact of political 
influence on FEMA disaster payments and concluded that presidential and 
congressional influences affect disaster declarations and the allocation of FEMA 
disaster expenditures.  States politically important to the president have a higher rate of 
disaster declaration, and disaster expenditures are higher in states having congressional 
representation on FEMA oversight committees (Garrett and Sobel 2003).  Garrett and 
                                                 
22
 Appendix B contains information on the number of homeowner units funded and the amount of grant 
assistance awarded by state and parish/county. 
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Sobel (2003) predicted that nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated politically 
rather than by actual need.              
Congress has raised questions about how federal funds for housing recovery 
have been allocated for the repair of homeowner and rental housing units, particularly 
under programs for which states have discretion regarding the amount and types of 
assistance available to homeowners and rental property owners (GAO 2010).  However, 
the determination of the GO Zone disaster area and the allocation of disaster assistance 
is outside the scope of this research.  The purpose of the research is to assess the 
effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives at the regional level, not to investigate 
how the region was selected to receive these incentives.  This research will focus on the 
impact of the tax policy investment incentives provided by the GO Zone Act on 
numerous dependent variables, and when appropriate, federal disaster assistance 
amounts will be included as an independent control variable.  Future research could 
focus on the selection of the GO Zone core disaster area and analyze the federal disaster 
assistance payments to determine whether politics or actual need provided the most 
significant influence on the selection process.       
Commercial casinos are significant contributors to the nation‟s economy, with 
gross gaming revenues totaling more than $32.5 billion in 2008 (AGA 2010).  Casinos 
are particularly vital to the states where they operate, creating jobs, providing business 
opportunities for local vendors and suppliers, and generating tax revenues.  In 2008, the 
commercial casino industry employed more than 375,000 people earning more than $13 
billion in total wages, which represented more direct employees than the United States 
automobile industry, software manufacturers or wireless phone carriers (AGA 2010).   
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The casino industry in Mississippi represents the third largest commercial casino market 
in the United States, behind only Las Vegas and Atlantic City, and the Louisiana 
commercial casino market is significant as well (Walker and Jackson 2008).     
Walker and Jackson (2008) examined the impact of the casino industry on 
economic growth after Hurricane Katrina.  They had previously published studies 
measuring the impact of the casino industry on economic growth, based on per capita 
income at the state level, with conflicting results.  In their 1998 study, which covered a 
sample period of 1991 to 1996, they found statistically significant evidence that casinos 
spurred economic growth.  In a 2007 study, covering 1991 to 2005, they found no 
significant effects at the state level.  Walker and Jackson (2008) interpreted these 
contradictory results as showing that casinos may have a short-run economic stimulus 
effect on a state‟s economy, but in the longer-run, these effects decrease.  In their initial 
study of Katrina, based solely on Louisiana and Mississippi, Walker and Jackson found 
evidence that the casino industry had a significantly positive impact on the states‟ 
economies.  In their more recent study, Walker and Jackson (2008) developed a model 
consisting of four states damaged by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, two with casinos 
(Louisiana and Mississippi), as well as two states (Texas and Alabama) without 
commercial casinos.  Based on their research findings, Walker and Jackson (2008) 
concluded that the commercial casino industry has had a significantly positive impact 
on state-level personal income in the hurricane-affected states of Louisiana and 
Mississippi.  Although previous analysis had used per capita income as the variable 
measuring economic growth, Walker and Jackson (2008) instead used personal income 
because they felt that the significant migration caused by Hurricane Katrina would 
64 
 
affect per capita income measures.  Based on these results, a dummy variable 
controlling for the location of casinos by county or parish will be created and used as an 
independent control variable when applicable.   
According to information obtained from the Mississippi Gaming Commission, 
Mississippi has commercial casino operations, excluding Native American casinos, 
located in seven different counties.  Appendix C contains a list of casinos operating in 
Mississippi.  According to the Louisiana Gaming Control Board, Louisiana has land-
based or riverboat casino operations, excluding Native American casinos, located in 
seven different parishes.  Parishes that contained only racetrack operations or video 
poker facilities were not included in the creation of the control variable used in this 
research.  Appendix D contains a list of casinos operating in Louisiana.  Alabama does 
not house any commercial casino operations, excluding Native American casinos. 
Based on the relevant literature, additional control variables will be included in 
the analysis, such as population density, federal government expenditures, 
unemployment rate, and race.  Population density will be calculated by dividing total 
population by total square miles for each county.  Federal government expenditures 
encompass the total dollar amount of federal government expenditures by county.  The 
unemployment control variable is comprised of the civilian labor force unemployment 
rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The race control variable represents the 
percentage of the resident population that is white for each county.  In addition, control 
variables for county, state, and time period will also be included in the analysis. 
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Measuring Lagged Data   
The GO Zone tax policy investment incentives primarily cover the time period 
of 2006 through 2008.  Some researchers believe there is inefficiency associated with 
the use of tax policy investment incentives that impact only short-term investment 
decisions.  Clark (1993) claims that tax stimulus incentives are poor instruments for 
fine-tuning investment demand over the business cycle due to the delays in the market 
response.  Chirinko (1986) noted that it takes time before the decision to invest is made 
and the delivery is complete and explained the existing lag caused by this time delay 
between delivery and useful incorporation into the production process.  Nordhaus felt 
that the delayed reaction to tax stimulus was very important and had the following 
comment concerning Shapiro‟s (1986) work: “one of the important messages of 
Shapiro‟s paper is that previous studies may have missed the significant effect of capital 
prices on investment decisions in large part because they did not allow for sufficient 
lags” (162).23   
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) recommended tax incentive lags of two years for 
manufacturing industries and about 1.3 years for non-manufacturing industries.  Rennie 
(1977) noted a lag of three years in the electric utility industry.  The data utilized in this 
research encompasses 2002 through 2008.  However, the period impacted by the GO 
Zone investment incentives covers only late 2005 through 2008.  Therefore, based on 
previous empirical studies, one would expect the investment incentives provided by the 
GO Zone Act to provide their greatest benefit during 2007 and 2008.  Any additional 
limitations will be noted as discovered. 
                                                 
23
 From the Comments and Discussion section of Shapiro‟s (1986) research.   
66 
 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Congress has used tax incentives such as bonus depreciation, larger expense 
allowances, and investment tax credits for more than 50 years to increase business 
spending and stimulate economic growth.  Frequent use over the past 50 years suggests 
that Congress believes that tax incentives are an effective tool for achieving these goals.  
The theory behind the use of tax incentives is that by providing businesses with 
accelerated tax deductions and other investment tax credits, the cost of capital needed to 
purchase new plant and equipment is reduced through the time value of money.  A U.S. 
House Committee relied on this theory when implementing the Job Creation and 
Worker Assistance Act of 2002 and the Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003.  
The committee felt that bonus depreciation incentives would stimulate equipment 
purchases and foster economic recovery by increasing employment and expanding 
business opportunities (U.S. Congress 2003).   
Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, and was 
the worst natural disaster in our nation‟s history in terms of geographic scope, the 
severity of its destruction, and the number of persons displaced from their homes (GAO 
2010, 1).  Katrina was by far the most economically costly hurricane to strike the 
United States, with estimated damages in excess of $200 billion (Congleton 2006).  In 
addition, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, all of which made landfall during a six-
week period, were three of the costliest hurricanes in the history of the United States 
based on insured losses, with Katrina being the costliest ($38.1 billion estimated insured 
loss), Wilma the third costliest ($8.4 billion) and Rita the seventh costliest ($5 billion) 
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(Rothman and Altieri 2006).  The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 provided tax 
incentives for businesses and individuals to encourage rebuilding, rehabilitation, and 
investment in these hurricane stricken areas.   
Despite the continued use of tax investment incentives by policy-makers, 
empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of tax incentives is inconclusive.  To 
date, however, very little empirical research has been performed on the impact of tax 
policy investment incentives at the regional level.  Although Congress has implemented 
multiple tax policy investment incentives in the past, the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 
2005 provided incentives separately from other provisions to a specific region of the 
United States and for a specific period of time.  As a result, this research can evaluate 
the effectiveness of tax policy incentives at the regional level and also investigate the 
economic impact these incentives may have on the surrounding regions.  This research 
evaluates the economic impact of tax policy investment incentives provided by the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 on numerous economic indicators in the GO Zone and 
whether these incentives cause negative results on the same economic indicators in 
surrounding regions.   
A panel data set has both a cross-sectional and a time-series dimension and is 
sometimes called longitudinal data.  Panel data sets are fairly easy to collect for school 
districts, cities, counties, states, and countries, and policy analysis is greatly enhanced 
by using panel data sets (Wooldridge 2009).  The key feature that distinguishes panel 
data from pooled-time-series-cross-sectional data is that panel data tracks the same 
variable for the same cross-sectional units (in this case counties) over a given period of 
time.  Having multiple observations on the same unit or subject allows one to control 
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for certain unobserved characteristics of the dependent variable, in this case counties 
and parishes.  However, having multiple observations on the same county over time 
creates certain econometric issues when analyzing panel data; primarily, one cannot 
assume that the observations are independently distributed across time, violating the 
independence assumption in OLS regression.  For this reason, different methods have 
been developed to analyze panel data. 
Two common approaches for analyzing panel data are fixed effects and random 
effects specifications.  Fixed effects modeling attempts to control for the unobserved, 
time-constant effects in the model by eliminating this value because one believes this 
effect is directly correlated with the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2009).  The 
basic fixed effects model assumes that no serial correlation exists and no correlation 
across subjects exists (Frees 2004).  A fixed effects transformation requires the 
explanatory variables to vary over time periods.  If the key explanatory variable is 
constant over time, the fixed effects approach cannot be used to estimate its effect on 
the dependent variable because time-constant variables in fixed effects models are 
perfectly collinear with subject-specific intercepts and hence are inestimable (Frees 
2004).   
The random effects transformation approach assumes that the unobserved effect 
is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, whether the explanatory variables vary 
over time or not.  The random effects approach allows for explanatory variables that are 
constant over time, and when implementing this technique as many time-constant 
controls as possible should be included among the explanatory variables (Wooldridge 
2009).  The random effects model, if consistent, yields more efficient estimators than 
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the fixed effects model, because the random effects model allows for more degrees of 
freedom compared to the fixed effects model, which, ceteris paribus, gives more 
efficient estimators (Peavy 2007).  The random effects approach can be extended to a 
linear mixed effects model to allow for variable slopes, serial correlation, and 
heteroscedasticity (Frees 2004).  The mixed effects approach allows for the model to 
contain a random-effects portion and fixed-effects portion.  The linear mixed effects 
approach is one technique that will be implemented in this research to perform data 
analysis on the actual values for each dependent variable.            
Multiple regression is the most widely used multivariate statistical analysis 
technique, primarily because of its ability to predict and explain metric variables (Hair 
et al. 2006).  Multiple regression is a statistical technique used to analyze the 
relationship between a dependent variable and a set of independent or explanatory 
variables.  The objective of multiple regression analysis is to use known independent 
variables to predict the single dependent variable analyzed by the researcher (Hair et al. 
2006).  Multiple regression techniques are the foundation for business forecasting 
models and are commonly used for the testing of economic models; however, multiple 
regression analysis is a statistical tool that should be used only when both the dependent 
and independent variables are metric (Hair et al. 2006).
24
  Panel data sets are most 
useful when controlling for time-constant unobserved features, which might be 
correlated with the explanatory variables included in the model (Wooldridge 2009).  
One method to remove the unobserved effect is to difference the data in adjacent time 
periods; then, a standard multiple regression analysis on the differences can be used to 
                                                 
24
 According to Hair et al. (2006), under certain circumstances it is possible to use nonmetric independent 
dummy variables in multiple regression.   
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analyze the data (Wooldridge 2009).  Yearly changes will be calculated for each 
dependent variable and these values will be analyzed using OLS regression procedures.  
By calculating annual changes and utilizing these values, the violation of the 
independence assumption can be avoided and standard OLS regression techniques can 
be used to analyze the data.    
The use of a non-metric dependent variable (in this case binary) makes the use 
of multiple regression unsuitable (Hair et al. 2006).  The second part of phase two of 
this research will be conducted using a binary dependent variable.  The binary nature of 
the dependent variable has properties that violate the assumptions of standard multiple 
regression: first, the error term of a discrete variable follows a binomial distribution, 
thus invalidating all statistical testing based on the assumptions of normality and, 
second, the variance of a binary variable is not constant, creating instances of 
heteroscedasticity as well (Hair et al. 2006).  In the case of a non-metric dependent 
variable (in this case GO Zone counties versus non-GO Zone counties), logistic 
regression is one technique that can be implemented to analyze the relationship between 
a dependent variable and multiple independent variables. 
Binary logistic regression is a special form of regression in which the dependent 
variable is a non-metric, dichotomous (binary) variable, and the interpretation is quite 
similar to linear regression (Hair et al. 2006).  Logistic regression is a generalized linear 
model that applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent 
variable and can be used to determine whether group membership can be predicted by 
the independent variables and which variables, if any, are significant in the prediction of 
group membership.  Logistic regression has many analogies to multiple regression: the 
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coefficients in both methods correspond to each other, the standardized coefficients in 
logistic regression correspond to beta weights in multiple regression, and there is a 
statistical measure for both techniques that summarizes the strength of the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables.  However, logistic regression, unlike 
multiple regression, does not assume that a linear relationship must exist between the 
dependent and independent variables, does not require that variables be normally 
distributed, and does not assume homoscedasticity.  In general, logistic regression 
imposes less stringent requirements than does standard multiple regression.  This 
research utilizes mixed effects modeling, binary logistic regression and multiple 
regression to identify any statistical differences between GO Zone and non-GO Zone 
counties and to analyze the impact of these variables on the affected regions.   
The research questions are analyzed with a matched sample panel data set using 
annual data from 2002 through 2008.  The data set consists of the 91 counties and 
parishes included in the GO Zone core disaster area and 91 non-GO Zone counties and 
parishes surrounding the affected region for a total sample of 182 counties.  The 91 
counties and parishes included in the GO Zone core disaster area include 49 counties in 
Mississippi, 31 parishes in Louisiana, and 11 counties in Alabama.  Mississippi is 
comprised of 82 counties, and Louisiana has 64 parishes.  The 91 non-GO Zone 
counties selected to create the matched sample for this research include the remaining 
33 non-GO Zone counties in Mississippi, the remaining 33 non-GO zone parishes in 
Louisiana, and 25 non-GO Zone counties in Alabama.  The 25 non-GO Zone Alabama 
counties were selected first based on proximity to the GO Zone core disaster area, and 
then matched on population from 2002.    
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The purpose of the research is to assess the effectiveness of tax policy 
investment incentives at the regional level and to identify statistically significant 
variables that can be utilized to predict economic growth at the county level.  
Additionally, the research examines whether these regional tax policy investment 
incentives create economic growth within policy coverage areas at the expense of the 
surrounding regions.  Specifically, this research addresses the following research 
questions: 
1) Do tax policy investment incentives promote economic 
growth and spur business investment spending at the  
regional level? 
 
2) Are regional tax policy investment incentives a zero-sum  
game, where growth in one local area comes at the  
expense of reduced growth in other local areas? 
 
The first phase of the research utilizes mixed effects modeling and multiple 
regression with a matched sample panel data set from 2002 through 2008 to determine 
whether the economic variables included in this study are significant predictors of GO 
Zone versus non-GO Zone counties.  This approach will determine whether tax policy 
investment incentives provided by the GO Zone Act created significant differences on 
key economic indicators included in this study.  Therefore, the first hypothesis, stated in 
the null form, is: 
 
H1:  The tax policy investment incentives provided by the Gulf Opportunity 
Zone Act of 2005 have no impact on economic growth in the affected region. 
 
 
The second phase of the research utilizes multiple regression and binary logistic 
regression with a matched sample panel data set using data from 2002 through 2008 to 
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determine whether tax policy investment incentives at the regional level are a zero-sum 
game.  The majority of the economic indicators evaluated in the first phase of this 
research will be evaluated individually in this phase of the research to determine if 
economic growth in GO Zone counties came at the expense of the surrounding counties.  
Therefore, the second hypothesis, stated in the null form, is: 
 
H2:  The tax policy investment incentives provided by the Gulf Opportunity 
Zone Act of 2005 have no impact on economic growth in the surrounding 
region.  
 
Research Question One 
The first research question examines the impact of tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level and asks whether these incentives promote economic 
growth.  Research question 1 will be tested with the following dependent variables at 
the county level: annual industry earnings, manufacturing industry earnings, 
construction industry earnings, per capita income, personal income, average wages per 
job, median household income, total employment for all industries, total manufacturing 
employment, total construction employment, housing unit number estimates, and the 
number of building permits issued annually.  Each dependent variable will be analyzed 
individually with mixed effects modeling procedures for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-
2008) and for the three-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2002-2004); 2005 will 
not be included in either combined sample due to the fact that it overlaps both groups.  
Annual changes for each dependent variable covering 2003 through 2008 will be 
calculated and subsequent statistical procedures will be performed on these values.  The 
year-over-year changes in each dependent variable will be analyzed individually with 
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OLS regression procedures on an annual basis for the period covering 2003 through 
2008 and will also be analyzed individually for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) 
and for the two-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2003-2004).  The year 2005 
will not be included in either combined sample due to the fact that it overlaps both 
groups.  The primary independent variable used for research question 1 will be a 
dichotomous variable created for GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties in the sample.
25
  
Population density, federal government expenditures, the unemployment rate, race, 
county, and state variables will be included as control variables in the majority of the 
regression models.  In addition, when appropriate, grant funds provided to specific 
counties for hurricane victims and commercial casinos by county/parish will also be 
used as independent variables for control purposes.
26
  The mixed effects models used in 
analyzing research question 1 are as follows: 
 
AIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2HUDt + β3CASt + β4PDEt + β5FGEt + β6UNRt + β7RACt + 
β8COUt + β9STAt + εt 
MIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
CIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2HUDt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
PCIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
                                                 
25
 Appendix A contains a listing of GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties/parishes. 
26
 Appendices B, C and D contain information for these control variables. 
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PEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
TEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
HSEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
MEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
CEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
BDPt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
MHIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
AWJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
where, for a given county/parish at a time period t: 
  
GOZ  = GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no); 
AIE  = annual industry earnings; 
MIE  = total manufacturing earnings; 
CIE  = total construction earnings; 
PCI  = per capita income; 
PEI  = personal income; 
TEI  = total employment for all industries; 
HSE  = housing unit estimates; 
MEJ  = total manufacturing employment; 
CEJ  = total construction employment; 
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BDP  = number of building permits issued annually; 
MHI  = median household income; 
AWJ  = average wages per job; 
HUD  = grant money provided to rebuild damaged housing; 
CAS  = dummy variable for casinos by county (1=yes, 0=no); 
PDE  = population density; 
FGE  = total federal government expenditures by county; 
UNR  = civilian labor force unemployment rate by county; 
RAC  = percentage of the resident population that is white; 
COU  = county identification control variable; 
STA  = state identification control variable; 
 
The OLS regression models used in analyzing research question 1 are as follows: 
 
AIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2HUDt + β3CASt + β4PDEt + β5FGEt + β6UNRt + β7RACt + 
β8COUt + β9STAt + εt 
MIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
CIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2HUDt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
PCIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
PEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
TEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
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HSEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
MEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
CEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
BDPt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
MHIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
AWJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
 
where, for a given county/parish at a time period t: 
  
GOZ  = GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no); 
AIE  = change in annual industry earnings; 
MIE  = change in total manufacturing earnings; 
CIE  = change in total construction earnings; 
PCI  = change in per capita income; 
PEI  = change in personal income; 
TEI  = change in total employment for all industries; 
HSE  = change in housing unit estimates; 
MEJ  = change in total manufacturing employment; 
CEJ  = change in total construction employment; 
BDP  = change in the number of building permits issued annually; 
MHI  = change in the median household income; 
AWJ  = change in the average wages per job; 
HUD  = grant money provided to rebuild damaged housing; 
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CAS  = dummy variable for casinos by county (1=yes, 0=no); 
PDE  = population density; 
FGE  = total federal government expenditures by county; 
UNR  = civilian labor force unemployment rate by county; 
RAC  = percentage of the resident population that is white; 
COU  = county identification control variable; 
STA  = state identification control variable; 
 
The Congressional Budget Office (2006) estimates that the tax benefits related 
to the GO Zone Act will amount to about $4 billion in 2006, $3 billion in 2007, and $2 
billion over the years from 2008 to 2015 (Richardson 2006).  The major tax provisions 
generating these tax benefits are the 50 percent bonus depreciation, the Section 179 
expensing, and the broadening of the employee retention tax credit to all companies 
regardless of size (Richardson 2006).  Based on these primary incentives, one would 
expect to see increases in total employment (particularly in manufacturing industries), 
increases in total earnings (particularly in manufacturing industries), increases in 
average wages per job, and increases in personal income.  Property damage caused by 
Hurricane Katrina should cause significant changes in the construction industry and 
significant changes in this area will not be viewed as tax-policy related.  Personal 
income, manufacturing employment and earnings, and average wages per job will be 
used as the primary measures of economic growth, instead of per capita income, due to 
the potential impact of population migration caused by the hurricanes on per capita 
income, as noted by Walker and Jackson (2008). 
The primary sources of information are the United States Census Bureau, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Total population 
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statistics, building permit statistics, federal government expenditures, race data and 
housing unit estimates were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.  Statistical 
information for all other dependent variables was obtained from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  Civilian labor force unemployment rates were obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Annual data were gathered for years 2002 through 2008 to 
calculate the necessary year over year change occurring during the GO Zone incentive 
timeframe (2006-2008) and the two-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2003-
2004) for use with OLS regression.   
Annual industry earnings represent net earnings by place of work (the sum of 
wage and salary disbursements, supplements to wages and salaries, and proprietors‟ 
income) less contributions for government social insurance, plus an adjustment to 
convert earnings by place of work to a place-of-residence basis.  Personal income is the 
income received by all persons from all sources and is measured before the deduction of 
personal income taxes.  Personal income is the sum of net earnings by place of 
residence, rental income of persons, personal dividend income, personal interest 
income, and current personal transfer receipts.  Per capita personal income is calculated 
as the personal income of residents of a given area divided by the resident population of 
the area.  In computing per capita personal income, the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
uses the Census Bureau‟s annual midyear population estimates.  To account for 
inflation during the sample time period, all dollar amounts are converted to constant 
2008 dollars using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
The independent variable, GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no), was created, based 
on information obtained from IRS Publication 4492, for GO Zone and non-GO Zone 
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counties in the sample.  The grant funds control variable was created based on 
information obtained from the GAO.  The funds identified by GAO Report 10-17, were 
allocated in the following manner in the creation of this control variable: 2006 – 50 
percent, 2007, 35 percent, and 2008 15 percent.
27
  The casino control variable by 
county/parish was created based on information pertaining to commercial casino 
operations obtained from the Mississippi Gaming Commission and the Louisiana 
Gaming Control Board.  Alabama does not authorize land-based commercial casino 
operations.  Population density is calculated by dividing total population by total square 
miles for each county or parish.  Federal government expenditures encompass the total 
dollar amount of federal government expenditures by county.  The unemployment 
control variable is comprised of the county/parish civilian labor force unemployment 
rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  The race control variable represents the 
percentage of the resident population that is white for each county or parish.  
 
Research Question Two 
The second research question examines whether tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level are a zero-sum game, where economic growth created by 
incentives are at the expense of the surrounding regions.  The second phase of the 
research utilizes multiple regression on the same panel data set used during the first 
research phase.  Research question 2 will be tested with many of the same economic 
indicators included in research question 1; however, research question 2 will examine 
                                                 
27
 GAO Report 10-17 only provides information for total dollar amounts awarded during 2006 through 
2008, with no annual amounts identified.  Estimates were developed based on information from the GAO 
and the Congressional Budget Office concerning annual government expenditures from 2006 through 
2008. 
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the percentage change in each of these variables individually at the county level and 
will attempt to determine whether any increases in the affected core disaster area are 
offset by decreases in the surrounding counties.  Each dependent variable will be 
analyzed individually for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) and for the two-year 
period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2003-2004).  The models are as follows: 
 
%AIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt + εt 
%MIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt + εt 
%CIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt + εt 
%PCIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt + εt 
%PEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
%TEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
%MEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt  
%CEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
%MHIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
%AWJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
 
where, for a given county or parish at a time period t: 
 
GOZ  = GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no); 
%AIE = percentage change in annual industry earnings; 
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%MIE = percentage change in manufacturing industry earnings; 
%CIE = percentage change in construction industry earnings; 
%PCI = percentage change in per capita income; 
%PEI = percentage change in personal income; 
%TEI = percentage change in total employment for all industries; 
%MEJ = percentage change in total manufacturing employment; 
%CEJ = percentage change in total construction employment; 
%MHI = percentage change in the median household income; 
%AWJ = percentage change in the average wage per job; 
PDE  = population density; 
FGE  = total federal government expenditures by county; 
UNR  = civilian labor force unemployment rate by county; 
STA  = state identification control variable; 
 
 
The year-over-year percentage change will be calculated at the county/parish 
level by taking current year minus previous year divided by previous year.  For 
example, to calculate the population change for 2006, the 2005 population figure will be 
subtracted from the 2006 population figure and the resulting number will be divided by 
the 2005 population figure and then converted to a percentage (by multiplying by 100) 
to calculate the change for 2006.  The percentage change at the county level for each 
variable will be calculated, and the data will then be analyzed to determine whether 
growth in the GO Zone region came at the expense of the surrounding region.   
In addition, research question 2 will be analyzed with binary logistic regression 
utilizing certain economic indicators implemented in research question 1; however, this 
model will consider all of the variables simultaneously to determine if statistically 
significant differences exist between GO Zone counties and non-GO Zone counties.  
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This model will analyze the two-year period (2003-2004) preceding Hurricane Katrina 
to determine whether differences existed between GO Zone counties and non-GO Zone 
counties prior to the 2005 hurricanes and will also analyze the three-year GO Zone 
timeframe (2006-2008) to determine whether differences existed between GO Zone 
counties and non-GO Zone counties after the hurricanes.  The models are as follows: 
 
GOZt = β0 + β1MIEt + β2CIEt + β3PEIt + β4MEJt + β5CEJt + β6MHIt + β7AWJt 
+ β8PDEt + β9FGEt + β10UNRt + β11STAt +εt  
where, for a given county at a time period t: 
  
GOZ  = GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no); 
MIE  = change in total manufacturing earnings; 
CIE  = change in total construction earnings; 
PEI  = change in personal income; 
MEJ  = change in total manufacturing employment; 
CEJ  = change in total construction employment; 
MHI  = change in the median household income; 
AWJ  = change in the average wage per job; 
PDE  = population density; 
FGE  = total federal government expenditures by county; 
UNR  = civilian labor force unemployment rate by county; 
STA  = state identification control variable; 
 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study involves measuring the impact of tax policy 
investment incentives, such as bonus depreciation and more generous Section 179 
allowances, on economic growth at the regional level.  In addition, the study identifies 
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the economic indicators that are significant for evaluating the impact of regional tax 
policy investment incentives and the impact these incentives have on the surrounding 
regions.  Prior relevant literature and research support the independent variables chosen 
for this study, which should increase the internal validity of the study.  The matched 
sample panel data set used in this research was comprehensive, however, interpretations 
and generalizations to other regions should be made with care.  
The expected results of this study should support the Brown (1955) hypothesis 
that “businessmen in pursuit of a gain will find the purchase of capital goods more 
attractive if they cost less” (Hall and Jorgenson 1967, 391).  Significantly increased 
economic growth for GO Zone counties compared to non-GO Zone counties should 
support some form of the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation reported 
by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), who found that tax incentives did have a substantial 
effect on investment decisions.  Non-significant results could indicate the lack of impact 
of tax policy incentives at the regional level.  This study should also provide evidence 
of the impact of regional tax incentives on surrounding areas.  Depending on the 
direction of the outcome, significant results could dispute or support Liard-Muriente 
(2007), who noted that regional development policies could be described as a zero-sum 
game. 
 The results of this study, as with all forms of research, are subject to a few 
important limitations. Archival empirical data for the affected region make this study 
possible but also limit the ability to generalize these results to other regions.  In 
addition, empirical research utilizing real-world data can be prone to internal validity 
issues that arise due to lack of environmental control and other possible causal factors.  
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The purpose of this research study is to determine whether tax policy investment 
incentives have an impact on economic growth at the regional level and also to 
determine the impact on surrounding regions.  Therefore, explanation and 
generalization are not the primary factors of this research study.   
The time limitation of the study and the temporary nature of the tax policy 
investment incentives impose additional limitations on any findings.  Even though the 
most currently available data were used, these tax policy investment incentives were 
short-lived, and Friedman‟s permanent income hypothesis indicates that investing 
patterns may not change with temporary reductions in tax burdens (Meghir 2004).  
Also, these temporary investment incentives may have shifted capital investment 
spending forward in time, which would indicate a temporary investment change with no 
significant impact on economic growth in the long run.  Future studies addressing tax 
policy investment incentives could help to clarify some of these temporary and time-
related limitations. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
This research evaluates the economic impact of tax incentives provided by the 
Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005.  Tax policy incentives included in the Act, such as 
bonus depreciation and a more generous Section 179 deduction, were intended to spur 
capital investments by businesses and promote economic growth within the core 
disaster area.  This research studies the economic impact of these incentives at the 
county/parish level in the affected regions, controlling for other relevant explanatory 
variables, such as federal government expenditures, population density, the 
unemployment rate, and the location of commercial casinos.  The purpose of the 
research is to assess the effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives at the regional 
level and to examine whether these regional tax policy investment incentives create 
economic growth within policy coverage areas at the expense of the surrounding 
regions.  As discussed in the methodology chapter, this study specifically addresses the 
two following research questions:  
1) Do tax policy investment incentives promote economic 
growth and spur business investment spending at the  
regional level? 
 
2) Are regional tax policy investment incentives a zero-sum  
game, where growth in one local area comes at the  
expense of reduced growth in other local areas? 
 
One might assume that the results of this study would support the Brown (1955) 
hypothesis that “businessmen in pursuit of a gain will find the purchase of capital goods 
more attractive if they cost less” (Hall and Jorgenson 1967, 391).  Significantly greater 
economic growth for GO Zone counties compared to non-GO Zone counties should 
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support some form of the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation reported 
by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), who found that tax incentives did have a substantial 
effect on investment decisions.  Non-significant results could indicate the lack of impact 
of tax policy incentives at the regional level.  This research will also provide evidence 
of the impact of regional tax incentives on surrounding areas. This chapter discusses the 
results of this research. 
 
The Sample 
This research utilizes a matched sample panel data set using relevant 
information from 2002 through 2008.  The data set consists of the 91 counties and 
parishes included in the GO Zone core disaster area and 91 non-GO Zone counties and 
parishes surrounding the affected region for a total sample of 182 counties.  A panel 
data set has both a cross-sectional and a time-series dimension and is sometimes called 
longitudinal data.  The key feature that distinguishes panel data from pooled-time-
series-cross-sectional data is that panel data tracks the same variable for the same cross-
sectional units (in this case counties/parishes) over a given period of time.  Having 
multiple observations on the same unit or subject allows one to control for certain 
unobserved characteristics of the dependent variable, in this case counties and parishes. 
The following dependent variables at the county level will be utilized in this 
research: annual industry earnings, manufacturing industry earnings, construction 
industry earnings, per capita income, personal income, average wages per job, median 
household income, total employment for all industries, total manufacturing 
employment, total construction employment, housing unit estimates, and the number of 
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building permits issued annually.  The dataset consists of 1,274 observations for each 
variable.
28
  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator.  Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for the 
dependent variables over the full sample.
29
   
 
Table 4.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics – Dependent Variables 
Variable N Range Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Median Household Income 1274 51675 20624 72299 35290 7796.20 
Personal Income 1274 28714 35 28749 1840.52 3306.14 
Average Wages Per Job 1274 33724 22365 56089 31785 5860.44 
Per Capita Income 1274 52903 16732 69635 27347 5248.70 
Building Permits 1274 6715 0 6715 295.03 671.59 
Housing Unit Estimates 1274 309740 883 310623 24901.58 37628.92 
Total Employment 1274 482014 664 482678 31424.42 57599.35 
Construction Employment* 1196 31286 31 31317 2341.49 4252.28 
Manufacturing Employment* 1210 32869 10 32879 2975.78 3994.22 
Total Industry Earnings 1274 26256 14.39 26270.24 1342.09 2892.56 
Construction Earnings* 1195 2119 .36 2119.75 104.84 242.86 
Manufacturing Earnings* 1203 2176 0 2176.24 179.83 276.28 
Based on the dataset of 1,274 observations for the years 2002-2008. 
Note: Median Household Income, Per Capita Income, and Average Wages Per Job are in dollars.  
Personal Income and Earnings information are in millions of dollars.   
All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
price deflator. 
*Data were missing for a few counties in the Construction and Manufacturing Industries. 
 
                                                 
28
 Data were unavailable for certain counties in the construction and manufacturing industries. 
29
 Appendices BA through BL contain information by state pertaining to actual values for each dependent 
variable. 
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The primary independent variable used for research question 1 will be a 
dichotomous variable created for GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties in the sample.
30
  
Other independent variables include population density, federal government 
expenditures, the unemployment rate, race, the presence of commercial casinos, and, 
when appropriate, grant funds provided to specific counties for hurricane victims.  
Table 4.2 provides descriptive statistics for the independent variables.   
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistics – Independent Variables 
Variable Range Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. 
Go Zone 1 0 1 .50 .500 
Time  6 2 8 5.00 2.00 
State Code 2 1 3 2.25 .765 
Casino 1 0 1 .08 .267 
Population Density 1345.60 3.75 1349.35 84.61 139.02 
Fed. Gov. Expenditures 18549.02 15.52 18564.54 495.64 1128.40 
Unemployment Rate 14.10 2.30 16.40 6.70 2.24 
Race 84.10 13.30 97.40 62.52 18.51 
Community Grant Funds 1227.50 0.00 1227.50 5.67 52.08 
Based on the dataset of 1,274 observations for the years 2002-2008. 
Note: Federal Government Expenditures and Community Grant Funds are in 
millions of dollars.  The Unemployment Rate and Race are both percentages. 
 
  
 The correlation matrix, shown in Table 4.3, provides the first insight to the 
assessment of the relationship of the variables.  All of the independent variables exhibit 
some level of significant correlation (two-tailed) with the dependent variables, 
                                                 
30
 Appendix A contains a listing of GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties/parishes. 
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indicating that relevant variables have been utilized in this research.  The first test of the 
data is for possible collinearity of the independent variables.  Collinearity can have 
substantial effects on the predictive ability of the model and on the estimation of 
regression coefficients.  The most obvious means of identifying collinearity is an 
examination of the correlation matrix.  The presence of high correlations (generally 0.90 
and higher) is the first indication of substantial collinearity (Hair et al. 2006). 
 
Table 4.3 
Correlation Matrix & Collinearity Statistics 
Pearson 
Correlations 
Go 
Zone 
Time Casino 
Pop. 
Density 
FGE 
Unemp. 
Rate 
Race CGBF 
Go Zone 1.000 .000 .082 .116 .100 -.064 -.095 .108 
Time .000 1.000 .000 -.002 .070 -.190 -.015 .090 
Casino .082 .000 1.000 .393 .371 -.012 -.125 .245 
Pop. Density .116 -.002 .393 1.000 .737 -.304 .033 .241 
FGE .100 .070 .371 .737 1.000 -.233 -.038 .480 
Unemp. Rate -.064 -.190 -.012 -.304 -.233 1.000 -.533 -.079 
Race -.095 -.015 -.125 .033 -.038 -.533 1.000 .003 
CGBF .108 .090 .245 .241 .480 -.079 .003 1.000 
 
Collinearity 
Statistics  
Go 
Zone 
Time Casino 
Pop. 
Density 
FGE 
Unemp. 
Rate 
Race CGBF 
Tolerance .880 .913 .785 .394 .349 .482 .643 .719 
VIF 1.136 1.095 1.274 2.538 2.862 2.076 1.556 1.390 
 
Based on the dataset of 1,274 observations for the years 2002-2008. 
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This examination reveals that none of the variables exhibit a high level of 
correlation with other independent variables.  Lack of high correlation values, however, 
does not guarantee no collinearity.  Collinearity can be caused by the combined effect 
of two or more independent variables, creating multicollinearity (Hair et al. 2006).  To 
assess multicollinearity, a statistical procedure is performed in which each independent 
variable becomes a dependent variable and is regressed against the remaining 
independent variables.  Two common measures for assessing multicollinearity are 
tolerance and its inverse, the variance inflation factor (VIF).  Tolerance is a direct 
measure of multicollinearity and is defined as the amount of variability of the selected 
independent variable not explained by the other independent variables (Hair et al. 
2006).  A high tolerance value indicates a small degree of multicollinearity.  A common 
cutoff threshold is a tolerance value of 0.10, which corresponds to a VIF value of 10.  
Table 4.3 provides tolerance and VIF values for each of the independent variables.  The 
results indicate that no significant multicollinearity exists between the independent 
variables used in this research. 
 
The Results 
 The first phase of the research utilizes linear mixed effects modeling and 
multiple regression with a matched sample panel data set using data from 2002 through 
2008 to determine whether the economic variables included in this study are significant 
predictors of GO Zone versus non-GO Zone counties.  The second phase of the research 
utilizes multiple regression and binary logistic regression on a matched sample panel 
data set using data from 2002 through 2008 to determine whether tax policy investment 
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incentives at the regional level are a zero-sum game.  The majority of the economic 
indicators evaluated in the first phase of this research will be tested individually in this 
phase of the research to determine whether economic growth in GO Zone counties came 
at the expense of the surrounding counties.  The remainder of the chapter provides a 
discussion of the results of the data analysis for each model. 
 
Research Question One 
As noted in Chapter Three, research question 1 will be analyzed with the 
following dependent variables at the county level: annual industry earnings, 
manufacturing industry earnings, construction industry earnings, per capita income, 
personal income, average wages per job, median household income, total employment 
for all industries, total manufacturing employment, total construction employment, 
housing unit estimates, and the number of building permits issued annually.  Each 
dependent variable will be analyzed individually with mixed effects modeling 
procedures for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) and for the three-year period 
preceding Hurricane Katrina (2002-2004); 2005 is not be included in either combined 
sample due to the fact that it overlaps both groups.  Annual changes for each dependent 
variable covering 2003 through 2008 will be calculated and subsequent statistical 
procedures will be performed on these values.  The year-over-year changes for each 
dependent variable will be analyzed individually with OLS regression procedures on a 
yearly basis for the period covering 2003 through 2008 and will also be analyzed 
individually for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) as well as for the two-year period 
preceding Hurricane Katrina (2003-2004); 2005 is not be included in either combined 
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sample due to the fact that it overlaps both groups.  The primary independent variable 
used for research question 1 will be a dichotomous variable created for GO Zone versus 
non-GO Zone counties in the sample.  Population density, federal government 
expenditures, the unemployment rate, race, county/parish, and state identifying 
variables will be included as control variables in the majority of the regression models.  
When appropriate, grant funds provided to specific counties for hurricane victims and 
commercial casinos by county/parish will also be used as independent variables for 
control purposes.  The mixed effects models used in analyzing research question 1 are 
as follows: 
 
AIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2HUDt + β3CASt + β4PDEt + β5FGEt + β6UNRt + β7RACt + 
β8COUt + β9STAt + εt 
MIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
CIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2HUDt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
PCIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
PEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
TEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
HSEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
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MEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
CEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
BDPt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
MHIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
AWJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
where, for a given county/parish at a time period t: 
  
GOZ  = GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no); 
AIE  = annual industry earnings; 
MIE  = total manufacturing earnings; 
CIE  = total construction earnings; 
PCI  = per capita income; 
PEI  = personal income; 
TEI  = total employment for all industries; 
HSE  = housing unit estimates; 
MEJ  = total manufacturing employment; 
CEJ  = total construction employment; 
BDP  = number of building permits issued annually; 
MHI  = median household income; 
AWJ  = average wages per job; 
HUD  = grant money provided to rebuild damaged housing; 
CAS  = dummy variable for casinos by county (1=yes, 0=no); 
PDE  = population density; 
FGE  = total federal government expenditures by county; 
UNR  = civilian labor force unemployment rate by county; 
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RAC  = percentage of the resident population that is white; 
COU  = county identification control variable; 
STA  = state identification control variable; 
 
Random effects modeling assumes that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated 
with all explanatory variables, and allows for explanatory variables that are constant 
over time.  The random effects approach can be extended to a linear mixed effects 
model to allow for variable slopes, serial correlation, and heteroscedasticity (Frees 
2004).  The mixed effects approach allows for the model to contain both a random-
effects factor and a fixed-effects factor.  Table 4.4 provides results from the first linear 
mixed effects models implemented in this research.  The results in Table 4.4 compare 
GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina.
31
  Each overall 
model analyzed was statistically significant below the alpha level of 0.05. 
Based on the linear mixed effects procedures, only three of the dependent 
variables showed a statistically significant change, at the alpha level equal 0.05, when 
comparing the pre-Katrina time period (2002-2004) to the post-Katrina time period 
(2006-2008), after controlling for the independent variables included in each model.  
These variables were construction employment, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.011, 
per capita income, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.019, and the number of building 
permits issued annually, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.015.  These significant 
differences were not unexpected and can be explained by the physical property damage 
and the population migration caused by Hurricane Katrina.  The physical property 
damage would lead to an increase in construction employment and building permits 
                                                 
31
 Appendices E through P contain information by state pertaining to Table 4.4. 
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issued; the population out-migration caused by Katrina would have a large impact on 
per capita income.
32
  
The dependent variables median household income and average wages per job 
were both significantly different when comparing GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone 
counties, but these statistical differences existed pre-Katrina and post-Katrina, so no 
change occurred post-Katrina.  After controlling for the independent variables included 
in each model, the remaining seven dependent variables analyzed showed no 
statistically significant differences pre-Katrina or post-Katrina, indicating that no 
significant changes occurred in the GO Zone counties post-Katrina that would 
distinguish them from non-GO Zone counties.  Overall, the results shown in Table 4.4 
do not indicate that the tax incentives provided to the GO Zone counties have had a 
statistically significant impact on key economic indicators.         
 
                                                 
32
 Appendices CI and CJ contain population data by state. 
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Table 4.4 
 
Summary Table Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties Pre- and 
Post-Katrina using Actual Values and Linear Mixed Effects Modeling 
 
Variables Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 F- statistic P-value F- statistic P-value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.028 
.084 
4.630 
22.801 
328.082 
228.494 
.706 
.091 
 
0.000 
0.866 
0.773 
0.011 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.401 
0.763 
 
 
2.615 
25.020 
7.966 
95.207 
153.795 
48.102 
31.390 
.383 
 
0.000 
0.108 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.536 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
13.914 
3.881 
9.392 
143.682 
4.684 
1.689 
1.861 
3.480 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.050 
0.000 
0.000 
0.031 
0.194 
0.173 
0.064 
 
 
29.455 
6.850 
14.507 
78.238 
6.377 
5.085 
2.316 
4.026 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.010 
0.000 
0.000 
0.012 
0.025 
0.126 
0.046 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.552 
3.792 
2.803 
190.935 
15.935 
6.343 
8.555 
22.091 
 
0.000 
0.459 
0.053 
0.063 
0.000 
0.000 
0.012 
0.004 
0.000 
 
 
5.626 
12.519 
2.124 
69.400 
5.765 
69.297 
25.384 
6.398 
 
0.000 
0.019 
0.001 
0.122 
0.000 
0.017 
0.000 
0.000 
0.012 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
9.154 
.758 
1.741 
61.765 
28.923 
8.841 
.002 
139.17 
 
0.000 
0.003 
0.385 
0.178 
0.000 
0.000 
0.003 
0.967 
0.000 
 
 
11.500 
.133 
.633 
113.399 
34.476 
3.388 
6.899 
102.424 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.716 
0.532 
0.000 
0.000 
0.066 
0.009 
0.000 
Housing Units (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.230 
8.416 
31.717 
757.155 
214.990 
.147 
1.868 
 
0.000 
0.632 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.701 
0.172 
 
 
2.631 
8.389 
81.089 
275.540 
55.038 
16.254 
1.676 
 
0.000 
0.107 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.196 
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Table 4.4 - Continued 
Variables Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 F- statistic P-value F- statistic P-value 
Building Permits (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
3.455 
.907 
18.345 
.884 
40.808 
.002 
12.701 
 
0.000 
0.065 
0.406 
0.000 
0.348 
0.000 
0.965 
0.000 
 
 
6.021 
2.393 
16.142 
99.336 
12.700 
.205 
5.097 
 
0.000 
0.015 
0.094 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.651 
0.025 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
Community Grant Funding (Post K) 
 
 
.044 
.124 
3.514 
29.431 
351.640 
247.714 
.656 
4.278 
 
0.000 
0.833 
0.725 
0.032 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.418 
0.040 
 
 
2.678 
29.302 
5.688 
30.281 
2.993 
58.339 
5.933 
9.912 
36.359 
 
0.000 
0.104 
0.000 
0.004 
0.000 
0.084 
0.000 
0.015 
0.002 
0.000 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
Community Grant Funding (Post K) 
 
 
.210 
1.748 
2.307 
95.149 
139.978 
.213 
.112 
 
 
0.000 
0.648 
0.177 
0.130 
0.000 
0.000 
0.645 
0.738 
 
 
1.441 
2.624 
5.096 
127.360 
.001 
9.102 
.045 
86.141 
 
0.000 
0.232 
0.077 
0.025 
0.000 
0.971 
0.003 
0.832 
0.000 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.189 
5.448 
.460 
53.900 
10.467 
.859 
2.514 
 
0.000 
0.664 
0.005 
0.498 
0.000 
0.001 
0.355 
0.115 
 
 
1.619 
7.046 
2.806 
95.813 
6.522 
17.283 
1.206 
 
0.000 
0.205 
0.001 
0.095 
0.000 
0.011 
0.000 
0.274 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.020 
.669 
4.687 
3.886 
597.041 
60.844 
2.323 
.012 
 
0.000 
0.889 
0.414 
0.010 
0.049 
0.000 
0.000 
0.129 
0.912 
 
 
2.133 
23.385 
7.901 
100.819 
212.601 
6.664 
31.951 
.591 
 
0.000 
0.146 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.010 
0.000 
0.442 
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Table 4.4 - Continued 
Variables Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 F- statistic P-value F- statistic P-value 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
1.777 
3.014 
1.362 
167.533 
43.002 
.001 
2.381 
 
0.000 
0.184 
0.052 
0.244 
0.000 
0.000 
0.978 
0.125 
 
 
6.726 
5.095 
32.825 
1.954 
.875 
11.588 
.576 
 
0.000 
0.011 
0.007 
0.000 
0.163 
0.350 
0.001 
0.449 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.318 
10.186 
18.975 
99.497 
.459 
4.181 
4.272 
 
0.000 
0.574 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.499 
0.042 
0.040 
 
 
.305 
9.246 
1.089 
85.878 
9.142 
23.613 
3.780 
 
0.000 
0.582 
0.000 
0.297 
0.000 
0.003 
0.000 
0.053 
 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 
2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables (DV) represent actual value by county for each variable. 
 
 
 
GO Zone versus GO Zone, Non-GO Zone versus Non-GO Zone Pre- and Post-Katrina 
In addition to the previous linear mixed effects modeling procedures listed 
above, additional tests were performed comparing GO Zone counties to themselves pre- 
and post-Katrina.   Table 4.5 provides the results from these additional linear mixed 
effects models.  An alternate version of the GO Zone independent variable was created 
and named Katrina to identify pre-Katrina versus post-Katrina time periods.  These 
statistical tests were performed to determine whether statistically significant differences 
existed in GO Zone counties post-Katrina when compared to GO Zone counties pre-
Katrina.  Significant results on the primary dependent variables of interest (personal 
income, average wages per job, manufacturing employment, and manufacturing 
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earnings) would provide support for the effectiveness of tax policy investment 
incentives.   
The results in Table 4.5 compare GO Zone counties to GO Zone counties pre- 
and post-Katrina and non-GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-
Katrina.
33
  Each overall model analyzed was statistically significant below the alpha 
level of 0.05.  Based on the additional linear mixed effects procedures, only two of the 
dependent variables showed a statistically significant change at the alpha level equal to 
0.05 when comparing the GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2002-
2004) to the post-Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling for the independent 
variables included in each model.  These variables were median household income, with 
a p-value of 0.002, and total industry net earnings, with a p-value of 0.002.  The 
significant differences in median household income can be explained by the physical 
property damage and the population migration caused by Hurricane Katrina.  The 
explanation for the statistically significant change in total industry net earnings for GO 
Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina is not as clear; however, total industry net earnings 
were also statistically significantly different for the non-GO Zone counties pre- and 
post-Katrina indicating that the change in the GO Zone counties was not caused by GO 
Zone tax incentives.  After controlling for the independent variables included in each 
model, the remaining ten dependent variables analyzed showed no statistically 
significant differences in GO Zone counties when comparing pre-Katrina to post-
Katrina, indicating that no significant changes occurred in the GO Zone counties post-
Katrina.  Overall, the results shown in Table 4.5 do not indicate that the tax incentives 
                                                 
33
 Appendices Q through AB contain information by state pertaining to Table 4.5. 
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provided to the GO Zone counties have had a statistically significant impact on key 
economic indicators. 
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Table 4.5 
Summary Table Comparing Pre-Katrina GO Zone Counties to Post-
Katrina GO Zone Counties and Pre-Katrina Non-GO Zone Counties to 
Post-Katrina Non-GO Zone Counties using Actual Values and Linear 
Mixed Effects Modeling 
Variables GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
 F- statistic P-value F- statistic P-value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.929 
25.349 
4.373 
20.231 
201.410 
65.681 
14.089 
1.625 
 
0.000 
0.336 
0.000 
0.016 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.205 
 
 
5.230 
.137 
.889 
9.189 
467.743 
483.387 
4.462 
.001 
 
0.000 
0.023 
0.712 
0.415 
0.003 
0.000 
0.000 
0.035 
0.970 
Average Wages Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.030 
7.193 
15.028 
48.451 
8.167 
7.644 
5.887 
.036 
 
0.000 
0.862 
0.009 
0.000 
0.000 
0.004 
0.006 
0.016 
0.851 
 
 
22.151 
4.322 
2.856 
93.511 
7.571 
6.029 
36.114 
1.618 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.041 
0.063 
0.000 
0.006 
0.014 
0.000 
0.206 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.006 
19.765 
6.091 
28.916 
15.634 
58.434 
24.624 
7.706 
 
0.000 
0.941 
0.000 
0.004 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.007 
 
 
17.006 
3.060 
1.193 
156.909 
32.864 
4.282 
20.362 
3.152 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.084 
0.309 
0.000 
0.000 
0.039 
0.000 
0.079 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
9.568 
.680 
6.512 
73.287 
.121 
3.534 
.342 
59.561 
 
0.000 
0.002 
0.412 
0.002 
0.000 
0.728 
0.061 
0.559 
0.000 
 
 
31.214 
2.643 
1.670 
72.310 
30.379 
.010 
14.891 
74.080 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.108 
0.194 
0.000 
0.000 
0.920 
0.000 
0.000 
Housing Units (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
3.657 
6.311 
7.092 
3438.091 
18.975 
3.947 
6.024 
 
0.000 
0.056 
0.003 
0.008 
0.000 
0.000 
0.048 
0.015 
 
 
4.839 
4.718 
7.688 
676.117 
484.735 
1.162 
1.422 
 
0.000 
0.028 
0.012 
0.006 
0.000 
0.000 
0.282 
0.234 
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Table 4.5 - Continued 
Variables GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
 F- statistic P-value F- statistic P-value 
Building Permits (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.778 
4.549 
.333 
12.223 
53.826 
.320 
16.414 
 
0.000 
0.378 
0.013 
0.564 
0.001 
0.000 
0.572 
0.000 
 
 
.034 
.237 
2.609 
89.733 
.821 
6.580 
.299 
 
0.000 
0.854 
0.789 
0.107 
0.000 
0.366 
0.011 
0.586 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
Community Grant Funding 
 
 
10.029 
26.613 
3.316 
28.810 
463.764 
91.981 
19.391 
3.052 
19.667 
 
0.000 
0.002 
0.000 
0.042 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.083 
0.000 
 
 
8.701 
1.051 
1.160 
8.909 
216.775 
144.297 
15.073 
.424 
.229 
 
0.000 
0.003 
0.308 
0.319 
0.003 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.516 
.632 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
Community Grant Funding 
 
 
.844 
2.110 
5.710 
134.507 
100.678 
8.197 
.066 
52.276 
 
0.000 
0.359 
0.128 
0.017 
0.000 
0.000 
0.004 
0.799 
0.000 
 
 
.000 
.246 
.120 
131.726 
3.379 
9.441 
.861 
.206 
 
0.000 
0.995 
0.783 
0.729 
0.000 
0.067 
0.002 
0.356 
.650 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.014 
3.619 
1.113 
4.681 
.970 
2.158 
2.606 
 
0.000 
0.907 
0.031 
0.292 
0.031 
0.325 
0.143 
0.109 
 
 
2.574 
2.523 
1.777 
99.362 
65.524 
18.979 
.205 
 
0.000 
0.109 
0.088 
0.183 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.652 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
2.459 
20.864 
3.564 
17.163 
1947.620 
61.882 
12.836 
.021 
 
0.000 
0.118 
0.000 
0.033 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.885 
 
 
1.318 
.929 
1.547 
2.425 
680.222 
254.623 
10.745 
1.046 
 
0.000 
0.252 
0.338 
0.219 
0.120 
0.000 
0.000 
0.001 
0.307 
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Table 4.5 - Continued 
Variables GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
 F- statistic P-value F- statistic P-value 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
1.708 
3.585 
5.694 
72.284 
99.968 
1.501 
.060 
 
0.000 
0.192 
0.033 
0.017 
0.000 
0.000 
0.221 
0.807 
 
 
.095 
1.163 
4.424 
641.735 
34.393 
7.525 
.447 
 
0.000 
0.759 
0.317 
0.036 
0.000 
0.000 
0.006 
0.505 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race 
 
 
.835 
1.983 
.824 
24.936 
2.420 
3.641 
7.945 
 
0.000 
0.361 
0.144 
0.365 
0.000 
0.121 
0.057 
0.006 
 
 
.363 
5.259 
19.126 
173.735 
.022 
33.836 
.241 
 
0.000 
0.547 
0.008 
0.000 
0.000 
0.882 
0.000 
0.625 
 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
The Katrina independent variable is used to identify pre- and post-Katrina time periods.   
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 
2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables (DV) represent actual value by county for each variable. 
 
 
 
Research Question One - Multiple Regression Procedures  
Multiple regression is the most widely used multivariate dependence technique, 
primarily because of its ability to predict and explain metric variables (Hair et al. 2006).  
The second step in phase one of the research utilizes multiple OLS regression 
procedures to analyze the data.  The OLS regression models used in analyzing research 
question 1 are as follows: 
 
AIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2HUDt + β3CASt + β4PDEt + β5FGEt + β6UNRt + β7RACt + 
β8COUt + β9STAt + εt 
105 
 
MIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
CIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2HUDt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
PCIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
PEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
TEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
HSEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
MEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
CEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
BDPt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5RACt + β6COUt + β7STAt + εt 
MHIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
AWJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2CASt + β3PDEt + β4FGEt + β5UNRt + β6RACt + β7COUt + 
β8STAt + εt 
 
where, for a given county/parish at a time period t: 
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GOZ  = GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no); 
AIE  = change in annual industry earnings; 
MIE  = change in total manufacturing earnings; 
CIE  = change in total construction earnings; 
PCI  = change in per capita income; 
PEI  = change in personal income; 
TEI  = change in total employment for all industries; 
HSE  = change in housing unit estimates; 
MEJ  = change in total manufacturing employment; 
CEJ  = change in total construction employment; 
BDP  = change in the number of building permits issued annually; 
MHI  = change in the median household income; 
AWJ  = change in the average wages per job; 
HUD  = grant money provided to rebuild damaged housing; 
CAS  = dummy variable for casinos by county (1=yes, 0=no); 
PDE  = population density; 
FGE  = total federal government expenditures by county; 
UNR  = civilian labor force unemployment rate by county; 
RAC  = percentage of the resident population that is white; 
COU  = county identification control variable; 
STA  = state identification control variable; 
 
Multiple regression is a statistical technique used to analyze the relationship 
between a dependent variable and a set of independent variables.  Yearly changes were 
calculated for each dependent variable and these values were analyzed using OLS 
multiple regression procedures.
34
  Table 4.6 contains results from the multiple 
regression procedures implemented in this research.
35
  
                                                 
34
 Appendices BM through BX contain information by state pertaining to the annual change values for 
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Since the second phase of data analysis on research question one used in this 
research study utilizes standard multiple regression equations, the models must be tested 
for violations of the regression assumptions.  The models must first satisfy the 
assumption of linearity.  Partial regression plots of each independent variable on the 
dependent variables exhibit no curvilinear patterns that would violate the linearity 
assumption in this model.  The second assumption concerns homoscedasticity or 
constant variance of the error term.  A review of the studentized residuals plotted 
against each dependent variable shows no presence of unequal variances or 
heteroscedasticity through a constant pattern in the residuals.  The residuals are 
randomly spread over the plot.   
Panel data sets contain repeated observations from the same unit of 
measurement and violate the independence assumption.  One method to remove the 
unobserved effect is to difference the data in adjacent time periods; then, a standard 
multiple regression analysis on the differences can be used to analyze the data 
(Wooldridge 2009).  By calculating annual changes and utilizing these values, the 
violation of the independence assumption can be avoided and standard OLS regression 
techniques can be used to analyze the data.   The residual plots show no consistent 
patterns related to independence of the error term and the partial regression plots 
indicate no major violations of the independence of the error term for the predicted 
variables. 
The normality assumption refers to the shape of the data distribution for 
dependent variables.  Normality was examined through the use of histograms of the 
                                                                                                                                               
each dependent variable. 
35
 Appendices AC through AN contain information by state pertaining to Table 4.6. 
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residuals and normal probability plots.  The histogram distributions for the majority of 
the dependent variables approximated normal distributions, and the normal probability 
plots showed only minimal deviations from the normal diagonal for most variables.  
There were a few of the dependent variables, however, that showed leptokurtic 
tendencies.  The shape of any distribution can be described by two measures: kurtosis 
and skewness (Hair et al. 2006).  Kurtosis refers to the “peakedness” or “flatness” of the 
distribution compared to the normal distribution, and skewness refers to whether the 
distribution is shifted to one side or whether the distribution is balanced and 
symmetrical (Hair et al. 2006).  Distributions that are taller than the normal distribution 
are referred to as leptokurtic, which occurs in some of the dependent variables used in 
this research, including three of the primary dependent variables of interests (average 
wages per job, manufacturing employment, and manufacturing earnings).  Statistical 
tests were performed to test the normality assumption and certain variables were 
confirmed to be leptokurtic and to potentially violate the normality assumption.  These 
“peaked” distributions appear to be caused by extreme values for certain counties on the 
coastline of Louisiana and Mississippi where hurricane damage was the greatest.  
Nonnormality in small sample sizes of 50 or fewer observations can have a substantial 
impact on the results; however the effects are negligible for sample sizes of 200 or more 
(Hair et al. 2006).  The usual tests used in regression analysis are robust in the sense 
that only extreme departures from normality yield spurious results (Kleinbaum et al. 
2008).  These results indicate no major violations of the regression assumptions 
required for appropriate multiple regression models and no transformations are 
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necessary to proceed with the interpretation of the results; however, additional statistical 
procedures will be performed during a sensitivity analysis to verify results. 
The results in Table 4.6 compare the annual change values for GO Zone 
counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina.  Each overall model analyzed 
was statistically significant below the alpha level of 0.05.  Based on the multiple 
regression procedures, six of the dependent variables showed a statistically significant 
change at the alpha level equal to 0.05 when comparing the yearly change values from 
the pre-Katrina time period (2003-2004) to the post-Katrina time period (2006-2008), 
after controlling for the independent variables included in each model.  These variables 
were construction employment, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.001, construction net 
earnings, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.001, average wages per job, with a post-
Katrina p-value of 0.000, total industry net earnings, with a post-Katrina p-value of 
0.000, manufacturing employment, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.000, and 
manufacturing net earnings, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.000.   
Additional statistical procedures were performed on the full dataset examining 
the interaction between GO Zone versus non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina; 
essentially testing whether the pre-Katrina and post-Katrina regression coefficients 
reported in Table 4.6 for the GO Zone variable in each model were statistically 
different.  Based on these multiple regression procedures, five of the dependent 
variables showed a statistically significant change at the alpha level equal to 0.05 when 
comparing the GO Zone variable regression coefficient from the pre-Katrina time 
period to the coefficient from the post-Katrina time period, after controlling for the 
independent variables included in each model.   These variables were construction 
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employment, with p-value of 0.017, construction earnings, with p-value of 0.021, total 
industry net earnings, with a p-value of 0.015, average wages per job, with a p-value of 
0.000, and manufacturing employment, with a p-value of 0.004.  These results verify 
previously reported statistical differences concerning these variables. 
The significant differences in the construction industry were not unexpected and 
can be explained by the physical property damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.  Based 
on actual values used in the previous linear mixed effects models (see Table 4.4), total 
industry net earnings and average wages per job were both statistically significantly 
different pre- and post-Katrina, indicating that GO Zone incentives had not caused these 
differences.  In addition, the significant difference in the annual change values of 
average wages per job appear to be driven primarily by extreme values or outliers along 
the southern coast of Louisiana, indicating that these findings could be caused by 
Hurricane Katrina.  The significant differences in manufacturing net earnings and 
employment could provide support for the effectiveness of regional tax incentives, but 
additional procedures analyzing pre-Katrina GO Zone counties to themselves post-
Katrina need to be performed to verify results before conclusions can be drawn.  
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Table 4.6 
 
Summary Table Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties Pre- and 
Post-Katrina using Annual Change Values and Multiple Regression 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t – 
statistic 
P-
value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.044 
-.053 
-.108 
.112 
.108 
.646 
-.133 
-.005 
.073 
 
 
-1.266 
-1.468 
-1.247 
3.401 
1.710 
10.188 
-2.834 
-.110 
.871 
 
0.000 
0.206 
0.143 
0.213 
0.001 
0.088 
0.000 
0.005 
0.913 
0.384 
 
 
.057 
.025 
-.069 
-.048 
.674 
-.225 
-.112 
.010 
.022 
 
 
1.536 
.654 
-.747 
-1.331 
12.159 
-4.183 
-1.978 
.229 
.246 
 
0.000 
0.125 
0.514 
0.455 
0.184 
0.000 
0.000 
0.048 
0.819 
0.806 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.005 
-.039 
-.255 
.137 
.006 
.115 
.022 
-.082 
.295 
 
 
.098 
-.664 
-1.845 
2.613 
.060 
1.129 
.288 
-1.190 
2.196 
 
0.025 
0.922 
0.507 
0.066 
0.009 
0.952 
0.260 
0.773 
0.235 
0.029 
 
 
.180 
.007 
.163 
.036 
-.171 
.256 
-.229 
.011 
-.174 
 
 
4.116 
.151 
1.494 
.852 
-2.637 
4.057 
-3.462 
.203 
-1.667 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.880 
0.136 
0.394 
0.009 
0.000 
0.001 
0.839 
0.096 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.158 
-.004 
-.298 
.151 
-.061 
.053 
-.170 
-.362 
.301 
 
 
-2.968 
-.080 
-2.272 
3.028 
-.639 
.552 
-2.398 
-5.516 
2.357 
 
0.000 
0.003 
0.936 
0.024 
0.003 
0.523 
0.581 
0.017 
0.000 
0.019 
 
 
.056 
.038 
.034 
-.009 
-.363 
.437 
-.104 
.036 
-.045 
 
 
1.270 
.834 
.305 
-.219 
-5.515 
6.820 
-1.552 
.677 
-.428 
 
0.000 
0.204 
0.405 
0.760 
0.827 
0.000 
0.000 
0.121 
0.498 
0.669 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.114 
-.063 
-.168 
-.257 
-.090 
-.065 
-.174 
.058 
.307 
 
 
-2.137 
-1.144 
-1.287 
-5.174 
-.942 
-.682 
-2.463 
.884 
2.413 
 
0.000 
0.033 
0.253 
0.199 
0.000 
0.347 
0.496 
0.014 
0.377 
0.016 
 
 
.062 
.015 
.155 
.114 
.000 
.028 
-.233 
.008 
-.129 
 
 
1.366 
.320 
1.372 
2.574 
.002 
.428 
-3.403 
.140 
-1.201 
 
0.000 
0.172 
0.749 
0.171 
0.010 
0.999 
0.668 
0.001 
0.889 
0.230 
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Table 4.6 - Continued 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t – 
statistic 
P-
value 
Housing Units (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.057 
.047 
.013 
.095 
.319 
-.239 
.108 
-.107 
 
 
1.237 
.418 
.303 
1.151 
3.818 
-3.862 
1.901 
-.971 
 
0.000 
0.217 
0.676 
0.762 
0.250 
0.000 
0.000 
0.058 
0.332 
 
 
-.001 
.002 
.041 
.444 
-.713 
-.060 
-.026 
-.001 
 
 
-.036 
.018 
1.020 
7.368 
-12.244 
-.976 
-.528 
-.014 
 
0.000 
0.971 
0.986 
0.308 
0.000 
0.000 
0.330 
0.598 
0.989 
Building Permits (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.067 
-.009 
-.026 
-.108 
.371 
-.072 
.094 
-.062 
 
 
1.259 
-.068 
-.525 
-1.134 
3.840 
-1.008 
1.428 
-.488 
 
0.000 
0.209 
0.946 
0.600 
0.257 
0.000 
0.314 
0.154 
0.626 
 
 
.029 
.058 
-.194 
-.257 
.257 
.155 
.028 
-.050 
 
 
.662 
.532 
-4.475 
-3.928 
4.068 
2.310 
.522 
-.473 
 
0.000 
0.508 
0.595 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.021 
0.602 
0.636 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
Community Grant Funding (Post K) 
 
 
-.044 
-.014 
-.032 
.017 
.179 
.645 
-.136 
-.033 
.031 
 
 
-1.452 
-.454 
-.430 
.597 
3.246 
11.681 
-3.334 
-.890 
.425 
 
0.000 
0.147 
0.650 
0.667 
0.551 
0.001 
0.000 
0.001 
0.374 
0.671 
 
 
 
.127 
.120 
-.038 
-.058 
.694 
.087 
-.029 
.041 
-.024 
-.452 
 
 
4.169 
3.739 
-.502 
-1.959 
15.470 
1.835 
-.636 
1.139 
-.332 
-12.955 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.616 
0.051 
0.000 
0.067 
0.525 
0.255 
0.740 
0.000 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
Community Grant Funding (Post K) 
 
 
-.136 
-.226 
.045 
.137 
.276 
-.170 
-.037 
.175 
 
 
 
-2.649 
-1.770 
.929 
1.499 
2.970 
-2.425 
-.571 
1.396 
 
 
0.000 
0.008 
0.078 
0.354 
0.135 
0.003 
0.016 
0.569 
0.164 
 
 
.137 
.172 
-.170 
-.113 
.664 
.029 
.117 
-.183 
-.179 
 
 
3.366 
1.735 
-4.319 
-1.919 
10.646 
.480 
2.552 
-1.906 
-3.952 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.083 
0.000 
0.056 
0.000 
0.632 
0.011 
0.057 
0.000 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.054 
-.142 
-.044 
-.190 
.322 
-.179 
-.050 
.147 
 
 
-.931 
-.998 
-.816 
-1.861 
3.108 
-2.281 
-.703 
1.061 
 
0.001 
0.353 
0.319 
0.415 
0.064 
0.002 
0.023 
0.483 
0.289 
 
 
.158 
-.157 
-.101 
.274 
.090 
-.110 
.007 
.059 
 
 
3.722 
-1.500 
-2.436 
4.410 
1.495 
-1.724 
.139 
.588 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.134 
0.015 
0.000 
0.136 
0.085 
0.889 
0.557 
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Table 4.6 - Continued 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t – 
statistic 
P-
value 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.002 
.020 
-.115 
.090 
-.002 
.034 
-.281 
.078 
.024 
 
 
.045 
.371 
-.883 
1.820 
-.022 
.352 
-3.973 
1.200 
.189 
 
0.000 
0.965 
0.711 
0.378 
0.070 
0.982 
0.725 
0.000 
0.231 
0.850 
 
 
.054 
-.003 
.040 
-.023 
.641 
-.617 
-.108 
-.005 
-.050 
 
 
1.309 
-.065 
.392 
-.566 
10.499 
-10.400 
-1.743 
-.109 
-.513 
 
0.000 
0.191 
0.948 
0.695 
0.571 
0.000 
0.000 
0.082 
0.913 
0.608 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.084 
-.238 
-.021 
-.019 
.013 
-.191 
.042 
.160 
 
 
-1.461 
-1.671 
-.387 
-.184 
.128 
-2.438 
.581 
1.147 
 
0.002 
0.145 
0.096 
0.699 
0.854 
0.899 
0.015 
0.562 
0.252 
 
 
.142 
.103 
-.201 
-.024 
.402 
.029 
.182 
-.119 
 
 
3.350 
.980 
-4.856 
-.395 
6.691 
.466 
3.756 
-1.173 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.328 
0.000 
0.693 
0.000 
0.641 
0.000 
0.241 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.033 
-.003 
.152 
-.043 
-.292 
-.172 
-.102 
.045 
 
 
.595 
-.021 
2.897 
-.439 
-2.916 
-2.228 
-1.450 
.334 
 
0.000 
0.552 
0.983 
0.004 
0.661 
0.004 
0.027 
0.148 
0.739 
 
 
.176 
.057 
-.152 
.023 
-.124 
-.241 
-.086 
-.071 
 
 
3.882 
.505 
-3.437 
.344 
-1.929 
-3.536 
-1.631 
-.654 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.614 
0.001 
0.731 
0.054 
0.000 
0.104 
0.513 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
 
 
 
When performing research with time-series observations, the data should be 
analyzed for serial correlation, also called autocorrelation.  Serial correlation occurs in 
time-series studies when the errors associated with a given time period carry over into 
future time periods.  Serial correlation will not affect the unbiasedness or consistency of 
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OLS estimators, but it does affect their efficiency, which can lead to inaccurate 
parameter estimates.  The most common statistical test for serial correlation is the 
Durbin-Watson test.  The Durbin-Watson critical values for data with 200 cases and 
nine variables (including the intercept) at the 0.01 significance level are dL = 1.582 and 
dU = 1.768.  These critical values will be used in this research to analyze the data for 
serial correlation.  Based on the null hypothesis that error terms are not autocorrelated, 
the Durbin-Watson statistic for each dependent variable will be compared to the lower 
limit critical value of 1.582, and if the Durbin-Watson statistic is below the critical 
value then the null hypothesis will be rejected and existence of serial correlation will be 
confirmed. 
Table 4.7 provides additional information for the regression models analyzed in 
Table 4.6.  Table 4.7 provides the Durbin-Watson statistic for each dependent variable 
for both pre- and post-Katrina, and also provides the R-Squared and Adjusted R-
Squared for each variable, which provides insight into the explanatory power of each 
model.  Based on the Durbin-Watson test statistic, the only dependent variable that 
exhibits serial correlation is pre-Katrina housing unit estimates.  The primary timeframe 
of interest in this research is post-Katrina and housing unit estimates is not a primary 
variable of interest, so no adjustments will be made to correct this serial correlation.  
For the remaining 11 dependent variables, the null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated 
errors can be accepted and statistical analysis can thus continue with no corrections for 
positive or negative serial correlation in these time-series models. 
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Table 4.7 
 
Supplemental Information for Summary Table 4.6 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Dependent Variables 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Personal Income .629 .620 1.788 .365 .354 2.346 
Average Wage Per Job .052 .028 2.290 .129 .114 2.067 
Per Capita Income .146 .125 2.343 .103 .088 2.486 
Median Household Inc. .152 .130 2.139 .066 .050 2.581 
Housing Units .352 .337 1.083 .234 .222 1.947 
Building Permits .133 .114 1.780 .096 .083 2.124 
Total Industry Earnings .719 .712 1.775 .586 .579 1.976 
Construction Earnings .256 .237 1.794 .327 .315 1.757 
Manufacturing Earnings .081 .058 1.651 .235 .223 1.785 
Total Employment .156 .135 1.725 .230 .217 1.981 
Construction Employment .073 .050 2.077 .246 .234 1.806 
Manufacturing Employment .123 .102 1.704 .122 .108 1.884 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
 
 
 
GO Zone versus GO Zone, Non-GO Zone versus Non-GO Zone Pre- and Post-Katrina 
In addition to the multiple regression procedures listed above, additional tests 
were performed comparing GO Zone counties to themselves pre- and post-Katrina.   
Table 4.8 provides the results from these additional multiple regression tests.  An 
alternate version of the GO Zone independent variable was created and named Katrina 
to identify pre-Katrina versus post-Katrina time periods.  These statistical tests were 
performed to determine whether statistically significant differences existed in GO Zone 
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counties post-Katrina when compared to GO Zone counties pre-Katrina.  Significant 
results on the primary dependent variables of interest (personal income, average wages 
per job, manufacturing employment, and manufacturing earnings) would provide 
support for the effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives. 
The models were tested for violations of the multiple regression assumptions.  
Partial regression plots of each independent variable on the dependent variables exhibit 
no curvilinear patterns that would violate the linearity assumption in this model.  A 
review of the studentized residuals plotted against each dependent variable shows no 
presence of unequal variances or heteroscedasticity through a constant pattern in the 
residuals.  The residual plots show no consistent patterns related to independence of the 
error term and the partial regression plots indicate no major violations of the 
independence of the error term for the predicted variables.  Once again, several of the 
dependent variables showed leptokurtic (kurtosis) tendencies, indicating nonnormality.  
Due to the large sample sizes used in this research, however, these “peaked” 
distributions should not lead to spurious results.  The graphical analysis indicates no 
major violations of the regression assumptions required for appropriate multiple 
regression models and no transformations are necessary to proceed with the 
interpretation of the results; however, additional statistical procedures will be performed 
during a sensitivity analysis to verify results. 
The results in Table 4.8 compare of GO Zone counties to GO Zone counties pre- 
and post-Katrina and non-GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-
Katrina.
36
  Each overall model analyzed was statistically significant below the alpha 
level of 0.05.  Based on the additional multiple regression procedures, only three of the 
                                                 
36
 Appendices AO through AZ contain information by state pertaining to Table 4.8. 
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dependent variables showed a statistically significant change, at the alpha level equal to 
0.05, when comparing the GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2003-
2004) to the post-Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling for the independent 
variables included in each model.  These variables were construction employment, with 
a p-value of 0.000, construction net earnings, with a p-value of 0.000, and the number 
of building permits issued annually, with a p-value of 0.009.  These significant 
differences were not unexpected and confirm earlier results from the linear mixed 
effects models.  The physical property damage caused by Katrina would lead to the 
increased annual changes in construction employment, construction net earnings and 
building permits issued.   
In the previous multiple regression procedures (see Table 4.6); significant 
differences existed in average wages per job when comparing GO Zone to non-GO 
Zone counties post-Katrina.  Results shown in Table 4.8 provide insight into this 
difference in average wages per job.  In GO Zone counties the year-over-year change in 
average wages per job were not significantly different when comparing pre-Katrina 
time periods to post-Katrina time periods; however, in non-GO Zone counties, average 
wages per job decreased post-Katrina and these changes were statistically significant (p-
value 0.029), providing an explanation for the earlier findings.  The significant 
differences in manufacturing net earnings and manufacturing employment from 
previous regressions were not supported, and these results do not provide support for 
the effectiveness of regional tax incentives.  Overall, findings reported in Table 4.8 do 
not indicate that the tax incentives provided to the GO Zone counties have had a 
statistically significant impact on key economic indicators evaluated in this research. 
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Table 4.8 
Summary Table Comparing GO Zone Counties to GO Zone Counties and 
non-GO Zone Counties to non-GO Zone Counties Pre- and Post-Katrina 
using Annual Change Values and Multiple Regression 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables (Yearly Changes) Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t – 
statistic 
P-
value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.113 
.009 
-.027 
-.038 
.522 
-.115 
-.163 
.039 
-.019 
 
 
1.050 
.195 
-.245 
-.360 
8.702 
-2.020 
-2.682 
.749 
-.182 
 
0.000 
0.294 
0.846 
0.807 
0.719 
0.000 
0.044 
0.008 
0.454 
0.855 
 
 
-.001 
.011 
-.024 
-.026 
.535 
.295 
-.070 
-.043 
.008 
 
 
-.019 
.407 
-.357 
-.365 
9.554 
5.320 
-1.696 
-1.251 
.125 
 
 
0.000 
0.985 
0.684 
0.721 
0.716 
0.000 
0.000 
0.091 
0.212 
0.901 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.196 
-.013 
-.066 
-.005 
-.105 
.232 
-.104 
.042 
.013 
 
 
1.610 
-.237 
-.528 
-.043 
-1.548 
3.594 
-1.515 
.700 
.109 
 
0.000 
0.108 
0.813 
0.597 
0.965 
0.122 
0.000 
0.131 
0.484 
0.913 
 
 
-.278 
-.020 
.191 
.274 
-.211 
.212 
-.352 
-.130 
-.144 
 
 
-2.193 
-.422 
1.652 
2.253 
-2.183 
2.223 
-4.970 
-2.178 
-1.266 
 
0.000 
0.029 
0.673 
0.099 
0.025 
0.030 
0.027 
0.000 
0.030 
0.206 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.120 
.002 
-.001 
-.103 
-.280 
.371 
-.092 
.012 
-.033 
 
 
.971 
.042 
-.007 
-.855 
-4.078 
5.680 
-1.320 
.205 
-.273 
 
0.000 
0.332 
0.966 
0.994 
0.393 
0.000 
0.000 
0.188 
0.838 
0.785 
 
 
-.431 
.074 
-.140 
.334 
-.201 
.179 
-.270 
-.235 
.165 
 
 
-3.399 
1.528 
-1.210 
2.737 
-2.076 
1.866 
-3.802 
-3.933 
1.456 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.127 
0.227 
0.006 
0.038 
0.063 
0.000 
0.000 
0.146 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.045 
-.016 
-.018 
.187 
-.053 
.084 
-.177 
.064 
.005 
 
 
.369 
-.296 
-.145 
1.581 
-.789 
1.308 
-2.585 
1.082 
.040 
 
0.000 
0.712 
0.767 
0.885 
0.115 
0.431 
0.192 
0.010 
0.280 
0.968 
 
 
.004 
-.002 
.140 
.104 
.052 
-.072 
-.173 
-.028 
-.124 
 
 
.030 
-.032 
1.182 
.838 
.521 
-.733 
-2.382 
-.459 
-1.068 
 
0.014 
0.976 
0.975 
0.238 
0.402 
0.603 
0.464 
0.018 
0.647 
0.286 
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Table 4.8 - Continued 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t – 
statistic 
P-
value 
Housing Units (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.106 
.048 
.140 
.370 
-.651 
-.057 
.015 
-.050 
 
 
-.934 
.413 
1.272 
6.065 
-11.087 
-.884 
.265 
-..450 
 
0.000 
0.351 
0.680 
0.204 
0.000 
0.000 
0.377 
0.791 
0.653 
 
 
.081 
.149 
-.086 
.882 
-.109 
-.145 
-.059 
-.067 
 
 
1.085 
2.199 
-1.204 
15.531 
-1.936 
-3.473 
-1.726 
-1.000 
 
0.000 
0.278 
0.028 
0.229 
0.000 
0.053 
0.001 
0.085 
0.318 
Building Permits (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.327 
.030 
-.472 
-.075 
.198 
.109 
.038 
-.022 
 
 
2.632 
.241 
-3.902 
-1.116 
3.072 
1.544 
.624 
-.180 
 
0.000 
0.009 
0.810 
0.000 
0.265 
0.002 
0.123 
0.533 
0.857 
 
 
.058 
-.045 
-.270 
-.200 
.024 
.019 
.005 
.023 
 
 
.458 
-.391 
-2.214 
-2.075 
.248 
.265 
.080 
.204 
 
0.000 
0.647 
0.696 
0.027 
0.039 
0.805 
0.791 
0.936 
0.839 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
Community Grant Funding  
 
 
.117 
.080 
-.052 
-.039 
.563 
.189 
-.097 
.056 
.003 
-.405 
 
 
1.328 
2.079 
-.582 
-.452 
11.430 
3.617 
-1.958 
1.319 
.037 
-10.092 
 
0.000 
0.185 
0.038 
0.561 
0.651 
0.000 
0.000 
0.51 
0.188 
0.971 
0.000 
 
 
-.024 
.039 
.037 
-.104 
.355 
.480 
-.076 
-.047 
-.028 
.014 
 
 
-.335 
1.393 
.560 
-1.499 
6.392 
8.751 
-1.862 
-1.362 
-.434 
.507 
 
0.000 
0.738 
0.164 
0.576 
0.135 
0.000 
0.000 
0.063 
0.174 
0.664 
0.612 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
Community Grant Funding 
 
 
.375 
.000 
-.294 
-.085 
.746 
-.011 
.121 
-.050 
-.238 
 
 
3.564 
-.001 
-2.895 
-1.507 
12.046 
-.209 
2.535 
-.481 
-5.046 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.999 
0.004 
0.133 
0.000 
0.834 
0.012 
0.631 
0.000 
 
 
.195 
-.030 
-.369 
.118 
.002 
-.147 
-.058 
.037 
.044 
 
 
1.462 
-.246 
-2.870 
1.171 
.017 
-1.941 
-.941 
.309 
.897 
 
0.000 
0.145 
0.806 
0.004 
0.242 
0.987 
0.053 
0.347 
0.758 
0.370 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.186 
-.038 
-.139 
.095 
.129 
-.185 
.002 
.037 
 
 
1.485 
-.295 
-1.141 
1.411 
1.993 
-2.706 
.036 
.299 
 
0.000 
0.138 
0.768 
0.254 
0.159 
0.047 
0.007 
0.971 
0.765 
 
 
.089 
-.152 
-.246 
-.059 
.463 
-.107 
-.008 
.091 
 
 
.744 
-1.372 
-2.122 
-.646 
5.135 
-1.567 
-.143 
.843 
 
0.000 
0.457 
0.171 
0.034 
0.518 
0.000 
0.118 
0.887 
0.400 
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Table 4.8 - Continued 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t – 
statistic 
P-
value 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.076 
-.027 
.035 
.025 
.419 
-.469 
-.112 
.066 
-.062 
 
 
.641 
-.523 
.285 
.213 
6.353 
-7.482 
-1.671 
1.147 
-.528 
 
0.000 
0.522 
0.601 
0.776 
0.831 
0.000 
0.000 
0.095 
0.252 
0.598 
 
 
.095 
.076 
.099 
-.097 
.515 
-.010 
-.285 
-.050 
-.092 
 
 
.958 
2.018 
1.101 
-1.018 
6.824 
-.131 
-5.158 
-1.070 
-1.046 
 
0.000 
0.338 
0.044 
0.272 
0.309 
0.000 
0.896 
0.000 
0.285 
0.296 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.549 
-.103 
-.436 
-.106 
.427 
.011 
.213 
.039 
 
 
4.656 
-.854 
-3.815 
-1.670 
7.008 
.184 
3.970 
.333 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.394 
0.000 
0.096 
0.000 
0.854 
0.000 
0.740 
 
 
.165 
-.036 
-.247 
.374 
-.264 
-.196 
-.026 
.029 
 
 
1.260 
-.299 
-1.964 
3.828 
-2.706 
-2.644 
-.428 
.252 
 
0.000 
0.209 
0.765 
0.050 
0.000 
0.007 
0.009 
0.669 
0.801 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.140 
.036 
-.082 
-.042 
-.100 
-.201 
-.033 
.008 
 
 
1.072 
.276 
-.648 
-.600 
-1.484 
-2.862 
-.537 
.065 
 
0.000 
0.284 
0.782 
0.517 
0.549 
0.139 
0.004 
0.592 
0.948 
 
 
-.050 
.043 
-.078 
-.749 
.355 
-.459 
-.148 
.015 
 
 
-.407 
.385 
-.665 
-8.114 
3.884 
-6.516 
-2.612 
.136 
 
0.000 
0.684 
0.700 
0.507 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.009 
0.892 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
The Katrina independent variable is used to identify pre- and post-Katrina time periods.   
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
 
 
 
The data used for these regression procedures was analyzed for serial 
correlation.  Table 4.9 provides additional information for the regression models 
analyzed in Table 4.8.  Table 4.9 provides the Durbin-Watson statistic for each 
dependent variable for both GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties, and also reports the 
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R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared for each variable, which provides insight into the 
explanatory power of each model.  Based on the Durbin-Watson test statistic (evaluated 
at dL = 1.582), the dependent variables that exhibit serial correlation are non-GO Zone 
housing unit estimates, non-GO Zone personal income, and non-GO Zone construction 
earnings.  The primary counties/parishes of interest in this research are GO Zone, so no 
adjustments will be made to correct this serial correlation.  For the remaining dependent 
variables, the null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated errors can be accepted and it is 
possible to continue with no corrections for positive or negative serial correlation in 
these time-series models. 
 
Table 4.9 
 
Supplemental Information for Summary Table 4.8 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Dependent Variables 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Personal Income .308 .294 2.209 .694 .688 1.461 
Average Wage Per Job .113 .095 2.031 .088 .069 2.325 
Per Capita Income .092 .074 2.489 .085 .067 2.343 
Median Household Inc. .123 .105 2.479 .045 .026 2.646 
Housing Units  .233 .219 1.952 .681 .676 0.674 
Building Permits  .076 .059 2.014 .082 .066 1.973 
Total Industry Earnings .544 .533 1.779 .702 .695 1.815 
Construction Earnings .401 .388 1.691 .079 .059 1.406 
Manufacturing Earnings .112 .095 1.704 .256 .242 1.896 
Total Employment .164 .147 1.827 .445 .434 1.584 
Construction Employment .238 .223 1.922 .113 .096 1.831 
Manufacturing Employment .046 .028 1.753 .220 .205 1.660 
 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable for 2003, 2004, 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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Based on the combined data analysis from all of the models tested with linear 
mixed effects and multiple regression procedures, statistical evidence supporting the 
rejection of hypothesis number one (H1) does not exist.  The null hypothesis, therefore, 
is supported and the conclusion is drawn that the tax policy investment incentives 
provided by the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 have no impact on economic 
growth in the affected region.  Additional statistical procedures will be performed 
during a sensitivity analysis to help confirm or deny these conclusions. 
 
Research Question Two 
As noted in Chapter Three, the second research question examines whether tax 
policy investment incentives at the regional level are a zero-sum game, where economic 
growth created by incentives in one region come at the expense of the surrounding 
regions.  The second phase of the research utilizes multiple regression implementing the 
same panel data set used during the first research phase.  Research question 2 will be 
tested with many of the same economic indicators implemented in research question 1; 
however research question 2 will examine the percentage change in each of these 
variables individually at the county level and will attempt to determine whether any 
increases in economic growth in the affected core disaster area are offset by decreases 
in the surrounding counties.  Each dependent variable will be analyzed individually for 
the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) and for the two-year period preceding Hurricane 
Katrina (2003-2004).  The models are as follows: 
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%AIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt + εt 
%MIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt + εt 
%CIEt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt + εt 
%PCIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt + εt 
%PEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
%TEIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
%MEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt  
%CEJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
%MHIt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
%AWJt = β0 + β1GOZt + β2PDEt + β3FGEt + β4UNRt + β5STAt +εt 
 
where, for a given county/parish at a time period t: 
 
GOZ  = GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no); 
%AIE = percentage change in annual industry earnings; 
%MIE = percentage change in manufacturing industry earnings; 
%CIE = percentage change in construction industry earnings; 
%PCI = percentage change in per capita income; 
%PEI = percentage change in personal income; 
%TEI = percentage change in total employment for all industries; 
%MEJ = percentage change in total manufacturing employment; 
%CEJ = percentage change in total construction employment; 
%MHI = percentage change in the median household income; 
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%AWJ = percentage change in the average wage per job; 
PDE  = population density; 
FGE  = total federal government expenditures by county; 
UNR  = civilian labor force unemployment rate by county; 
STA  = state identification control variable; 
 
 
The year-over-year percentage change is calculated at the county level by taking 
current year minus previous year divided by previous year.
37
  For example, to calculate 
the population change for 2006, the 2005 population figure will be subtracted from the 
2006 population figure and the resulting number will be divided by the 2005 population 
figure and then converted (by multiplying by 100) to a percentage to calculate the 
change for 2006.  The percentage change at the county level for each variable will be 
calculated, and the data will then be analyzed to determine whether growth in the GO 
Zone region came at the expense of surrounding regions.  As in the multiple regression 
analysis of research question 1, research question 2 will be tested by comparing GO 
Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina, and will also be tested 
by comparing GO Zone counties to GO Zone counties and comparing non-GO Zone 
counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina.      
Since the data analysis on research question 2 in this research study utilizes 
standard multiple regression equations, the models must be tested for violations of the 
regression assumptions.  Partial regression plots of each independent variable on the 
dependent variables exhibit no curvilinear patterns that would violate the linearity 
assumption of this model.  A review of the studentized residuals plotted against each 
                                                 
37
 Appendices BY through CH contain information by state pertaining to the annual percentage change 
values for each dependent variable. 
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dependent variable shows no presence of unequal variances or heteroscedasticity by 
exhibiting a constant pattern in the residuals.  The residual plots show no consistent 
patterns related to independence of the error term and the partial regression plots 
indicate no major violations of the independence of the error term for the predicted 
variables.  Normality was analyzed by examining the histograms of the residuals and 
normal probability plots.  The histogram distributions approximated normal 
distributions, and the normal probability plots showed only minimal deviations from the 
normal diagonal.  The graphical analysis indicates no major violations of the regression 
assumptions required for appropriate multiple regression models and no transformations 
are necessary to proceed with the interpretation of the results. 
The results reported in Table 4.10 compare the annual percentage change values 
for GO Zone counties versus non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina.  Each 
overall model analyzed was statistically significant below the alpha level of 0.05, except 
for pre-Katrina construction industry earnings, personal income, average wage per job, 
and post-Katrina median household income.  Based on the multiple regression 
procedures, eight of the ten dependent variables tested showed statistically significant 
differences, at the alpha level equal to 0.05, between GO Zone and non-GO Zone 
counties post-Katrina,  and these differences did not exist during the pre-Katrina time 
period (2003-2004), after controlling for the independent variables included in each 
model.   These variables were personal income, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.011, 
construction employment, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.014, construction net 
earnings, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.018, average wage per job, with a post-
Katrina p-value of 0.001, total industry net earnings, with a post-Katrina p-value of 
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0.003, manufacturing employment, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.033, manufacturing 
net earnings, with a post-Katrina p-value of 0.003, and total employment, with a post-
Katrina p-value of 0.001.   
Additional statistical procedures were performed on the full dataset examining 
the interaction between GO Zone versus non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina; 
essentially testing whether the pre-Katrina and post-Katrina regression coefficients 
reported in Table 4.10 for the GO Zone variable in each model were statistically 
different.  Based on these multiple regression procedures, three of the dependent 
variables showed a statistically significant change at the alpha level equal to 0.05 when 
comparing the GO Zone variable regression coefficient from the pre-Katrina time 
period to the coefficient from the post-Katrina time period, after controlling for the 
independent variables included in each model.   These variables were construction 
employment, with p-value of 0.039, average wages per job, with a p-value of 0.028, and 
total employment, with a p-value of 0.033.  These results verify previously reported 
statistical differences concerning these variables. 
These significant differences in the construction industry were not unexpected 
and can be explained by the physical property damage caused by Hurricane Katrina.  
The significant differences in annual percentage change values in the remaining 
dependent variables could provide support for the theory that regional tax incentives are 
a zero-sum game, but additional procedures need to be performed before such 
conclusions can be drawn.  Evidence in support of the zero-sum game theory will exist 
if additional statistical tests show that the annual percentage change in GO Zone 
counties post-Katrina (2006-2008) were significantly greater than the annual percentage 
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change pre-Katrina (2003-2004), and if statistical tests also show that the annual 
percentage change in non-GO Zone counties post-Katrina were significantly smaller 
than the annual percentage change in non-GO Zone counties pre-Katrina.  
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Table 4.10 
Summary Table Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties Pre- and 
Post-Katrina using Annual Percentage Change Values and Multiple 
Regression 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.093 
.057 
.096 
-.035 
-.001 
-.005 
 
 
-1.691 
1.004 
1.815 
-.347 
-.009 
-.080 
 
0.263 
0.092 
0.316 
0.070 
0.729 
0.993 
0.937 
 
 
.110 
.061 
.077 
.100 
-.180 
-.289 
 
 
2.545 
1.181 
1.813 
1.538 
-2.865 
-5.397 
 
0.000 
0.011 
0.238 
0.070 
0.125 
0.004 
0.000 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.035 
.081 
.121 
-.056 
.078 
.103 
 
 
-.640 
1.433 
2.306 
-.556 
.785 
1.784 
 
0.055 
0.523 
0.153 
0.022 
0.579 
0.433 
0.075 
 
 
.141 
.043 
-.001 
-.206 
.226 
-.219 
 
 
3.226 
.830 
-.029 
-3.142 
3.555 
-4.047 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.407 
0.977 
0.002 
0.000 
0.000 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.090 
.015 
.100 
-.092 
.073 
.181 
 
 
-1.657 
.272 
1.932 
-.928 
.738 
3.159 
 
0.001 
0.098 
0.786 
0.054 
0.354 
0.461 
0.002 
 
 
.066 
-.001 
-.012 
-.364 
.420 
-.109 
 
 
1.518 
-.014 
-.278 
-5.566 
6.651 
-2.025 
 
0.000 
0.130 
0.989 
0.781 
0.000 
0.000 
0.043 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.126 
.103 
-.253 
-.157 
-.040 
.064 
 
 
-2.448 
1.969 
-5.166 
-1.678 
-.428 
1.184 
 
0.000 
0.015 
0.050 
0.000 
0.094 
0.669 
0.237 
 
 
.037 
.019 
.082 
-.064 
.058 
-.141 
 
 
.832 
.358 
1.848 
-.945 
.890 
-2.533 
 
0.078 
0.406 
0.720 
0.065 
0.345 
0.374 
0.012 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.028 
.033 
.197 
-.086 
.032 
-.187 
 
 
.498 
.581 
3.719 
-.849 
.323 
-3.183 
 
0.000 
0.619 
0.562 
0.000 
0.397 
0.747 
0.002 
 
 
.094 
.056 
-.125 
-.042 
-.022 
-.322 
 
 
2.136 
1.078 
-2.883 
-.640 
-.349 
-5.875 
 
0.000 
0.033 
0.282 
0.004 
0.523 
0.727 
0.000 
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Table 4.10 - Continued 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.082 
.094 
-.130 
-.051 
.013 
.065 
 
 
-1.502 
1.678 
-2.500 
-.508 
.132 
1.123 
 
0.012 
0.134 
0.094 
0.013 
0.612 
0.895 
0.262 
 
 
.129 
.084 
.067 
.037 
-.062 
-.371 
 
 
3.037 
1.668 
1.599 
.573 
-1.005 
-7.055 
 
0.000 
0.003 
0.096 
0.110 
0.567 
0.316 
0.000 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.056 
-.104 
-.005 
.057 
-.077 
.005 
 
 
-.979 
-1.784 
-.091 
.540 
-.742 
.079 
 
0.486 
0.328 
0.075 
0.927 
0.590 
0.459 
0.937 
 
 
.111 
.054 
-.102 
-.093 
.070 
-.102 
 
 
2.381 
.978 
-2.225 
-1.338 
1.037 
-1.762 
 
0.002 
0.018 
0.328 
0.027 
0.181 
0.300 
0.079 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.015 
.043 
.074 
-.115 
.086 
-.190 
 
 
-.258 
.744 
1.360 
-1.112 
.833 
-3.155 
 
0.029 
0.797 
0.457 
0.175 
0.267 
0.406 
0.002 
 
 
.130 
.048 
-.139 
-.025 
-.006 
-.283 
 
 
2.944 
.928 
-3.184 
-.376 
-.089 
-5.154 
 
0.000 
0.003 
0.354 
0.002 
0.707 
0.929 
0.000 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.027 
-.072 
.153 
-.003 
-.043 
-.361 
 
 
-.533 
-1.388 
3.149 
-.035 
-.471 
-6.735 
 
0.000 
0.595 
0.166 
0.002 
0.972 
0.638 
0.000 
 
 
.134 
.120 
-.073 
.271 
-.397 
-.371 
 
 
3.329 
2.497 
-1.849 
4.475 
-6.780 
-7.443 
 
0.000 
0.001 
0.013 
0.065 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.058 
-.135 
-.016 
.012 
-.093 
-.110 
 
 
-1.013 
-2.332 
-.300 
.119 
-.908 
-1.824 
 
0.043 
0.312 
0.020 
0.764 
0.905 
0.364 
0.069 
 
 
.115 
.052 
-.123 
-.104 
.084 
-.052 
 
 
2.459 
.943 
-2.675 
-1.490 
1.247 
-.902 
 
0.002 
0.014 
0.346 
0.008 
0.137 
0.213 
0.367 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual percentage change by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
 
 
130 
 
The data used for these regression procedures were analyzed for serial 
correlation.  Table 4.11 provides additional information for the regression models 
reported in Table 4.10.  Table 4.11 provides the Durbin-Watson statistic for each 
dependent variable for both the pre- and post-Katrina time periods, and also provides 
the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared for each variable.  Based on the Durbin-Watson 
test statistic (evaluated at dL = 1.582), no dependent variables exhibit serial correlation.  
The null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated errors can be accepted and it is possible to 
continue with no corrections for serial correlation in these time-series models. 
 
Table 4.11 
 
Supplemental Information for Summary Table 4.10 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Dependent Variables 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Personal Income  .021 .005 2.281 .097 .087 2.672 
Average Wage Per Job .034 .017 2.237 .082 .071 2.089 
Per Capita Income .059 .043 2.202 .092 .082 2.273 
Median Household Inc. .155 .141 1.983 .021 .010 2.556 
Total Industry Earnings .045 .029 2.322 .133 .124 2.262 
Construction Earnings .016 -.002 2.108 .041 .030 2.025 
Manufacturing Earnings .042 .024 1.616 .125 .115 1.888 
Total Employment .173 .159 1.840 .219 .210 1.861 
Construction Employment .038 .021 2.111 .042 .030 2.097 
Manufacturing Employment .081 .064 1.703 .128 .118 1.837 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual percentage change by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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GO Zone versus GO Zone, Non-GO Zone versus Non-GO Zone Pre- and Post-Katrina 
Additional tests were performed comparing GO Zone counties to GO Zone 
counties pre- and post-Katrina and non-GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties 
pre- and post-Katrina.  Table 4.12 reports the results from these multiple regression 
tests.  An alternate version of the GO Zone independent variable was created and named 
Katrina to identify pre-Katrina versus post-Katrina time periods.  These statistical tests 
were performed to determine if statistically significant increases in the annual 
percentage changes in values existed in GO Zone counties post-Katrina when compared 
to GO Zone counties pre-Katrina, if statistically significant decreases in annual 
percentage change values existed in non-GO Zone counties post-Katrina when 
compared to non- GO Zone counties pre-Katrina.  Significant results would provide 
support for the theory that regional tax incentives are a zero-sum game. 
The models were tested for violations of the multiple regression assumptions.  
Partial regression plots of each independent variable on the dependent variables exhibit 
no curvilinear patterns that would violate the linearity assumption for this model.  A 
review of the studentized residuals plotted against each dependent variable shows no 
presence of unequal variances or heteroscedasticity by exhibiting an obvious pattern in 
the residuals.  The residual plots show no consistent patterns related to independence of 
the error term and the partial regression plots indicate no major violations of the 
assumption of independence of the error term for the predicted variables.  Normality 
was examined by examining the histograms of the residuals and normal probability 
plots.  The histogram distributions approximated normal distributions, and the normal 
probability plots showed only minimal deviations from the normal diagonal.  The 
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graphical analysis indicates no major violations of the assumptions required for 
appropriate multiple regression models and no transformations are necessary to proceed 
with the interpretation of the results. 
The results reported in Table 4.12 compare GO Zone counties to GO Zone 
counties pre- and post-Katrina and non-GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties 
pre- and post-Katrina.  Each overall model analyzed was statistically significant below 
the alpha level of 0.05, except for pre-Katrina construction industry earnings, and post-
Katrina personal income, median household income, and construction employment.  
Based on the multiple regression procedures, four of the dependent variables showed a 
statistically significant change, at the alpha level equal to 0.05, when comparing the GO 
Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2003-2004) to the post-Katrina time 
period (2006-2008), after controlling for the independent variables included in each 
model.  These variables were construction employment, with a p-value of 0.020, total 
employment, with a p-value of 0.036, total industry net earnings, with a p-value of 
0.008, and manufacturing industry net earnings, with a p-value of 0.008.  Based on the 
standardized coefficients, these differences pointed to significant increases in the annual 
percentage change in each variable, except for annual industry net earnings, which 
showed smaller values post-Katrina compared to the pre-Katrina timeframe.  Only two 
of the dependent variables produced a statistically significant change, at the alpha level 
equal to 0.05, when comparing the non-GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time 
period (2003-2004) to the post-Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling for 
the independent variables included in each model.  These variables were construction 
employment, with a p-value of 0.026, and construction industry net earnings, with a p-
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value of 0.004.  Three of the four primary variables of interest (average wages per job, 
manufacturing employment, and manufacturing earnings) showed larger percentage 
changes post-Katrina in GO Zone counties and smaller percentage changes post-Katrina 
in non-GO Zone counties, providing support for the zero-sum game theory.  These 
results, however, were not significant at the alpha level equal to 0.05, eliminating the 
possibility of drawing conclusions supporting the zero-sum game theory. 
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Table 4.12 
Summary Table Comparing GO Zone Counties to GO Zone Counties and 
non-GO Zone Counties to non-GO Zone Counties Pre- and Post-Katrina 
using Annual Percentage Change Values and Multiple Regression 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.153 
.024 
.232 
.039 
-.150 
-.252 
 
 
-1.251 
.486 
1.930 
.593 
-2.342 
-4.800 
 
0.000 
0.212 
0.627 
0.054 
0.554 
0.020 
0.000 
 
 
-.226 
.050 
.084 
-.024 
.002 
-.136 
 
 
-1.757 
.877 
.672 
-.241 
.024 
-2.170 
 
0.091 
0.080 
0.381 
0.502 
0.810 
0.981 
0.031 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.218 
.006 
-.099 
-.135 
.184 
-.099 
 
 
1.759 
.114 
-.817 
-2.039 
2.833 
-1.862 
 
0.000 
0.079 
0.910 
0.415 
0.042 
0.005 
0.063 
 
 
-.214 
.092 
.172 
-.329 
.237 
-.255 
 
 
-1.775 
1.649 
1.398 
-3.402 
2.528 
-4.125 
 
0.001 
0.077 
0.100 
0.163 
0.001 
0.012 
0.000 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.102 
-.038 
-.103 
-.290 
.353 
-.073 
 
 
.833 
-.780 
-.854 
-4.425 
5.493 
-1.395 
 
0.000 
0.405 
0.436 
0.394 
0.000 
0.000 
0.164 
 
 
-.240 
.021 
.087 
-.276 
.217 
.002 
 
 
-1.886 
.373 
.709 
-2.857 
2.311 
.036 
 
0.002 
0.060 
0.710 
0.479 
0.004 
0.021 
0.971 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.089 
-.008 
.110 
-.102 
.081 
-.114 
 
 
.724 
-.171 
.910 
-1.550 
1.251 
-2.155 
 
0.000 
0.469 
0.865 
0.364 
0.122 
0.212 
0.032 
 
 
.076 
.023 
.012 
-.129 
.047 
-.068 
 
 
.589 
.413 
.095 
-1.318 
.498 
-1.092 
 
0.203 
0.556 
0.680 
0.924 
0.188 
0.619 
0.275 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.251 
.023 
-.190 
-.004 
-.052 
-.185 
 
 
1.952 
.450 
-1.508 
-.057 
-.778 
-3.400 
 
0.002 
0.052 
0.653 
0.132 
0.955 
0.437 
0.001 
 
 
-.154 
.135 
.079 
-.363 
.271 
-.489 
 
 
-1.231 
2.425 
.653 
-3.818 
2.941 
-7.945 
 
0.000 
0.219 
0.016 
0.514 
0.000 
0.003 
0.000 
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Table 4.12 - Continued 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.328 
.057 
.180 
-.022 
-.034 
-.235 
 
 
-2.647 
1.151 
1.484 
-.331 
-.524 
-4.430 
 
0.000 
0.008 
0.250 
0.139 
0.741 
0.600 
0.000 
 
 
-.036 
.047 
-.282 
-.102 
.075 
-.088 
 
 
-.290 
.868 
-2.342 
-1.077 
.824 
-1.463 
 
0.000 
0.772 
0.386 
0.020 
0.282 
0.411 
0.144 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.187 
-.006 
-.099 
-.050 
.042 
-.031 
 
 
1.412 
-.117 
-.764 
-.705 
.614 
-.554 
 
0.369 
0.159 
0.907 
0.445 
0.481 
0.540 
0.580 
 
 
.377 
-.002 
-.547 
-.101 
.049 
-.120 
 
 
2.873 
-.029 
-4.291 
-1.019 
.507 
-1.896 
 
0.000 
0.004 
0.977 
0.000 
0.309 
0.612 
0.059 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.389 
.047 
-.357 
.003 
-.031 
-.170 
 
 
3.037 
.926 
-2.841 
.047 
-.459 
-3.131 
 
0.001 
0.003 
0.355 
0.005 
0.963 
0.646 
0.002 
 
 
-.200 
.104 
.048 
-.329 
.274 
-.449 
 
 
-1.569 
1.841 
.384 
-3.410 
2.921 
-7.220 
 
0.000 
0.118 
0.066 
0.701 
0.001 
0.004 
0.000 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.244 
.032 
-.019 
.193 
-.322 
-.273 
 
 
2.105 
.684 
-.165 
3.118 
-5.320 
-5.513 
 
0.000 
0.036 
0.494 
0.869 
0.002 
0.000 
0.000 
 
 
.049 
.089 
-.025 
.051 
-.089 
-.548 
 
 
.439 
1.811 
-.235 
.607 
-1.076 
-10.104 
 
0.000 
0.661 
0.071 
0.814 
0.544 
0.283 
0.000 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
State Code 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.306 
-.011 
-.179 
-.089 
.061 
-.053 
 
 
2.337 
-.222 
-1.401 
-1.283 
.893 
-.953 
 
0.015 
0.020 
0.824 
0.162 
0.200 
0.372 
0.341 
 
 
.299 
-.057 
-.336 
.028 
-.079 
-.055 
 
 
2.227 
-.966 
-2.574 
.273 
-.801 
-.847 
 
0.070 
0.026 
0.335 
0.010 
0.785 
0.423 
0.398 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual percentage change by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau.  
The Katrina independent variable is used to identify pre- and post-Katrina time periods.   
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
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The data used for these multiple regression procedures were tested for serial 
correlation.  Table 4.13 provides additional information for the regression models 
reported in Table 4.12.  Table 4.13 provides the Durbin-Watson statistic for each 
dependent variable for both GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties.  The table also 
provides the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared for each variable.  Based on the 
Durbin-Watson test statistic (evaluated at dL = 1.582), no dependent variables exhibit 
serial correlation.  The null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated errors can be accepted and 
it is possible to continue with no corrections for serial correlation in these time-series 
models. 
 
Table 4.13 
 
Supplemental Information for Summary Table 4.12 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Dependent Variables 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Personal Income .080 .067 2.578 .024 .011 2.452 
Average Wage Per Job .056 .044 2.086 .047 .034 2.360 
Per Capita Income .078 .066 2.308 .045 .032 2.439 
Median Household Inc. .066 .053 2.560 .019 .006 2.585 
Total Industry Earnings .059 .047 1.904 .093 .080 2.465 
Construction Earnings .016 .001 2.078 .072 .058 2.119 
Manufacturing Earnings .054 .041 1.706 .136 .123 1.821 
Total Employment .178 .167 1.878 .266 .256 1.859 
Construction Employment .037 .023 2.102 .028 .014 2.102 
Manufacturing Employment .049 .036 1.677 .148 .136 1.949 
 
All dependent variables represent average annual percentage change by county for each variable for 2003, 
2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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Research Question Two - Logistic Regression Procedures 
In addition, research question 2 was analyzed with binary logistic regression 
utilizing certain economic indicators implemented in research question 1; however this 
model will consider all of the variables simultaneously to determine whether 
statistically significant differences exist between GO Zone counties and non-GO Zone 
counties.  This model analyzes the two-year period (2003-2004) preceding Hurricane 
Katrina to determine whether differences existed between GO Zone counties and non-
GO Zone counties prior to the hurricanes and also analyzes the three-year GO Zone 
timeframe (2006-2008) to determine whether differences existed between GO Zone 
counties and non-GO Zone counties after the hurricanes.  The models are as follows: 
 
GOZt = β0 + β1MIEt + β2CIEt + β3PEIt + β4MEJt + β5CEJt + β6MHIt + β7AWJt 
+ β8PDEt + β9FGEt + β10UNRt + β11STAt +εt  
 
where, for a given county/parish at a time period t: 
  
GOZ  = GO Zone county (1=yes, 0=no); 
MIE  = change in total manufacturing earnings; 
CIE  = change in total construction earnings; 
PEI  = change in personal income; 
MEJ  = change in total manufacturing employment; 
CEJ  = change in total construction employment; 
MHI  = change in the median household income; 
AWJ  = change in the average wage per job; 
PDE  = population density; 
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FGE  = total federal government expenditures by county; 
UNR  = civilian labor force unemployment rate by county; 
STA  = state identification control variable; 
 
Binary logistic regression is a special form of regression in which the dependent 
variable is a non-metric, dichotomous (binary) variable.  The binary nature of the 
dependent variable has properties that violate the assumptions of standard multiple 
regression: first, the error term of a discrete variable follows a binomial distribution, 
thus invalidating all statistical testing based on the assumptions of normality and, 
second, the variance of a binary variable is not constant, creating instances of 
heteroscedasticity as well (Hair et al. 2006).  Logistic regression is a generalized linear 
model that applies maximum likelihood estimation after transforming the dependent 
variable and can be used to determine if group membership can be predicted by the 
independent variables and the variables that are significant in the prediction of group 
membership.  Logistic regression has many analogies to multiple regression; however, 
logistic regression, unlike multiple regression, does not assume that a linear relationship 
must exist between the dependent and independent variables, does not require that 
variables be normally distributed, and does not assume homoscedasticity.  In general, 
logistic regression imposes less stringent requirements than does standard multiple 
regression.   
Results from the binary logistic regression data analysis comparing Go Zone 
counties to non-GO Zone counties post-Katrina produce similar findings to previously 
analyzed multiple regression models (see Table 4.6); however, the data do not fit the 
model.  The recommended test for overall fit of a binary logistic regression model is the 
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Hosmer and Lemeshow test, also called the chi-square test (Hair et al. 2006).  The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test is used to assess the goodness of fit of a model and allows 
for any number of explanatory variables, which may be continuous or categorical.  A 
finding of non-significance (p-value greater than 0.05) allows the researcher to conclude 
that the model adequately fits the data.  In this case, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test 
performed on the binary logistic model comparing Go Zone counties to non-GO Zone 
counties post-Katrina shows a p-value of 0.000.  This significant p-value indicates that 
the overall model is not a good fit for the data at an acceptable level.  The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test performed on the binary logistic model comparing non-Go Zone 
counties to non-GO Zone counties post-Katrina shows a p-value of 0.050, indicating a 
poor overall model fit for this model as well.  Based on these significant findings, the 
binary logistic models will not be used to draw conclusions in this research study. 
Based on the multiple regression data analysis from all of the models tested for 
research question 2, statistically significant evidence supporting the rejection of 
hypothesis number two (H2) does not exist.  The null hypothesis, therefore, is not 
rejected and the conclusion is drawn that the tax policy investment incentives provided 
by the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 have no significant impact on economic 
growth in the surrounding region. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis will be performed in an attempt to eliminate the potential 
impact on research findings caused by Hurricane Katrina storm damage and to verify 
previously reported results.  A subset of the full dataset will be created and tested with 
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multiple regression procedures.  The subset sample will consist of GO Zone and non-
GO Zone counties from Mississippi.  The sample dataset will consist of the 20 most 
northern GO Zone counties in Mississippi and the 20 most southern non-GO Zone 
counties in the same state.  The impact of Hurricane Katrina should be minimized by 
selecting the northern GO Zone counties where storm damage was minimal when 
compared to counties along the coastline.  Appendix CK contains a list of the GO Zone 
and non-GO Zone counties included in the dataset.  This sample dataset will be 
analyzed using the same multiple regression models examined in research question 1 
and research question 2.          
The models were tested for violations of the multiple regression assumptions.  
Partial regression plots of each independent variable on the dependent variables exhibit 
no curvilinear patterns that would violate the linearity assumption in this model.  A 
review of the studentized residuals plotted against each dependent variable reveals no 
presence of unequal variances or heteroscedasticity by producing an obvious constant 
pattern in the residuals.  The residual plots exhibit no consistent patterns related to 
independence of the error term and the partial regression plots indicate no major 
violations of the assumption of independence of the error term for the predicted 
variables.  Normality was examined by plotting the histograms of the residuals and with 
the normal probability plots.  The histogram distributions approximated normal 
distributions, and the normal probability plots showed only minimal deviations from the 
normal diagonal.  The graphical analysis indicates no major violations of the 
assumptions required for appropriate multiple regression models and no transformations 
are therefore necessary to proceed with the interpretation of the results. 
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The results reported in Table 4.14 compare the annual change values for GO 
Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina for the restricted 
Mississippi sample.  Based on the multiple regression procedures, no statistically 
significant results exist, at the alpha level equal to 0.05, that show any differences 
between GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties pre-Katrina or post-Katrina.  Additional 
statistical procedures were performed on the full dataset examining the interaction 
between GO Zone versus non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina; essentially 
testing whether the pre-Katrina and post-Katrina regression coefficients reported in 
Table 4.14 for the GO Zone variable in each model were statistically different.  Based 
on these multiple regression procedures, none of the dependent variables showed a 
statistically significant change at the alpha level equal to 0.05 when comparing the GO 
Zone variable regression coefficient from the pre-Katrina time period to the coefficient 
from the post-Katrina time period, after controlling for the independent variables 
included in each model.  Additional multiple regression will be analyzed comparing GO 
Zone counties to GO Zone counties and non-GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone 
counties pre- and post-Katrina. 
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Table 4.14 
Sensitivity Analysis Summary Table Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone 
Counties Pre- and Post-Katrina using Annual Change Values for Subset 
Sample Dataset and Multiple Regression Procedures 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.009 
-.090 
.099 
.247 
.470 
-.238 
-.103 
.113 
 
 
.125 
-1.239 
1.470 
1.461 
2.882 
-2.213 
-1.037 
1.569 
 
0.000 
0.901 
0.219 
0.146 
0.149 
0.005 
0.030 
0.303 
0.121 
 
 
.044 
.004 
.023 
.309 
.531 
-.090 
.037 
.003 
 
 
.784 
.075 
.437 
3.573 
6.407 
-1.211 
.562 
.063 
 
0.000 
0.435 
0.940 
0.663 
0.001 
0.000 
0.228 
0.576 
0.950 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.147 
-.114 
.154 
.225 
-.045 
.063 
-.039 
.316 
 
 
-1.250 
-.967 
1.404 
.815 
-.169 
.361 
-.241 
2.695 
 
0.148 
0.215 
0.337 
0.165 
0.418 
0.866 
0.719 
0.810 
0.009 
 
 
.136 
.234 
.010 
.047 
.072 
-.048 
.062 
-.036 
 
 
1.411 
2.382 
.111 
.307 
.490 
-.366 
.536 
-.374 
 
0.094 
0.161 
0.019 
0.912 
0.760 
0.625 
0.715 
0.593 
0.709 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.207 
-.128 
-.017 
-.235 
.111 
-.236 
-.448 
.208 
 
 
-1.802 
-1.111 
-.162 
-.871 
.429 
-1.380 
-2.837 
1.815 
 
0.053 
0.076 
0.270 
0.872 
0.387 
0.669 
0.172 
0.006 
0.074 
 
 
-.047 
.126 
.243 
-.064 
.158 
-.206 
-.093 
-.066 
 
 
-.478 
1.294 
2.580 
-.413 
1.071 
-1.557 
-.795 
-.685 
 
0.153 
0.634 
0.198 
0.011 
0.681 
0.286 
0.122 
0.428 
0.495 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.107 
-.219 
-.210 
-.334 
.121 
-.337 
-.073 
.298 
 
 
-.936 
-1.911 
-1.969 
-1.248 
.467 
-1.980 
-.465 
2.619 
 
0.040 
0.352 
0.060 
0.053 
0.216 
0.642 
0.052 
0.644 
0.011 
 
 
-.018 
.012 
-.056 
.114 
-.104 
-.164 
-.024 
-.007 
 
 
-.174 
.117 
-.580 
.718 
-.681 
-1.198 
-.202 
-.067 
 
0.821 
0.862 
0.907 
0.563 
0.474 
0.497 
0.234 
0.840 
0.946 
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Table 4.14 - Continued 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Housing Units (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.118 
.024 
.629 
-.060 
-.175 
.009 
.025 
 
 
1.358 
.301 
3.083 
-.304 
-1.355 
.076 
.302 
 
0.000 
0.179 
0.764 
0.003 
0.762 
0.180 
0.940 
0.763 
 
 
.101 
.001 
.368 
.309 
-.148 
.130 
.039 
 
 
1.540 
.0108 
3.611 
3.155 
-1.687 
1.702 
.643 
 
0.000 
0.126 
0.986 
0.000 
0.002 
0.094 
0.091 
0.522 
Building Permits (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.026 
.095 
.144 
.132 
-.048 
.016 
.013 
 
 
.218 
.848 
.513 
.488 
-.267 
.097 
.116 
 
0.341 
0.828 
0.399 
0.609 
0.627 
0.790 
0.923 
0.908 
 
 
-.062 
-.125 
-.345 
.289 
.123 
-.006 
-.045 
 
 
-.636 
-1.341 
-2.271 
1.979 
.943 
-.048 
-.499 
 
0.062 
0.526 
0.183 
0.025 
0.050 
0.348 
0.961 
0.618 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.024 
-.082 
-.003 
.336 
.250 
-.290 
-.138 
.107 
 
 
.272 
-.947 
-.033 
1.653 
1.275 
-2.242 
-1.155 
1.240 
 
0.000 
0.786 
0.347 
0.974 
0.103 
0.206 
0.028 
0.252 
0.219 
 
 
.036 
.002 
.010 
.289 
.553 
-.123 
-.050 
-.015 
 
 
.676 
.041 
.193 
3.475 
6.916 
-1.713 
-.796 
-.278 
 
0.000 
0.500 
0.967 
0.847 
0.001 
0.000 
0.090 
0.428 
0.782 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.152 
.081 
.594 
-.267 
-.107 
-.100 
.250 
 
 
-1.351 
.764 
2.256 
-1.039 
-.642 
-.642 
2.309 
 
0.005 
0.181 
0.448 
0.027 
0.303 
0.523 
0.523 
0.024 
 
 
.077 
-.046 
-.088 
.390 
.006 
.083 
.107 
 
 
.751 
-.475 
-.556 
2.569 
.045 
.693 
1.129 
 
0.032 
0.454 
0.636 
0.579 
0.012 
0.964 
0.490 
0.262 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.076 
-.015 
-.252 
.098 
-.409 
-.082 
.040 
 
 
.597 
-.126 
-.848 
.339 
-2.161 
-.467 
.330 
 
0.395 
0.553 
0.900 
0.400 
0.736 
0.035 
0.642 
0.743 
 
 
.178 
-.127 
-.516 
.208 
-.347 
-.158 
.001 
 
 
1.821 
-1.375 
-3.447 
1.447 
-2.640 
-1.385 
.008 
 
0.000 
0.072 
0.172 
0.001 
0.151 
0.010 
0.169 
0.994 
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Table 4.14 - Continued 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.097 
-.046 
.144 
.189 
-.442 
-.322 
-.050 
.110 
 
 
.845 
-.483 
1.339 
.702 
-1.706 
-1.885 
-.315 
.964 
 
0.051 
0.401 
0.631 
0.185 
0.485 
0.092 
0.064 
0.754 
0.338 
 
 
.056 
-.078 
-.057 
.182 
.513 
-.267 
-.006 
.055 
 
 
.953 
-1.365 
-1.030 
2.001 
5.893 
-3.415 
-.081 
.968 
 
0.000 
0.343 
0.175 
0.305 
0.048 
0.000 
0.001 
0.936 
0.335 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.139 
.071 
.687 
-.595 
-.103 
-.114 
.280 
 
 
-1.210 
.651 
2.565 
-2.277 
-.607 
-.720 
2.546 
 
0.012 
0.231 
0.517 
0.013 
0.026 
0.546 
0.474 
0.013 
 
 
.036 
-.039 
.077 
.413 
.059 
.107 
.081 
 
 
.372 
-.426 
.516 
2.873 
.446 
.936 
.897 
 
0.000 
0.711 
0.671 
0.607 
0.005 
0.657 
0.352 
0.372 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.104 
.120 
-.711 
.330 
-.422 
-.058 
.052 
 
 
.877 
1.073 
-2.522 
1.213 
-2.298 
-.347 
.456 
 
0.057 
0.384 
0.287 
0.014 
0.230 
0.025 
0.729 
0.650 
 
 
.142 
-.049 
-.862 
.318 
-.500 
-.267 
.004 
 
 
1.713 
-.618 
-6.739 
2.579 
-4.498 
-2.761 
.055 
 
0.000 
0.090 
0.538 
0.000 
0.011 
0.000 
0.007 
0.956 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable in the sensitivity 
analysis sample dataset. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
 
 
The data used for these multiple regression procedures were analyzed for serial 
correlation.  Table 4.15 provides additional information for the regression models 
reported in Table 4.14.  Table 4.15 provides the Durbin-Watson statistic for each 
dependent variable for both pre- and post-Katrina time periods.  The table also provides 
the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared for each variable.  Based on the Durbin-Watson 
test statistic (evaluated at dL = 1.582), three dependent variables exhibit serial 
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correlation.  These variables were housing unit estimates, manufacturing earnings, and 
manufacturing employment.  Due to lack of statistical significance, no adjustments will 
be made to these variables.  For the remaining dependent variables, the null hypothesis 
of non-autocorrelated errors can be accepted and the statistical analysis continued with 
no corrections for serial correlation in these time-series models. 
 
Table 4.15 
 
Supplemental Information for Summary Table 4.14 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Dependent Variables 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Personal Income  .679 .643 1.805 .717 .696 2.152 
Average Wage Per Job .151 .055 2.230 .112 .048 2.242 
Per Capita Income .187 .095 2.393 .100 .035 2.049 
Median Household Inc. .197 .106 2.090 .038 -.032 2.630 
Housing Units .527 .481 1.425 .599 .574 0.829 
Building Permits .101 .013 2.594 .111 .055 2.457 
Total Industry Earnings .536 .484 1.701 .737 .718 2.062 
Construction Earnings .256 .177 1.739 .139 .079 2.507 
Manufacturing Earnings .107 .007 1.271 .225 .170 1.702 
Total Employment  .188 .097 1.623 .687 .664 1.948 
Construction Employment .230 .149 2.110 .225 .171 2.590 
Manufacturing Employment .181 .094 1.152 .414 .374 1.651 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change values by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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GO Zone versus GO Zone, Non-GO Zone versus Non-GO Zone Pre- and Post-Katrina 
The results reported in Table 4.16 compare GO Zone counties to GO Zone 
counties pre- and post-Katrina and non-GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties 
pre- and post-Katrina for the sensitivity analysis sample dataset.  These statistical tests 
were performed to determine whether statistically significant differences existed in GO 
Zone counties post-Katrina when compared to GO Zone counties pre-Katrina.  A 
graphical analysis indicates no major violations of the assumptions required for multiple 
regression models and no transformations are necessary to proceed with the 
interpretation of the results.  Based on the additional multiple regression procedures, 
only one of the dependent variables showed a statistically significant change, at the 
alpha level equal to 0.05, when comparing the GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina 
time period (2003-2004) to the post-Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling 
for the independent variables included in each model.  This variable was per capita 
income, with a p-value of 0.002; however, based on the sign of the standardized 
coefficient, the annual change in per capita income in the GO Zone counties fell post-
Katrina.   Results from the multiple regression procedures performed on annual change 
values in this sensitivity analysis provide no statistical evidence supporting the rejection 
of null hypothesis one (H1).   
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Table 4.16 
Sensitivity Analysis Summary Table Comparing GO Zone Counties to GO 
Zone Counties and non-GO Zone Counties to non-GO Zone Counties Pre- 
and Post-Katrina using Annual Change Values for Subset Sample Dataset 
and Multiple Regression Procedures 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables (Yearly Changes) Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.098 
-.057 
.083 
.366 
.467 
-.081 
.046 
.050 
 
 
-.610 
-.924 
.523 
3.168 
4.538 
-.733 
.504 
.766 
 
0.000 
0.543 
0.358 
0.603 
0.002 
0.000 
0.465 
0.615 
0.446 
 
 
-.315 
.148 
.294 
.577 
.103 
-.266 
-.153 
-.015 
 
 
-1.804 
1.853 
1.684 
5.993 
.971 
-3.216 
-1.733 
-.216 
 
0.000 
0.075 
0.067 
0.096 
0.000 
0.334 
0.002 
0.087 
0.830 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.063 
.037 
.092 
.218 
.018 
.165 
.136 
.246 
 
 
.231 
.350 
.342 
1.108 
.101 
.881 
.884 
2.225 
 
0.178 
0.818 
0.727 
0.733 
0.271 
0.920 
0.381 
0.379 
0.029 
 
 
-.351 
-.039 
.124 
.031 
.061 
.000 
-.032 
.034 
 
 
-1.293 
-.317 
.458 
.206 
.370 
.000 
-.234 
.318 
 
0.651 
0.199 
0.752 
0.648 
0.837 
0.712 
1.000 
0.816 
0.751 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.833 
.027 
.799 
-.155 
.297 
-.191 
-.185 
.101 
 
 
-3.141 
.262 
3.050 
-.809 
1.746 
-1.045 
-1.234 
.940 
 
0.040 
0.002 
0.794 
0.003 
0.421 
0.084 
0.299 
0.220 
0.350 
 
 
-.332 
.057 
.192 
-.040 
-.063 
-.125 
-.223 
.013 
 
 
-1.230 
.463 
.712 
-.272 
-.383 
-.983 
-1.641 
.118 
 
0.513 
0.222 
0.645 
0.478 
0.786 
0.703 
0.328 
0.104 
0.906 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.147 
-.021 
-.051 
.149 
-.129 
-.149 
-.023 
.106 
 
 
.524 
-.192 
-.186 
.739 
-.719 
-.774 
-.144 
.929 
 
0.639 
0.601 
0.848 
0.853 
0.462 
0.474 
0.441 
0.886 
0.355 
 
 
.405 
.010 
-.383 
-.042 
-.077 
-.101 
-.012 
-.024 
 
 
1.476 
.079 
-1.400 
-.279 
-.460 
-.783 
-.088 
-.221 
 
0.850 
0.143 
0.937 
0.165 
0.781 
0.647 
0.436 
0.930 
0.826 
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Table 4.16 - Continued 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Housing Units (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.096 
-.049 
.609 
.126 
.035 
.293 
.062 
 
 
.531 
-.272 
4.647 
1.079 
.279 
2.869 
.878 
 
0.000 
0.597 
0.786 
0.000 
0.283 
0.781 
0.005 
0.382 
 
 
.218 
-.053 
.341 
.264 
-.327 
.043 
-.021 
 
 
1.146 
-.281 
3.255 
2.461 
-3.632 
.452 
-.292 
 
0.000 
0.255 
0.779 
0.002 
0.016 
0.000 
0.653 
0.771 
Building Permits (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.027 
-.205 
-.164 
.166 
-.051 
-.131 
-.053 
 
 
-.096 
-.750 
-.823 
.936 
-.270 
-.838 
-.496 
 
0.399 
0.924 
0.455 
0.413 
0.352 
0.787 
0.404 
0.621 
 
 
-.056 
-.062 
.077 
-.089 
.012 
.006 
.003 
 
 
-.205 
-.226 
.508 
-.576 
.091 
.040 
.027 
 
0.960 
0.838 
0.822 
0.613 
0.566 
0.928 
0.968 
0.978 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.176 
-.043 
.026 
.435 
.325 
-.131 
-.044 
.027 
 
 
-.994 
-.625 
.147 
3.404 
2.854 
-1.074 
-.440 
.382 
 
0.000 
0.323 
0.534 
0.883 
0.001 
0.005 
0.285 
0.661 
0.703 
 
 
-.296 
.081 
-.043 
.421 
.082 
-.369 
-.230 
.035 
 
 
-1.570 
.944 
-.231 
4.055 
.713 
-4.146 
-2.423 
.475 
 
0.000 
0.120 
0.348 
0.818 
0.000 
0.478 
0.000 
0.017 
0.636 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.140 
-.037 
.117 
.254 
.085 
.154 
.254 
 
 
.504 
-.134 
.576 
1.436 
.427 
.947 
2.320 
 
0.021 
0.616 
0.894 
0.566 
0.155 
0.671 
0.346 
0.023 
 
 
.274 
-.401 
.180 
.257 
.116 
.044 
.035 
 
 
1.018 
-1.492 
1.301 
1.707 
.914 
.317 
.345 
 
0.023 
0.311 
0.139 
0.197 
0.091 
0.363 
0.752 
0.731 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.010 
-.180 
-.122 
-.036 
-.276 
-.089 
-.025 
 
 
0.35 
-.617 
-.561 
-.189 
-1.293 
-.513 
-.214 
 
0.598 
0.972 
0.539 
0.577 
0.851 
0.200 
0.610 
0.831 
 
 
-.245 
.000 
-.569 
.177 
-.521 
-.098 
.083 
 
 
-1.083 
-.002 
-4.837 
1.367 
-4.830 
-.817 
.961 
 
0.000 
0.282 
0.999 
0.000 
0.175 
0.000 
0.416 
0.339 
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Table 4.16 - Continued 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Casino 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.023 
-.096 
.075 
-.059 
.348 
-.128 
.174 
.124 
 
 
-.090 
-.966 
.295 
-.317 
2.106 
-.722 
1.200 
1.187 
 
0.005 
0.929 
0.337 
0.768 
0.752 
0.038 
0.472 
0.233 
0.238 
 
 
-.045 
-.093 
.171 
-.303 
.378 
-.518 
.027 
.099 
 
 
-.193 
-.867 
.731 
-2.345 
2.657 
-4.681 
.232 
1.072 
 
0.000 
0.848 
0.388 
0.466 
0.021 
0.009 
0.000 
0.817 
0.287 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
.186 
-.020 
.122 
.295 
.155 
.197 
.298 
 
 
.690 
-.074 
.616 
1.722 
.799 
1.242 
2.798 
 
0.003 
0.492 
0.941 
0.540 
0.089 
0.427 
0.218 
0.006 
 
 
.319 
-.173 
.469 
-.028 
.071 
.032 
.054 
 
 
1.233 
-.668 
3.519 
-.192 
.584 
.240 
.560 
 
0.002 
0.221 
0.506 
0.001 
0.848 
0.561 
0.811 
0.577 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
Race  
County ID 
 
 
-.225 
.098 
-.404 
.064 
-.352 
-.139 
-.051 
 
 
-.767 
.341 
-1.886 
.341 
-1.665 
-.806 
-.445 
 
0.379 
0.446 
0.734 
0.063 
0.734 
0.100 
0.422 
0.658 
 
 
-.204 
.095 
-.916 
.226 
-.531 
-.125 
.108 
 
 
-1.197 
.557 
-9.922 
2.331 
-6.518 
-1.426 
1.663 
 
0.000 
0.235 
0.579 
0.000 
0.022 
0.000 
0.157 
0.100 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable in the sensitivity 
analysis sample dataset. 
The Katrina independent variable is used to identify pre- and post-Katrina time periods. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
 
 
 
 
The data used for these multiple regression procedures were analyzed for serial 
correlation.  Table 4.17 provides additional information for the regression models 
reported in Table 4.16.  Table 4.17 provides the Durbin-Watson statistic for each 
dependent variable for both GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties.  The table also 
provides the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared for each variable.  Based on the 
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Durbin-Watson test statistic (evaluated at dL = 1.582), one dependent variable exhibits 
serial correlation.  That variable was housing unit estimates, which is not a primary 
variable of interest, so no adjustments are made to correct this serial correlation.  For 
the remaining dependent variables, the null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated errors can 
be accepted and the analysis can thus continue with no corrections for serial correlation 
in these time-series models. 
 
Table 4.17 
 
Supplemental Information for Summary Table 4.16 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Dependent Variables 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Personal Income .694 .667 1.982 .611 .577 1.738 
Average Wage Per Job .115 .037 1.963 .061 -.021 2.163 
Per Capita Income .158 .084 2.168 .074 -.007 2.114 
Median Household Inc. .063 -.020 2.433 .042 -.042 2.768 
Housing Units .602 .571 0.733 .532 .496 1.376 
Building Permits .074 .004 2.374 .021 -.053 2.167 
Total Industry Earnings .625 .592 1.797 .548 .509 2.176 
Construction Earnings .178 .108 2.088 .171 .102 2.073 
Manufacturing Earnings .063 -.017 1.858 .414 .362 1.919 
Total Employment .210 .141 1.712 .302 .240 2.072 
Construction Employment .225 .159 1.820 .232 .168 2.496 
Manufacturing Employment .085 .007 1.824 .646 .618 1.915 
 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable for 2003, 2004, 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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Additional multiple regression procedures were run as a sensitivity analysis for 
research question 2.  The second research question examines whether tax policy 
investment incentives at the regional level are a zero-sum game, by examining the 
percentage change in each dependent variable to determine if any increases in the 
affected core disaster area are offset by decreases in the surrounding counties.  Each 
dependent variable was analyzed individually for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) 
and for the two-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2003-2004).  A graphical 
analysis indicates no major violations of the assumptions required for appropriate 
multiple regression models and no transformations therefore are necessary to proceed 
with the interpretation of the results. 
The results reported in Table 4.18 compare the annual percentage changes for 
GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina.  Based on the 
multiple regression procedures, no statistically significant results exist, at the alpha 
level equal to 0.05, that show any differences between GO Zone and non-GO Zone 
counties pre-Katrina or post-Katrina.  Additional statistical procedures were performed 
on the full dataset examining the interaction between GO Zone versus non-GO Zone 
counties pre- and post-Katrina; essentially testing whether the pre-Katrina and post-
Katrina regression coefficients reported in Table 4.18 for the GO Zone variable in each 
model were statistically different.  Based on these multiple regression procedures, none 
of the dependent variables showed a statistically significant change at the alpha level 
equal to 0.05 when comparing the GO Zone variable regression coefficient from the 
pre-Katrina time period to the coefficient from the post-Katrina time period, after 
controlling for the independent variables included in each model.  Additional multiple 
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regression models will be analyzed comparing GO Zone counties to GO Zone counties 
and non-GO Zone counties to non-GO Zone counties pre- and post-Katrina. 
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Table 4.18 
Sensitivity Analysis Summary Table Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone 
Counties Pre- and Post-Katrina using Annual Percentage Change Values 
for Subset Sample Dataset and Multiple Regression Procedures 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t – 
statistic 
P-
value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.078 
-.086 
-.272 
.195 
.024 
 
 
-.650 
-.749 
-.971 
.761 
.165 
 
0.708 
0.517 
0.456 
0.335 
0.449 
0.870 
 
 
.017 
.211 
-.064 
.137 
-.201 
 
 
.184 
2.268 
-.417 
.943 
-1.913 
 
0.077 
0.855 
0.025 
0.678 
0.348 
0.058 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.116 
.156 
.158 
-.083 
.127 
 
 
-.976 
1.374 
.566 
-.327 
.893 
 
0.559 
0.332 
0.174 
0.573 
0.745 
0.375 
 
 
.200 
-.024 
-.078 
.060 
-.081 
 
 
2.080 
-.255 
-.501 
.406 
-.756 
 
0.247 
0.040 
0.799 
0.618 
0.686 
0.451 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.111 
-.085 
-.310 
.241 
.167 
 
 
-.965 
-.769 
-1.149 
.975 
1.208 
 
0.125 
0.288 
0.444 
0.254 
0.333 
0.231 
 
 
-.030 
.219 
-.148 
.173 
-.088 
 
 
-.313 
2.316 
-.956 
1.172 
-.824 
 
0.306 
0.754 
0.022 
0.341 
0.244 
0.412 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.078 
-.201 
-.449 
.195 
.022 
 
 
-.694 
-1.871 
-1.702 
.809 
.163 
 
0.034 
0.490 
0.065 
0.093 
0.421 
0.871 
 
 
-.027 
-.049 
.017 
-.060 
-.088 
 
 
-.274 
-.506 
.107 
-.401 
-.810 
 
0.931 
0.785 
0.614 
0.915 
0.689 
0.420 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.078 
.227 
-.361 
.165 
-.245 
 
 
.645 
1.976 
-1.273 
.643 
-1.672 
 
0.133 
0.521 
0.052 
0.207 
0.522 
0.099 
 
 
.122 
-.087 
-.265 
.060 
-.442 
 
 
1.325 
-.970 
-1.813 
.430 
-4.367 
 
0.000 
0.188 
0.334 
0.073 
0.668 
0.000 
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Table 4.18 - Continued 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.070 
-.211 
-.273 
.172 
.059 
 
 
-.603 
-1.895 
-1.000 
.688 
.422 
 
0.223 
0.549 
0.062 
0.320 
0.494 
0.674 
 
 
.034 
.115 
-.002 
.060 
-.218 
 
 
.359 
1.224 
-.013 
.413 
-2.058 
 
0.148 
0.720 
0.223 
0.990 
0.680 
0.042 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.070 
-.060 
.327 
-.204 
.158 
 
 
-.564 
-.502 
1.130 
-.766 
1.071 
 
0.772 
0.574 
0.618 
0.262 
0.446 
0.288 
 
 
-.013 
-.057 
.074 
.048 
-.037 
 
 
-.123 
-.555 
.445 
.306 
-.320 
 
0.808 
0.902 
0.580 
0.657 
0.761 
0.750 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.084 
.076 
-.340 
.169 
-.272 
 
 
.672 
.628 
-1.161 
.629 
-1.818 
 
0.416 
0.504 
0.532 
0.250 
0.532 
0.074 
 
 
.170 
-.133 
-.199 
.034 
-.374 
 
 
1.817 
-1.439 
-1.332 
.239 
-3.612 
 
0.000 
0.072 
0.153 
0.186 
0.811 
0.000 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.082 
.273 
.006 
-.018 
-.260 
 
 
-.726 
2.530 
.024 
-.073 
-1.917 
 
0.040 
0.470 
0.014 
0.981 
0.942 
0.059 
 
 
.083 
-.042 
-.231 
.183 
-.492 
 
 
.968 
-.506 
-1.682 
1.403 
-5.197 
 
0.000 
0.335 
0.614 
0.095 
0.163 
0.000 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Go Zone 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.158 
-.030 
.387 
-.236 
.050 
 
 
-1.285 
-.257 
1.354 
-.896 
.341 
 
0.533 
0.203 
0.798 
0.180 
0.373 
0.734 
 
 
-.026 
.029 
.059 
.056 
.050 
 
 
-.250 
.279 
.353 
.353 
.431 
 
0.949 
0.803 
0.781 
0.725 
0.725 
0.667 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual percentage change by county for each variable in the 
sensitivity analysis sample dataset. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
 
 
 
The data used for these multiple regression procedures were analyzed for serial 
correlation.  Table 4.19 provides additional information for the regression models 
reported in Table 4.18.  Table 4.19 provides the Durbin-Watson statistic for each 
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dependent variable for both pre- and post-Katrina time periods.  The table also provides 
the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared for each variable.  Based on the Durbin-Watson 
test statistic (evaluated at dL = 1.582), no dependent variables exhibit serial correlation.  
The null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated errors can be accepted and the analysis can 
thus continue with no corrections for serial correlation in these time-series models. 
 
Table 4.19 
 
Supplemental Information for Summary Table 4.18 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
Dependent Variables 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Personal Income .038 -.027 2.251 .082 .042 2.047 
Average Wage Per Job .051 -.013 2.105 .056 .015 2.273 
Per Capita Income .108 .048 2.170 .051 .009 2.073 
Median Household Inc. .147 .090 1.648 .011 -.032 2.644 
Total Industry Earnings .088 .027 2.173 .068 .027 1.883 
Construction Earnings .036 -.035 2.311 .022 -.026 1.973 
Manufacturing Earnings .074 .001 1.728 .205 .166 1.622 
Total Employment .143 .085 1.854 .258 .226 1.653 
Construction Employment .057 -.012 1.983 .011 -.037 2.011 
Manufacturing Employment .115 .049 1.726 .217 .179 2.302 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual percentage change by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
 
 
 
 
 
GO Zone versus GO Zone, Non-GO Zone versus Non-GO Zone Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
The results reported in Table 4.20 compare GO Zone counties with GO Zone 
counties pre- and post-Katrina and non-GO Zone counties with non-GO Zone counties 
pre- and post-Katrina for the sensitivity sample dataset.  A graphical analysis indicates 
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no major violations of the assumptions required for appropriate multiple regression 
models and no transformations are thus necessary to proceed with the interpretation of 
the results.  Based on the additional multiple regression procedures, only one of the 
dependent variables showed a statistically significant change, at the alpha level equal to 
0.05, when comparing the GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2003-
2004) to the post-Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling for the independent 
variables included in each model.  That variable was per capita income, with a p-value 
of 0.003; however, based on the sign of the standardized coefficient, the annual change 
in per capita income in the GO Zone counties decreased post-Katrina.   Results from the 
multiple regression procedures performed on annual percentage change values in this 
sensitivity analysis provide no statistical evidence supporting the rejection of null 
hypothesis two (H2). 
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Table 4.20 
Sensitivity Analysis Summary Table Comparing GO Zone Counties to GO 
Zone Counties and non-GO Zone Counties to non-GO Zone Counties Pre- 
and Post-Katrina using Annual Percentage Change Values for Subset 
Sample Dataset and Multiple Regression Procedures 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Personal Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.727 
.601 
-.225 
.291 
-.118 
 
 
-2.695 
2.260 
-1.197 
1.674 
-.992 
 
0.114 
0.008 
0.026 
0.234 
0.097 
0.324 
 
 
-.234 
.010 
-.083 
.024 
-.036 
 
 
-.875 
.038 
-.594 
.176 
-.337 
 
0.369 
0.384 
0.970 
0.554 
0.861 
0.737 
Average Wage Per Job (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.025 
.043 
.042 
-.013 
-.019 
 
 
.088 
.156 
.212 
-.070 
-.156 
 
0.987 
0.930 
0.876 
0.833 
0.945 
0.876 
 
 
-.434 
.122 
-.092 
.049 
.027 
 
 
-1.669 
.470 
-.678 
.378 
.254 
 
0.056 
0.098 
0.639 
0.500 
0.706 
0.800 
Per Capita Income (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.799 
.642 
-.239 
.285 
.053 
 
 
-3.001 
2.445 
-1.273 
1.659 
.453 
 
0.045 
0.003 
0.016 
0.206 
0.100 
0.651 
 
 
-.248 
-.002 
-.152 
.046 
.063 
 
 
-.941 
-.007 
-1.109 
.349 
.593 
 
0.147 
0.349 
0.994 
0.270 
0.728 
0.555 
Median Household Inc. (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.080 
-.032 
.044 
-.089 
-.040 
 
 
.283 
-.115 
.219 
-.493 
-.320 
 
0.988 
0.777 
0.909 
0.827 
0.623 
0.750 
 
 
.336 
-.360 
-.117 
-.029 
-.044 
 
 
1.245 
-1.336 
-.837 
-.216 
-.404 
 
0.595 
0.216 
0.185 
0.405 
0.829 
0.687 
Manufacturing Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.095 
-.083 
-.180 
.054 
-.141 
 
 
-.326 
-.287 
-.878 
.288 
-1.105 
 
0.522 
0.745 
0.775 
0.383 
0.774 
0.272 
 
 
-.439 
.307 
-.307 
.125 
-.477 
 
 
-1.772 
1.242 
-2.418 
1.019 
-4.774 
 
0.000 
0.080 
0.218 
0.018 
0.311 
0.000 
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Table 4.20 - Continued 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Variables Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Beta 
t - 
statistic 
P-
value 
Total Industry Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
-.484 
.146 
-.093 
.122 
-.055 
 
 
-1.825 
.560 
-.498 
.714 
-.474 
 
0.033 
0.071 
0.577 
0.619 
0.477 
0.636 
 
 
-.116 
-.245 
-.110 
.018 
.002 
 
 
-.451 
-.957 
-.831 
.139 
.015 
 
0.017 
0.653 
0.341 
0.408 
0.890 
0.988 
Construction Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.142 
-.105 
.145 
-.034 
.025 
 
 
.475 
-.359 
.697 
-.180 
.194 
 
0.940 
0.636 
0.720 
0.488 
0.858 
0.847 
 
 
.218 
-.400 
-.051 
.224 
.051 
 
 
.779 
-1.431 
-.374 
1.668 
.455 
 
0.213 
0.438 
0.156 
0.709 
0.099 
0.650 
Manufacturing Earnings (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.007 
-.238 
-.086 
-.002 
-.115 
 
 
.025 
-.833 
-.422 
-.009 
-.910 
 
0.321 
0.980 
0.407 
0.674 
0.993 
0.365 
 
 
-.426 
.231 
-.283 
.144 
-.466 
 
 
-1.694 
.917 
-2.277 
1.181 
-4.556 
 
0.000 
0.094 
0.362 
0.025 
0.241 
0.000 
Total Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.090 
.108 
.060 
-.005 
-.225 
 
 
.336 
.408 
.316 
-.031 
-1.912 
 
0.066 
0.738 
0.685 
0.752 
0.976 
0.059 
 
 
-.283 
.337 
-.365 
.259 
-.547 
 
 
-1.206 
1.436 
-2.991 
2.194 
-5.766 
 
0.000 
0.231 
0.154 
0.004 
0.031 
0.000 
Construction Employment (DV) 
Overall Model 
Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) 
Time 
Population Density 
Federal Gov. Expenditures 
Unemployment Rate 
 
 
.157 
.063 
.193 
-.066 
.024 
 
 
.539 
.222 
.951 
-.356 
.190 
 
0.355 
0.591 
0.825 
0.344 
0.722 
0.850 
 
 
.317 
-.179 
.112 
-.052 
.072 
 
 
1.107 
-.626 
.799 
-.381 
.632 
 
0.679 
0.271 
0.533 
0.426 
0.704 
0.529 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual percentage change by county for each variable in the 
sensitivity analysis sample dataset. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau.  
The Katrina independent variable is used to identify pre- and post-Katrina time periods.   
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was calculated to determine the overall significance of each model. 
 
 
The data used for these multiple regression procedures were analyzed for serial 
correlation.  Table 4.21 provides additional information for the regression models 
reported in Table 4.20.  Table 4.21 provides the Durbin-Watson statistic for each 
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dependent variable for both GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties.  The table also 
provides the R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared for each variable.  Based on the 
Durbin-Watson test statistic (evaluated at dL = 1.582), no dependent variables exhibit 
serial correlation.  The null hypothesis of non-autocorrelated errors can be accepted and 
the analysis can thus continue with no corrections for serial correlation in these time-
series models. 
 
Table 4.21 
 
Supplemental Information for Summary Table 4.20 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone 
Dependent Variables 
R- 
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Durbin-
Watson 
Personal Income .089 .040 1.972 .055 .005 2.291 
Average Wage Per Job .006 -.046 1.937 .107 .059 1.927 
Per Capita Income .112 .065 2.159 .082 .033 2.081 
Median Household Inc. .006 -.047 2.555 .038 -.013 2.624 
Total Industry Earnings .120 .073 2.114 .134 .088 1.742 
Construction Earnings .014 -.044 1.932 .078 .024 2.397 
Manufacturing Earnings .066 .011 1.630 .257 .212 1.665 
Total Employment .103 .055 1.633 .272 .233 1.829 
Construction Employment .063 .007 1.682 .035 -.021 2.280 
Manufacturing Employment .048 -.009 1.734 .235 .192 1.605 
 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual percentage change by county for each variable. 
Data Sources: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis and U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Economic theory states that a decline in the total cost of productive assets would 
spur an increase in the quantity demanded, because, all else equal, lowering the cost of 
any item increases the quantity demanded of that item (U.S. Congress 2007).  
Politicians utilize tax policy investment incentives to foster economic growth and 
stimulate investment.  On December 21, 2005, President Bush signed the Gulf 
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, otherwise known as the GO Zone Act.  The GO Zone 
Act provided tax incentives, such as bonus depreciation and tax-exempt bond financing, 
to stimulate economic growth and assist in the recovery and rebuilding efforts.  
Empirical research on the impact of tax incentives on economic growth has proven to be 
inconclusive, even though Congress is still implementing tax incentives to stimulate 
economic growth. 
This research evaluates the economic impact of tax policy investment incentives 
provided by the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005.  This study measures the economic 
impact of these incentives at the county level in the impact area, controlling for other 
relevant explanatory variables, such as population density, the unemployment rate, and 
the location of commercial casinos.  The purpose of the research is to assess the 
effectiveness of tax policy investment incentives at the regional level.  The first phase 
of the research estimates the impact of these regional tax incentives on several key 
economic variables, including manufacturing earnings, manufacturing employment, 
personal income, and average wages per job.  The second phase of the research 
examines whether these regional tax policy investment incentives create economic 
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growth within policy coverage areas at the expense of the surrounding regions.  The 
following sections of Chapter Five address the summary of the findings of these two 
research questions, the limitations inherent in the study, the possible suggestions for 
future research, the contributions of this research, and the overall conclusion. 
 
Summary of the Findings 
This research reports the results of linear mixed-effects modeling and multiple 
regression procedures analyzed to identify the significant variables that distinguish 
differences between GO Zone and non-GO Zone counties and standard empirical 
models to analyze the impact of these variables on the surrounding counties.  The 
research questions are analyzed with a matched sample panel data set using 
observations from 2002 through 2008 to test whether tax policy investment incentives 
are effective at the regional level and to determine the impact of these incentives on the 
surrounding regions.   
Findings for Research Question 1 
The first research question examines the impact of tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level and whether these incentives promote economic growth.  
Specifically, phase one of this research addresses the following research question: 
1) Do tax policy investment incentives promote economic 
growth and spur business investment spending at the  
regional level? 
 
The first phase of the research utilizes linear mixed effects modeling and multiple 
regression procedures on a matched sample panel data set from 2002 through 2008 to 
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determine whether tax policy investment incentives provided by the GO Zone Act 
created significant differences in the key economic indicators included in this study.  
Research question 1 was tested with the following dependent variables at the county 
level: annual industry earnings, manufacturing industry earnings, construction industry 
earnings, per capita income, personal income, average wages per job, median household 
income, total employment for all industries, total manufacturing employment, total 
construction employment, housing unit number estimates, and the number of building 
permits issued annually.  Each dependent variable was analyzed individually with 
mixed effects modeling procedures for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) and for the 
three-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2002-2004).  Annual changes in each 
dependent variable covering 2003 through 2008 were calculated and subsequent 
statistical procedures were performed on these values.  The year-over-year changes in 
each dependent variable were analyzed with multiple regression procedures individually 
for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) and for the two-year period preceding 
Hurricane Katrina (2003-2004).  Population density, federal government expenditures, 
unemployment rate, commercial casinos, race, county, and state variables were included 
as control variables in the majority of the regression models.   
 The linear mixed effects and multiple regression procedures produced the 
following results.  Based on the linear mixed effects procedures, only three of the 
dependent variables showed a statistically significant change, at the alpha level equal to 
0.05, when comparing GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2002-2004) to 
the post-Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling for the independent 
variables included in each model.  These variables were construction employment, with 
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a post –Katrina p-value of 0.011, per capita income, with a post –Katrina p-value of 
0.019, and the number of building permits issued annually, with a post –Katrina p-value 
of 0.015.  Based on the multiple regression procedures, only three of the dependent 
variables showed a statistically significant change, at the alpha level equal to 0.05, when 
comparing GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2003-2004) to the post-
Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling for the independent variables 
included in each model.  These variables were construction employment, with a p-value 
of 0.000, construction net earnings, with a p-value of 0.000, and the number of building 
permits issued annually, with a p-value of 0.009.  These significant differences were not 
unexpected and can be explained by the physical property damage and the population 
migration caused by Hurricane Katrina.  The physical property damage explains the 
increases in the construction industry earnings and employment and the number of 
building permits issued.  The population out-migration caused by Katrina would have a 
large impact on per capita income.   
A subsequent sensitivity analysis performed on a sample of the original dataset 
attempted to remove the effects of Hurricane Katrina by focusing on counties where the 
storm damage was minimal.  Based on the sensitivity analysis, none of the dependent 
variables showed a statistically significant difference, at the alpha level equal to 0.05, 
when comparing GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2003-2004) to the 
post-Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling for other independent variables.  
Overall, the results do not indicate that the tax incentives provided to the GO Zone 
counties have had a statistically significant impact on key economic indicators. 
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Findings for Research Question 2 
The second research question examines whether tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level are a zero-sum game, where economic growth created by 
incentives come at the expense of the surrounding regions.  Specifically, phase two of 
this research addresses the following research question: 
2) Are regional tax policy investment incentives a zero-sum  
game, where growth in one local area comes at the  
expense of reduced growth in other local areas? 
 
The second phase of the research utilizes multiple regression implementing the same 
panel data set used for testing the first research phase.  Research question 2 was tested 
with many of the same economic indicators implemented in research question 1; 
however research question 2 examined the percentage change in each of these variables 
individually at the county level and attempted to determine if any increases in the 
affected core disaster area are offset by decreases in the surrounding counties.  Each 
dependent variable was analyzed for the GO Zone timeframe (2006-2008) and for the 
two-year period preceding Hurricane Katrina (2003-2004). 
 Based on the multiple regression procedures, four of the dependent variables 
showed a statistically significant change, at the alpha level equal to 0.05, when 
comparing GO Zone counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2003-2004) to the post-
Katrina time period (2006-2008), after controlling for the independent variables 
included in each model.  These variables were construction employment, with a p-value 
of 0.020, total employment, with a p-value of 0.036, total industry net earnings, with a 
p-value of 0.008, and manufacturing industry net earnings, with a p-value of 0.008.  
Based on the standardized coefficients, these significant differences represented 
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increases in the annual percentage change value for each variable, except for annual 
industry net earnings, which showed lower values post-Katrina compared to the pre-
Katrina timeframe.  Only two of the dependent variables showed a statistically 
significant change, at the alpha level equal to 0.05, when comparing the non-GO Zone 
counties for the pre-Katrina time period (2003-2004) to the post-Katrina time period 
(2006-2008), after controlling for the independent variables included in each model.  
These variables were construction employment, with a p-value of 0.026, and 
construction industry net earnings, with a p-value of 0.004.    
Three of the four primary variables of interest (average wages per job, 
manufacturing employment, and manufacturing earnings) produced increased 
percentage changes in post-Katrina GO Zone counties and decreased percentage 
changes in post-Katrina non-GO Zone counties, providing support to the zero-sum 
game theory.  These results, however, were not significant at the alpha level equal to 
0.05, eliminating the possibility of drawing conclusions in support of the zero-sum 
game theory based on these changes.   
A subsequent sensitivity analysis was also performed on research question 2 in 
an attempt to eliminate the impact of Hurricane Katrina.  Based on the multiple 
regression procedures performed in this analysis, none of the dependent variables 
showed a statistically significant difference, at the alpha level equal to 0.05, after 
controlling for the independent variables included in each model.  Overall, the results 
do not indicate that the tax incentives provided by the GO Zone Act has had a 
statistically significant negative impact on the surrounding region. 
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Limitations of the Study 
As with all forms of research, some limitations are inherent in archival empirical 
research.  Archival empirical data for the affected region make this study possible but 
also limit the ability to generalize these results to other regions.  In addition, empirical 
research utilizing real-world data can be prone to internal validity issues that exist due 
to lack of environmental controls and other possible causal factors.  The purpose of this 
research is to determine whether tax policy investment incentives have an impact on 
economic growth at the regional level and to determine the impact on surrounding 
regions.  Therefore, explanation and generalization are not the primary factors of this 
research study.   
The time limitation of the study and the temporary nature of the tax policy 
investment incentives impose additional limitations on any findings.  Even though the 
most current available research were relied on, these tax policy investment incentives 
were temporary, and Friedman‟s permanent income hypothesis indicates that investing 
patterns may not change with temporary reductions in tax burdens (Meghir 2004).  The 
short-term nature of these regional tax policy investment incentives restricts the data 
and limits the time available to identify a statistically significant impact.  Also, these 
temporary investment incentives may have shifted capital investment spending forward 
in time, which would indicate a temporary change with no significant long-term impact 
on economic growth.  Future studies covering tax policy investment incentives could 
help to clarify some of these temporary and time-related limitations. 
Although the models used in this research were capable of explaining a large 
portion of the variation in the dependent variables, any missing and unexplained 
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variables can contribute omitted variable bias to this study.  Unfortunately, some of 
these omitted variables are intangible and could not be measured.  The physical 
property damage and population out-migration caused by Hurricane Katrina also creates 
potential limitations on any findings.  Hurricane Katrina was the worst natural disaster 
in our nation‟s history in terms of geographic scope, the severity of its destruction, and 
the number of persons displaced from their homes (GAO 2010).  These extraneous 
factors make drawing conclusions difficult in the counties and parishes most severely 
damaged by Hurricane Katrina.    
 
Contributions of the Study 
The results of this study contribute additional evidence to the conclusions found 
in prior empirical work concerning the impact of the cost of capital through tax 
incentives upon investment decisions.  Most prior empirical research studies in this area 
have been cross-sectional studies based on industry-, firm-, or asset-level data and not 
typically tested at the regional level.  Steinnes (1984) examined regional economic 
development and concluded that the use of pooled-time-series-cross-sectional data 
provides more accurate results when compared to research that only examines cross-
sectional data for one time period.  According to Wooldridge (2009), utilizing pooled 
cross sections from different years is an effective way of analyzing the effects of 
government policy.  This research addresses these issues by utilizing a matched sample 
panel data set at the county level. 
In general, counties are the smallest geographical regions for which significant 
data are available, and, to date, very little, if any, empirical research has been performed 
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on the effectiveness of tax investment incentives using real-world economic data at the 
county level.  The GO Zone Act provides an opportunity for researching the 
effectiveness of tax-policy incentives on capital investment and economic growth at the 
county level over a finite period of time covering 2006 through 2008.  According to 
Richardson (2006), Hurricanes Katrina and Rita may provide the ultimate test for tax 
policy in the United States.  The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA) 
and, especially, the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 give economists an opportunity 
to evaluate the effectiveness of tax policy (Richardson 2006).   
The matched sample implemented in this research also allows the impact of tax 
incentives on surrounding regions to be examined.  Multiple researchers have stated that 
regional tax incentives are potentially a zero-sum game, where the benefits provided to 
one region come at the expense of surrounding areas and that tax incentives do not 
produce growth at the regional level, but simply shift spending from one area to another 
with no net gain.  This research minimizes some of these issues addressed by prior 
empirical research and provides evidence on the effectiveness of tax policy investment 
incentives at the regional level and estimates the impact of these incentives on 
surrounding regions. 
This research adds to the existing literature concerning the effectiveness of tax 
policy investment incentives by using real-world, county-level economic indicators to 
test the impact of tax policy investment incentives at the regional level.  This research 
also provides evidence of the impact that regional tax policy investment incentives have 
on the surrounding areas, helping to determine whether regionally tailored tax 
169 
 
incentives have a significant impact on the intended beneficiaries or are simply a zero-
sum game that shifts spending from one geographic location to another.    
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
Regional tax investment incentives provide opportunities for future research. 
Very little empirical research has been performed on the effectiveness of tax investment 
incentives using real-world economic data.  Additional research could be performed on 
the incentives provided by the GO Zone Act after additional time has passed to 
determine its potential long-term effects.  The current study provides a foundation for 
future research by identifying significant independent control variables that explain a 
large portion of the variation in key economic indicators.  If possible, research could be 
performed on regional tax incentives not created in response to a natural disaster of 
some type, eliminating potential extraneous factors.  Future research on regional tax 
incentives could also be performed on a micro level, examining very specific North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes within specific industries. 
 
Conclusion 
The Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 implemented temporary regional tax 
investment incentives after Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast.  The Act 
provided tax incentives for businesses and individuals to encourage rebuilding, 
rehabilitation, and investment in these hurricane stricken areas.  The Congressional 
Budget Office (2006) estimates that the tax benefits related to the GO Zone Act will 
amount to about $4 billion in 2006, $3 billion in 2007, and $2 billion over the years 
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from 2008 to 2015 (Richardson 2006).  The major tax provisions generating these tax 
benefits are the 50 percent bonus depreciation, the Section 179 expensing, and the 
broadening of the employee retention tax credit for all companies regardless of size 
(Richardson 2006).  The purpose of this study was to assess the effectiveness of tax 
policy investment incentives at the regional level and to examine whether these regional 
tax policy investment incentives create economic growth at the expense of the 
surrounding region.  
The regional tax policy investment incentives provided by the GO Zone Act did 
not generate significant increases in key economic indicators included in this study.  
These tax incentives were intended to accelerate capital spending and spur economic 
recovery, but based on research findings, they do not appear to have had the impact 
desired by Congress.  Based on the combined data analysis from all the models tested 
with linear mixed effects and multiple regression procedures, statistical evidence 
supporting the rejection of hypothesis number one (H1) does not exist.  The null 
hypothesis, therefore, is supported and the conclusion is drawn that the tax policy 
investment incentives provided by the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 have had no 
significant impact on economic growth in the affected region.  
Bartik (1994) noted that success in one area could cause negative results in other 
areas.  Liard-Muriente (2007) also noted that regional development policies could be 
described as a zero-sum game, with local job reshuffling as the outcome.  Research 
results provided some tentative evidence supporting the zero-sum game theory; 
however, these results were not significant at the alpha level equal to 0.05.  Based on 
the multiple regression data analysis from all of the models tested for research question 
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2, statistically significant evidence supporting the rejection of hypothesis number two 
(H2) does not exist.  The null hypothesis, therefore, is supported and the conclusion is 
drawn that the tax policy investment incentives provided by the Gulf Opportunity Zone 
Act of 2005 have had no significant impact on economic growth in the surrounding 
region. 
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Appendix A – Counties and Parishes included in research dataset 
 
GO Zone Counties non-GO Zone Counties 
Baldwin, AL Bibb, AL 
Choctaw, AL Calhoun, AL 
Clarke, AL Chilton, AL 
Greene, AL Coffee, AL 
Hale, AL Conecuh, AL 
Marengo, AL Covington, AL 
Mobile, AL Cullman, AL 
Pickens, AL Dale, AL 
Sumter, AL Dallas, AL 
Tuscaloosa, AL Elmore, AL 
Washington, AL Escambia, AL 
Acadia, LA Etowah, AL 
Ascension, LA Fayette, AL 
Assumption, LA Houston, AL 
Calcasieu, LA Jefferson, AL 
Cameron, LA Lamar, AL 
East Baton Rouge, LA Monroe, AL 
East Feliciana, LA Montgomery, AL 
Iberia, LA Morgan, AL 
Iberville, LA Perry, AL 
Jefferson, LA St. Clair, AL 
Jefferson Davis, LA Shelby, AL 
Lafayette, LA Talladega, AL 
Lafourche, LA Walker, AL 
Livingston, LA Wilcox, AL 
Orleans, LA Allen, LA 
Plaquemines, LA Avoyelles, LA 
Pointe Coupee, LA Beauregard, LA 
St. Bernard, LA Bienville, LA 
St. Charles, LA Bossier, LA 
St. Helena, LA Caddo, LA 
St. James, LA Caldwell, LA 
St. John the Baptist, LA Catahoula, LA 
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St. Martin, LA Claiborne, LA 
St. Mary, LA Concordia, LA 
St. Tammany, LA De Soto, LA 
Tangipahoa, LA East Carroll, LA 
Terrebonne, LA Evangeline, LA 
Vermilion, LA Franklin, LA 
Washington, LA Grant, LA 
West Baton Rouge, LA Jackson, LA 
West Feliciana, LA La Salle, LA 
Adams, MS Lincoln, LA 
Amite, MS Madison, LA 
Attala, MS Morehouse, LA 
Choctaw, MS Natchitoches, LA 
Claiborne, MS Ouachita, LA 
Clarke, MS Rapides, LA 
Copiah, MS Red River, LA 
Covington, MS Richland, LA 
Forrest, MS Sabine, LA 
Franklin, MS St. Landry, LA 
George, MS Tensas, LA 
Greene, MS Union, LA 
Hancock, MS Vernon, LA 
Harrison, MS Webster, LA 
Hinds, MS West Carroll, LA 
Holmes, MS Winn, LA 
Humphreys, MS Alcorn, MS 
Jackson, MS Benton, MS 
Jasper, MS Bolivar, MS 
Jefferson, MS Calhoun, MS 
Jefferson Davis, MS Carroll, MS 
Jones, MS Chickasaw, MS 
Kemper, MS Clay, MS 
Lamar, MS Coahoma, MS 
Lauderdale, MS DeSoto, MS 
Lawrence, MS Grenada, MS 
Leake, MS Issaquena, MS 
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Lincoln, MS Itawamba, MS 
Lowndes, MS Lafayette, MS 
Madison, MS Lee, MS 
Marion, MS Leflore, MS 
Neshoba, MS Marshall, MS 
Newton, MS Monroe, MS 
Noxubee, MS Montgomery, MS 
Oktibbeha, MS Panola, MS 
Pearl River, MS Pontotoc, MS 
Perry, MS Prentiss, MS 
Pike, MS Quitman, MS 
Rankin, MS Sharkey, MS 
Scott, MS Sunflower, MS 
Simpson, MS Tallahatchie, MS 
Smith, MS Tate, MS 
Stone, MS Tippah, MS 
Walthall, MS Tishomingo, MS 
Warren, MS Tunica, MS 
Wayne, MS Union, MS 
Wilkinson, MS Washington, MS 
Winston, MS Webster, MS 
Yazoo, MS Yalobusha, MS 
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Appendix B – Grant Assistance by Parish/County 
 
Number of Homeowner Units Funded and Total Amounts Awarded through the 
Road Home Homeowner Program (Louisiana) and the Homeowner Assistance 
Program (Mississippi), by State and Parish/County  
Parish/County 
GO Zone 
(1 = yes) 
Homeowner 
units funded 
Assistance 
Awarded 
Acadia, LA 1 279 $5,544,470 
Allen, LA 0 487 $10,075,978 
Ascension, LA 1 136 $3,957,068 
Assumption, LA 1 200 $3,486,988 
Beauregard, LA 0 912 $19,027,802 
Calcasieu, LA 1 12,313 $313,703,052 
Cameron, LA 1 1,482 $58,486,809 
East Baton Rouge, LA 1 174 $4,581,435 
East Feliciana, LA 1 27 $516,317 
Evangeline, LA 0 51 $905,100 
Iberia, LA 1 977 $26,138,919 
Iberville, LA 1 51 $1,215,867 
Jefferson, LA 1 23,218 $928,511,348 
Jefferson Davis, LA 1 819 $19,783,362 
Lafayette, LA 1 107 $1,917,445 
Lafourche, LA 1 743 $17,400,332 
Livingston, LA 1 203 $4,686,996 
Orleans, LA 1 40,783 $2,455,013,610 
Plaquemines, LA 1 2,436 $86,614,182 
Pointe Coupee, LA 1 14 $356,394 
Sabine, LA 0 27 $412,876 
St. Bernard, LA 1 10,221 $645,792,150 
St. Charles, LA 1 914 $26,488,864 
St. Helena, LA 1 252 $4,911,715 
St. James, LA 1 355 $7,874,097 
St. John the Baptist, LA 1 1,168 $21,771,460 
St. Landry, LA 0 156 $4,158,029 
St. Martin, LA 1 95 $1,464,994 
St. Mary, LA 1 786 $13,017,832 
St. Tammany, LA 1 10,463 $538,165,766 
Tangipahoa, LA 1 1,440 $33,307,532 
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Terrebonne, LA 1 2,350 $57,426,077 
Vermilion, LA 1 1,541 $51,310,723 
Vernon, LA 0 139 $2,706,415 
Washington, LA 1 1,252 $23,559,492 
West Baton Rouge, LA 1 13 $487,795 
West Feliciana, LA 1 3 $115,534 
All Parishes 116,587 $5,394,894,825 
  
Hancock, MS 1 6,278 $517,112,976 
Harrison, MS 1 8,364 $654,079,862 
Jackson, MS 1 10,113 $658,319,634 
Pearl River, MS 1 92 $4,666,521 
All Counties 24,847 $1,834,178,993 
  
All Parishes and Counties 141,434 $7,229,073,818 
  
Data Source: GAO 2010 
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Appendix C – Mississippi Casinos 
 
Name of Casino Location County 
AMERISTAR CASINO VICKSBURG, MS  WARREN 
BALLY'S SALOON TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
BEAU RIVAGE RESORTS, INC. BILOXI, MS HARRISON 
BOOMTOWN BILOXI CASINO BILOXI, MS  HARRISON 
DIAMONDJACKS  VICKSBURG, MS  WARREN 
FITZGERALDS CASINO TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
GOLD STRIKE CASINO RESORT TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
GRAND CASINO BILOXI, MS  HARRISON 
HARD ROCK CASINO BILOXI, MS  HARRISON 
HARLOW'S CASINO RESORT  GREENVILLEE, MS  WASHINGTON 
HARRAH'S CASINO TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
HOLLYWOOD CASINO  TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
HOLLYWOOD CASINO BAY ST LOUIS, MS  HANCOCK 
HORIZON CASINO  VICKSBURG, MS  WARREN 
HORSESHOE CASINO & HOTEL TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
IMPERIAL PALACE BILOXI, MS HARRISON 
ISLAND VIEW CASINO  GULFPORT, MS  HARRISON 
ISLE OF CAPRI – LULA  LULA, MS COAHOMA 
ISLE OF CAPRI – NATCHEZ  NATCHEZ, MS ADAMS 
ISLE OF CAPRI CASINO – BILOXI  BILOXI, MS HARRISON 
JUBILEE CASINO  GREENVILLE, MS WASHINGTON 
LIGHTHOUSE POINT CASINO GREENVILLE, MS WASHINGTON 
NEW PALACE CASINO BILOXI, MS HARRISON 
RAINBOW CASINO VICKSBURG, MS  WARREN 
RESORTS TUNICA HOTEL & CASINO TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
RIVERWALK CASINO AND HOTEL VICKSBURG, MS WARREN 
SAM'S TOWN HOTEL TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
SHERATON CASINO TUNICA RESORTS, MS  TUNICA 
SILVER SLIPPER BAY ST LOUIS, MS  HANCOCK 
TREASURE BAY BILOXI, MS HARRISON 
Data Source: Mississippi Gaming Commission 
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Appendix D – Louisiana Casinos 
 
Name of Casino Location Parish 
Amelia Belle Amelia St. Mary  
Belle of Baton Rouge Baton Rouge East Baton Rouge 
Boomtown Bossier City Bossier 
Boomtown Casino Harvey Jefferson 
Diamond Jacks Bossier City Bossier 
Eldorado Casino Resort Shreveport Caddo 
Harrah's New Orleans Orleans 
Hollywood Baton Rouge East Baton Rouge 
Horseshoe Bossier City Bossier 
Isle of Capri Westlake Calcasieu 
Isle/Grand Palais Lake Charles Calcasieu 
L' Auberge Du Lac Lake Charles Calcasieu 
PNK Baton Rouge East Baton Rouge 
Sam 's Town Shreveport Caddo 
Sugar Cane Bay Lake Charles Calcasieu 
Treasure Chest Kenner Jefferson 
Data Source: Louisiana Gaming Control Board 
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Appendix E 
 
Actual Annual County Personal Income by State Comparing GO Zone to Non-
GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 2237.226 
(3307.73) 
n = 33 
2950.724 
(5253.97) 
n = 75 
0.039 
2574.812 
(3811.53) 
n = 33 
3248.363 
(5661.71) 
n = 75 
0.010 
Louisiana 3246.613 
(4492.10) 
n = 93 
1146.025 
(1656.93) 
n = 99 
0.472 
3684.207 
(4815.13) 
n = 93 
1277.313 
(1858.95) 
n = 99 
0.037 
Mississippi 1126.881 
(1536.25) 
n = 147 
736.999 
(776.29) 
n = 99 
0.038 
1249.009 
(1698.18) 
n = 147 
799.270 
(889.47) 
n = 99 
0.051 
Total 1983.205 
(3213.89) 
N = 273 
1493.493 
(3090.96) 
N = 273 
0.866 
2238.844 
(3515.21) 
N = 273 
1645.454 
(3356.99) 
N = 273 
0.108 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix F 
 
Actual Annual County Average Wages per Job by State Comparing GO Zone 
to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-Value* GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-Value* 
Alabama 32534 
(6351.87) 
n = 33 
32269 
(4883.90) 
n = 75 
0.357 
33789 
(6003.99) 
n = 33 
33190 
(5448.96) 
n = 75 
0.288 
Louisiana 35716 
(6335.92) 
n = 93 
29099 
(3598.61) 
n = 99 
0.000 
40507 
(7309.09) 
n = 93 
31018 
(3898.09) 
n = 99 
0.000 
Mississippi 29471 
(4543.96) 
n = 147 
28411 
(2916.32) 
n = 99 
0.211 
31194 
(4904.63) 
n = 147 
28955 
(2716.04) 
n = 99 
0.009 
Total 31969 
(6133.42) 
N = 273 
29720 
(4095.82) 
N = 273 
0.000 
34680 
(7314.03) 
N = 273 
30867 
(4363.23) 
N = 273 
0.000 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix G 
 
Actual Annual Per Capita Income by State Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 26038 
(3488.61) 
n = 33 
28072 
(5173.11) 
n = 75 
0.719 
28860 
(3801.53) 
n = 33 
30078 
(5580.05) 
n = 75 
0.256 
Louisiana 28303 
(4356.60) 
n = 93 
25041 
(3238.93) 
n = 99 
0.094 
34407 
(7463.61) 
n = 93 
27422 
(3922.17) 
n = 99 
0.000 
Mississippi 24937 
(4544.24) 
n = 147 
24568 
(3147.60) 
n = 99 
0.935 
26869 
(5436.11) 
n = 147 
26256 
(2888.22) 
n = 99 
0.745 
Total 26217 
(4616.63) 
N = 273 
25702 
(4099.51) 
N = 273 
0.459 
29678 
(6956.65) 
N = 273 
27729 
(4400.57) 
N = 273 
0.019 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix H 
 
Actual Annual Median Household Income by State Comparing GO Zone to 
Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 33437 
(6702.47) 
n = 33 
37900 
(9322.45) 
n = 75 
0.314 
34287 
(7279.55) 
n = 33 
38665 
(9592.69) 
n = 75 
0.284 
Louisiana 40545 
(6657.33) 
n = 93 
31978 
(4972.07) 
n = 99 
0.000 
42682 
(7355.08) 
n = 93 
33273 
(5422.82) 
n = 99 
0.000 
Mississippi 33295 
(6899.51) 
n = 147 
32913 
(6869.27) 
n = 99 
0.745 
34252 
(7466.43) 
n = 147 
32868 
(6561.94) 
n = 99 
0.237 
Total 35782 
(7589.12) 
N = 273 
33944 
(7460.70) 
N = 273 
0.003 
37128 
(8393.61) 
N = 273 
34608 
(7578.54) 
N = 273 
0.001 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix I 
 
Actual Annual County Housing Unit Estimates by State Comparing GO Zone 
to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 36232 
(51251.87) 
n = 33 
39349 
(56902.33) 
n = 75 
0.002 
39140 
(55176.44) 
n = 33 
40914 
(59488.85) 
n = 75 
0.004 
Louisiana 42245 
(53980.68) 
n = 93 
17891 
(21401.15) 
n = 99 
0.779 
39937 
(46739.62) 
n = 93 
18615 
(22279.20) 
n = 99 
0.036 
Mississippi 16831 
(19503.84) 
n = 147 
11628 
(9060.99) 
n = 99 
0.031 
17229 
(19631.13) 
n = 147 
12245 
(10452.24) 
n = 99 
0.044 
Total 27834 
(40543.71) 
N = 273 
21515 
(34692.19) 
N = 273 
0.632 
27613 
(37818.76) 
N = 273 
22431 
(36307.82) 
N = 273 
0.107 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of houses.   
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix J 
 
Actual Annual Building Permits by State Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 626.15 
(1197.45) 
n = 33 
403.47 
(843.95) 
n = 75 
0.017 
726.55 
(1321.87) 
n = 33 
360.05 
(745.88) 
n = 75 
0.000 
Louisiana 541.97 
(730.91) 
n = 93 
133.65 
(255.42) 
n = 99 
0.157 
603.90 
(859.59) 
n = 93 
123.15 
(232.28) 
n = 99 
0.147 
Mississippi 173.07 
(403.01) 
n = 147 
125.01 
(419.52) 
n = 99 
0.994 
235.54 
(578.05) 
n = 147 
103.58 
(352.41) 
n = 99 
0.652 
Total 353.51 
(689.44) 
N = 273 
204.64 
(543.81) 
N = 273 
0.065 
420.38 
(822.31) 
N = 273 
181.14 
(477.26) 
N = 273 
0.015 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of permits.  
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix K 
 
 
Average County Annual Total Industry Net Earnings by State Comparing GO 
Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 1577.459 
(2595.29) 
n = 33 
2280.068 
(5062.07) 
n = 75 
0.208 
1784.915 
(2943.30) 
n = 33 
2424.696 
(5172.89) 
n = 75 
0.060 
Louisiana 2524.074 
(4011.39) 
n = 93 
782.563 
(1348.11) 
n = 99 
0.755 
2744.076 
(4002.74) 
n = 93 
858.489 
(1473.60) 
n = 99 
0.043 
Mississippi 828.902 
(1431.51) 
n = 147 
488.303 
(548.78) 
n = 99 
0.124 
882.731 
(1489.18) 
n = 147 
499.150 
(574.70) 
n = 99 
0.090 
Total 1496.863 
(2817.39) 
N = 273 
1087.256 
(2879.47) 
N = 273 
0.833 
1625.871 
(2890.98) 
N = 273 
1158.46 
(2968.91) 
N = 273 
0.104 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix L 
 
Average County Construction Industry Earnings by State Comparing GO 
Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 121.433 
(206.78) 
n = 33 
170.846 
(415.39) 
n = 75 
0.176 
152.140 
(268.56) 
n = 33 
175.346 
(404.85) 
n = 75 
0.017 
Louisiana* 200.261 
(314.77) 
n = 93 
42.692 
(69.29) 
n = 99 
0.270 
252.147 
(388.50) 
n = 91 
58.199 
(91.43) 
n = 88 
0.100 
Mississippi** 50.127 
(69.74) 
n = 147 
30.570 
(71.60) 
n = 99 
0.595 
65.547 
(89.18) 
n = 133 
32.989 
(73.74) 
n = 92 
0.034 
Total 109.891 
(214.22) 
N = 273 
73.504 
(232.70) 
N = 273 
0.648 
142.739 
(271.18) 
N = 257 
83.559 
(237.07) 
N = 255 
0.232 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix M 
 
Average County Manufacturing Industry Earnings by State Comparing GO 
Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama** 260.285 
(354.04) 
n = 33 
309.863 
(415.44) 
n = 73 
0.083 
269.625 
(384.89) 
n = 33 
321.749 
(450.436) 
n = 75 
0.083 
Louisiana** 278.144 
(312.84) 
n = 92 
98.663 
(171.98) 
n = 88 
0.126 
288.768 
(296.91) 
n = 93 
93.361 
(156.56) 
n = 89 
0.007 
Mississippi** 114.819 
(174.87) 
n = 136 
118.145 
(146.53) 
n = 91 
0.371 
118.890 
(195.17) 
n = 137 
100.826 
(119.01) 
n = 93 
0.950 
Total 190.782 
(268.13) 
N = 261 
166.879 
(275.50) 
N = 252 
0.664 
197.874 
(275.07) 
N = 263 
162.712 
(287.47) 
N = 257 
0.205 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix N 
 
Actual Average County Employment for all Industries by State Comparing GO 
Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 40163.18 
(63873.26) 
n = 33 
49923.77 
(92530.55) 
n = 75 
0.022 
44938.09 
(71151.87) 
n = 33 
53642.96 
(95639.32) 
n = 75 
0.023 
Louisiana 57218.24 
(83002.26) 
n = 93 
19728.11 
(30299.24) 
n = 99 
0.853 
58355.23 
(77585.60) 
n = 93 
21245.25 
(32899.86) 
n = 99 
0.052 
Mississippi 20802.91 
(31380.51) 
n = 147 
13349.19 
(13081.31) 
n = 99 
0.096 
21939.60 
(31872.12) 
n = 147 
14021.69 
(14831.88) 
n = 99 
0.061 
Total 35548.38 
(60161.65) 
N = 273 
25710.39 
(54332.88) 
N = 273 
0.889 
37124.96 
(58847.38) 
N = 273 
27526.19 
(56802.67) 
N = 273 
0.146 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix O 
 
Actual Average County Construction Employment by State Comparing GO 
Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 3024.18 
(5039.80) 
n = 33 
3268.96 
(5974.93) 
n = 75 
0.003 
3807.79 
(6409.94) 
n = 33 
3625.25 
(6066.63) 
n = 75 
0.002 
Louisiana** 4383.03 
(5934.41) 
n = 89 
1201.29 
(1642.70) 
n = 91 
0.322 
5129.70 
(6716.18) 
n = 91 
1468.34 
(1985.05) 
n = 88 
0.006 
Mississippi** 1410.86 
(1704.82) 
n = 131 
738.67 
(886.27) 
n = 95 
0.023 
1749.59 
(2198.47) 
n = 133 
879.61 
(1197.14) 
n = 92 
0.003 
Total 2666.84 
(4347.38) 
N = 253 
1627.06 
(3536.70) 
N = 261 
0.184 
3210.72 
(5094.13) 
N = 257 
1890.32 
(3729.08) 
N = 255 
0.011 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix P 
 
Actual Average County Manufacturing Employment by State Comparing GO 
Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 4044.45 
(5105.76) 
n = 33 
5363.57 
(6315.88) 
n = 75 
0.087 
4139.00 
(5551.22) 
n = 33 
5347.68 
(6280.45) 
n = 75 
0.101 
Louisiana** 3734.16 
(4035.32) 
n = 92 
1532.49 
(2301.22) 
n = 88 
0.314 
3714.34 
(3838.05) 
n = 93 
1495.69 
(2270.52) 
n = 89 
0.026 
Mississippi** 2278.11 
(2786.57) 
n = 135 
2482.76 
(2980.15) 
n = 96 
0.194 
2238.38 
(2855.30) 
n = 136 
2162.86 
(2504.22) 
n = 96 
0.647 
Total 3017.52 
(3682.58) 
N = 260 
2994.10 
(4353.78) 
N = 259 
0.574 
3001.68 
(3683.56) 
N = 262 
2853.18 
(4234.77) 
N = 260 
0.582 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix Q 
 
Actual Average County Personal Income by State Comparing GO Zone to GO 
Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-
Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 2237.226 
(3307.73) 
n = 33 
2574.812 
(3811.53) 
n = 33 
0.755 
2950.724 
(5253.97) 
n = 75 
3248.363 
(5661.71) 
n = 75 
0.538 
Louisiana 3246.613 
(4492.10) 
n = 93 
3684.207 
(4815.13) 
n = 93 
0.411 
1146.025 
(1656.93) 
n = 99 
1277.313 
(1858.95) 
n = 99 
0.838 
Mississippi 1126.881 
(1536.25) 
n = 147 
1249.009 
(1698.18) 
n = 147 
0.217 
736.999 
(776.29) 
n = 99 
799.270 
(889.47) 
n = 99 
0.291 
Total 1983.205 
(3213.89) 
N = 273 
2238.844 
(3515.21) 
N = 273 
0.336 
1493.493 
(3090.96) 
N = 273 
1645.454 
(3356.99) 
N = 273 
0.023 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix R 
 
Actual County Average Wages per Job by State Comparing GO Zone to GO 
Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-
Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 32534 
(6351.87) 
n = 33 
33789 
(6003.99) 
n = 33 
0.310 
32269 
(4883.90) 
n = 75 
33190 
(5448.96) 
n = 75 
0.082 
Louisiana 35716 
(6335.92) 
n = 93 
40507 
(7309.09) 
n = 93 
0.001 
29099 
(3598.61) 
n = 99 
31018 
(3898.09) 
n = 99 
0.164 
Mississippi 29471 
(4543.96) 
n = 147 
31194 
(4904.63) 
n = 147 
0.498 
28411 
(2916.32) 
n = 99 
28955 
(2716.04) 
n = 99 
0.004 
Total 31969 
(6133.42) 
N = 273 
34680 
(7314.03) 
N = 273 
0.862 
29720 
(4095.82) 
N = 273 
30867 
(4363.23) 
N = 273 
0.000 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix S 
 
Actual Average County Per Capita Income by State Comparing GO Zone to 
GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and 
Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 26038 
(3488.61) 
n = 33 
28860 
(3801.53) 
n = 33 
0.753 
28072 
(5173.11) 
n = 75 
30078 
(5580.05) 
n = 75 
0.068 
Louisiana 28303 
(4356.60) 
n = 93 
34407 
(7463.61) 
n = 93 
0.007 
25041 
(3238.93) 
n = 99 
27422 
(3922.17) 
n = 99 
0.242 
Mississippi 24937 
(4544.24) 
n = 147 
26869 
(5436.11) 
n = 147 
0.119 
24568 
(3147.60) 
n = 99 
26256 
(2888.22) 
n = 99 
0.012 
Total 26217 
(4616.63) 
N = 273 
29678 
(6956.65) 
N = 273 
0.941 
25702 
(4099.51) 
N = 273 
27729 
(4400.57) 
N = 273 
0.000 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix T 
 
Actual Average County Median Household Income by State Comparing GO 
Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for 
Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 33437 
(6702.47) 
n = 33 
34287 
(7279.55) 
n = 33 
0.667 
37900 
(9322.45) 
n = 75 
38665 
(9592.69) 
n = 75 
0.396 
Louisiana 40545 
(6657.33) 
n = 93 
42682 
(7355.08) 
n = 93 
0.626 
31978 
(4972.07) 
n = 99 
33273 
(5422.82) 
n = 99 
0.207 
Mississippi 33295 
(6899.51) 
n = 147 
34252 
(7466.43) 
n = 147 
0.035 
32913 
(6869.27) 
n = 99 
32868 
(6561.94) 
n = 99 
0.000 
Total 35782 
(7589.12) 
N = 273 
37128 
(8393.61) 
N = 273 
0.002 
33944 
(7460.70) 
N = 273 
34608 
(7578.54) 
N = 273 
0.000 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) price deflator.  
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix U 
 
Actual Annual County Housing Unit Estimates by State Comparing GO Zone 
to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- 
and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 36232 
(51251.87) 
n = 33 
39140 
(55176.44) 
n = 33 
0.370 
39349 
(56902.33) 
n = 75 
40914 
(59488.85) 
n = 75 
0.549 
Louisiana 42245 
(53980.68) 
n = 93 
39937 
(46739.62) 
n = 93 
0.050 
17891 
(21401.15) 
n = 99 
18615 
(22279.20) 
n = 99 
0.859 
Mississippi 16831 
(19503.84) 
n = 147 
17229 
(19631.13) 
n = 147 
0.023 
11628 
(9060.99) 
n = 99 
12245 
(10452.24) 
n = 99 
0.832 
Total 27834 
(40543.71) 
N = 273 
27613 
(37818.76) 
N = 273 
0.056 
21515 
(34692.19) 
N = 273 
22431 
(36307.82) 
N = 273 
0.028 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of houses.   
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix V 
 
Actual Average County Building Permits by State Comparing GO Zone to GO 
Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-
Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 626.15 
(1197.45) 
n = 33 
726.55 
(1321.87) 
n = 33 
0.940 
403.47 
(843.95) 
n = 75 
360.05 
(745.88) 
n = 75 
0.482 
Louisiana 541.97 
(730.91) 
n = 93 
603.90 
(859.59) 
n = 93 
0.869 
133.65 
(255.42) 
n = 99 
123.15 
(232.28) 
n = 99 
0.469 
Mississippi 173.07 
(403.01) 
n = 147 
235.54 
(578.05) 
n = 147 
0.738 
125.01 
(419.52) 
n = 99 
103.58 
(352.41) 
n = 99 
0.430 
Total 353.51 
(689.44) 
N = 273 
420.38 
(822.31) 
N = 273 
0.378 
204.64 
(543.81) 
N = 273 
181.14 
(477.26) 
N = 273 
0.854 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of permits.  
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix W 
 
Actual Average County Total Net Earnings for all Industries by State 
Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 1577.459 
(2595.29) 
n = 33 
1784.915 
(2943.30) 
n = 33 
0.372 
2280.068 
(5062.07) 
n = 75 
2424.696 
(5172.89) 
n = 75 
0.254 
Louisiana 2524.074 
(4011.39) 
n = 93 
2744.076 
(4002.74) 
n = 93 
0.577 
782.563 
(1348.11) 
n = 99 
858.489 
(1473.60) 
n = 99 
0.113 
Mississippi 828.902 
(1431.51) 
n = 147 
882.731 
(1489.18) 
n = 147 
0.003 
488.303 
(548.78) 
n = 99 
499.150 
(574.70) 
n = 99 
0.018 
Total 1496.863 
(2817.39) 
N = 273 
1625.871 
(2890.98) 
N = 273 
0.002 
1087.256 
(2879.47) 
N = 273 
1158.46 
(2968.91) 
N = 273 
0.003 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix X 
 
Actual Average County Construction Industry Earnings by State Comparing 
GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties 
for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 121.433 
(206.78) 
n = 33 
152.140 
(268.56) 
n = 33 
0.361 
170.846 
(415.39) 
n = 75 
175.346 
(404.85) 
n = 75 
0.521 
Louisiana** 200.261 
(314.77) 
n = 93 
252.147 
(388.50) 
n = 91 
0.869 
42.692 
(69.29) 
n = 99 
58.199 
(91.43) 
n = 88 
0.558 
Mississippi** 50.127 
(69.74) 
n = 147 
65.547 
(89.18) 
n = 133 
0.766 
30.570 
(71.60) 
n = 99 
32.989 
(73.74) 
n = 92 
0.431 
Total 109.891 
(214.22) 
N = 273 
142.739 
(271.18) 
N = 257 
0.814 
73.504 
(232.70) 
N = 273 
83.559 
(237.07) 
N = 255 
0.968 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix Y 
 
Actual Average County Manufacturing Industry Earnings by State Comparing 
GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties 
for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 260.285 
(354.04) 
n = 33 
269.625 
(384.89) 
n = 33 
0.451 
309.863 
(415.44) 
n = 73 
321.749 
(450.436) 
n = 75 
0.661 
Louisiana* 278.144 
(312.84) 
n = 92 
288.768 
(296.91) 
n = 93 
0.529 
98.663 
(171.98) 
n = 88 
93.361 
(156.56) 
n = 89 
0.175 
Mississippi** 114.819 
(174.87) 
n = 136 
118.890 
(195.17) 
n = 137 
0.528 
118.145 
(146.53) 
n = 91 
100.826 
(119.01) 
n = 93 
0.714 
Total 190.782 
(268.13) 
N = 261 
197.874 
(275.07) 
N = 263 
0.907 
166.879 
(275.50) 
N = 252 
162.712 
(287.47) 
N = 257 
0.109 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix Z 
 
Actual Average County Employment for all Industries by State Comparing GO 
Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for 
Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 40163.18 
(63873.26) 
n = 33 
44938.09 
(71151.87) 
n = 33 
0.651 
49923.77 
(92530.55) 
n = 75 
53642.96 
(95639.32) 
n = 75 
0.815 
Louisiana 57218.24 
(83002.26) 
n = 93 
58355.23 
(77585.60) 
n = 93 
0.593 
19728.11 
(30299.24) 
n = 99 
21245.25 
(32899.86) 
n = 99 
0.748 
Mississippi 20802.91 
(31380.51) 
n = 147 
21939.60 
(31872.12) 
n = 147 
0.832 
13349.19 
(13081.31) 
n = 99 
14021.69 
(14831.88) 
n = 99 
0.043 
Total 35548.38 
(60161.65) 
N = 273 
37124.96 
(58847.38) 
N = 273 
0.118 
25710.39 
(54332.88) 
N = 273 
27526.19 
(56802.67) 
N = 273 
0.252 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Appendix AA 
 
Actual Average County Construction Employment by State Comparing GO 
Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for 
Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 3024.18 
(5039.80) 
n = 33 
3807.79 
(6409.94) 
n = 33 
0.626 
3268.96 
(5974.93) 
n = 75 
3625.25 
(6066.63) 
n = 75 
0.259 
Louisiana** 4383.03 
(5934.41) 
n = 89 
5129.70 
(6716.18) 
n = 91 
0.029 
1201.29 
(1642.70) 
n = 91 
1468.34 
(1985.05) 
n = 88 
0.314 
Mississippi** 1410.86 
(1704.82) 
n = 131 
1749.59 
(2198.47) 
n = 133 
0.793 
738.67 
(886.27) 
n = 95 
879.61 
(1197.14) 
n = 92 
0.110 
Total 2666.84 
(4347.38) 
N = 253 
3210.72 
(5094.13) 
N = 257 
0.192 
1627.06 
(3536.70) 
N = 261 
1890.32 
(3729.08) 
N = 255 
0.759 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix AB 
 
Actual Average County Manufacturing Employment by State Comparing GO 
Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for 
Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 4044.45 
(5105.76) 
n = 33 
4139.00 
(5551.22) 
n = 33 
0.315 
5363.57 
(6315.88) 
n = 75 
5347.68 
(6280.45) 
n = 75 
0.131 
Louisiana* 3734.16 
(4035.32) 
n = 92 
3714.34 
(3838.05) 
n = 93 
0.734 
1532.49 
(2301.22) 
n = 88 
1495.69 
(2270.52) 
n = 89 
0.740 
Mississippi** 2278.11 
(2786.57) 
n = 135 
2238.38 
(2855.30) 
n = 136 
0.481 
2482.76 
(2980.15) 
n = 96 
2162.86 
(2504.22) 
n = 96 
0.200 
Total 3017.52 
(3682.58) 
N = 260 
3001.68 
(3683.56) 
N = 262 
0.361 
2994.10 
(4353.78) 
N = 259 
2853.18 
(4234.77) 
N = 260 
0.547 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2002, 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana 
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Appendix AC 
 
Average Annual County Change in Personal Income by State Comparing GO 
Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina  
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-Value* GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-Value* 
Alabama 87.025 
(134.69) 
n = 22 
139.363 
(276.47) 
n = 50 
0.449 
141.412 
(234.25) 
n = 33 
137.765 
(232.58) 
n = 75 
0.003 
Louisiana 111.830 
(171.82) 
n = 62 
47.887 
(79.90) 
n = 66 
0.246 
208.083 
(446.14) 
n = 93 
60.508 
(101.49) 
n = 99 
0.851 
Mississippi 44.211 
(66.35) 
n = 98 
32.003 
(37.82) 
n = 66 
0.737 
57.150 
(129.56) 
n = 147 
31.851 
(48.36) 
n = 99 
0.725 
Total 72.421 
(124.10) 
N = 182 
67.258 
(159.76) 
N = 182 
0.206 
118.752 
(296.02) 
N = 273 
71.340 
(145.25) 
N = 273 
0.125 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Unit: Millions of dollars. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AD 
 
Average Annual Change in Wages Per Job by State Comparing GO Zone to 
Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 947.59 
(530.02) 
n = 22 
1004.70 
(366.20) 
n = 50 
0.378 
1174.42 
(709.25) 
n = 33 
1107.36 
(632.40) 
n = 75 
0.609 
Louisiana 1034.35 
(574.57) 
n = 62 
983.70 
(476.23) 
n = 66 
0.352 
2599.00 
(2018.99) 
n = 93 
1430.15 
(1255.88) 
n = 99 
0.000 
Mississippi 1011.96 
(947.13) 
n = 98 
1006.89 
(601.44) 
n = 66 
0.902 
1257.22 
(1319.27) 
n = 147 
832.09 
(587.50) 
n = 99 
0.033 
Total 1011.81 
(790.74) 
N = 182 
997.88 
(497.77) 
N = 182 
0.922 
1704.30 
(1669.71) 
N = 273 
1124.59 
(930.93) 
N = 273 
0.000 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, and 
2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AE 
 
Average Annual County Change in Per Capita Income by State Comparing 
GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO 
Zone 
Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 1184.82 
(537.02) 
n = 22 
1215.30 
(524.76) 
n = 50 
0.655 
1252.58 
(573.13) 
n = 33 
1129.11 
(455.71) 
n = 75 
0.603 
Louisiana 894.73 
(454.17) 
n = 62 
1106.97 
(1017.44) 
n = 66 
0.106 
2362.22 
(6363.31) 
n = 93 
1239.04 
(845.04) 
n = 99 
0.057 
Mississippi 1005.26 
(768.69) 
n = 98 
1217.61 
(1119.15) 
n = 66 
0.033 
1055.08 
(1415.53) 
n = 147 
935.25 
(1171.64) 
n = 99 
0.778 
Total 989.31 
(653.82) 
N = 182 
1176.85 
(948.10) 
N = 182 
0.003 
1524.24 
(3895.88) 
N = 273 
1098.67 
(908.58) 
N = 273 
0.204 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Unit: Dollars. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AF 
 
Average Annual County Change in Median Household Income by State 
Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 760.18 
(347.12) 
n = 22 
947.80 
(511.48) 
n = 50 
0.714 
1527.82 
(1271.67) 
n = 33 
1374.03 
(1882.26) 
n = 75 
0.828 
Louisiana 764.21 
(519.14) 
n = 62 
926.33 
(490.37) 
n = 66 
0.089 
2339.65 
(2247.66) 
n = 93 
1574.23 
(1688.71) 
n = 99 
0.037 
Mississippi 926.36 
(565.93) 
n = 98 
969.76 
(430.07) 
n = 66 
0.231 
1301.01 
(1638.39) 
n = 147 
1121.29 
(1672.83) 
n = 99 
0.765 
Total 851.03 
(532.07) 
N = 182 
947.98 
(473.22) 
N = 182 
0.033 
1682.25 
(1889.20) 
N = 273 
1354.98 
(1742.71) 
N = 273 
0.172 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AG 
 
Average Annual County Change in Housing Unit Estimates by State 
Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 517.36 
(943.44) 
n = 22 
350.74 
(653.75) 
n = 50 
0.002 
779.76 
(1568.36) 
n = 33 
381.59 
(752.39) 
n = 75 
0.001 
Louisiana 455.48 
(670.95) 
n = 62 
141.27 
(223.03) 
n = 66 
0.633 
-826.53 
(12431.41) 
n = 93 
197.94 
(277.14) 
n = 99 
0.345 
Mississippi 166.51 
(329.11) 
n = 98 
129.27 
(388.22) 
n = 66 
0.968 
106.86 
(1443.08) 
n = 147 
164.17 
(425.60) 
n = 99 
0.179 
Total 307.36 
(580.21) 
N = 182 
194.47 
(443.87) 
N = 182 
0.217 
-129.77 
(7346.74) 
N = 273 
236.15 
(505.17) 
N = 273 
0.971 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of houses.   
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
 
216 
 
Appendix AH 
 
Average Annual County Change in Building Permits Issued by State 
Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina  
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 142.41 
(419.48) 
n = 22 
64.80 
(184.07) 
n = 50 
0.175 
-142.55 
(664.83) 
n = 33 
-90.71 
(308.28) 
n = 75 
0.256 
Louisiana 56.18 
(191.76) 
n = 62 
16.38 
(103.33) 
n = 66 
0.900 
-41.51 
(487.51) 
n = 93 
-26.73 
(108.88) 
n = 99 
0.640 
Mississippi 26.82 
(121.01) 
n = 98 
9.52 
(69.10) 
n = 66 
0.759 
5.90 
(274.02) 
n = 147 
-28.65 
(171.86) 
n = 99 
0.291 
Total 50.79 
(204.93) 
N = 182 
27.19 
(123.57) 
N = 182 
0.209 
-28.19 
(418.29) 
N = 273 
-45.00 
(203.87) 
N = 273 
0.508 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of permits.  
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AI 
 
Average Annual County Change in Total Industry Net Earnings by State 
Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-Value* GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-Value* 
Alabama 59.979 
(89.59) 
n = 22 
102.259 
(207.45) 
n = 50 
0.581 
83.137 
(170.93) 
n = 33 
74.264 
(158.04) 
n = 75 
0.013 
Louisiana 99.031 
(157.15) 
n = 62 
43.505 
(77.12) 
n = 66 
0.046 
158.560 
(320.46) 
n = 93 
36.743 
(72.24) 
n = 99 
0.121 
Mississippi 40.597 
(69.01) 
n = 98 
25.205 
(30.40) 
n = 66 
0.986 
33.813 
(73.46) 
n = 147 
9.314 
(24.70) 
n = 99 
0.371 
Total 62.846 
(111.91) 
N = 182 
53.009 
(122.90) 
N = 182 
0.147 
82.272 
(210.54) 
N = 273 
37.105 
(97.76) 
N = 273 
0.000 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AJ 
 
Average Annual County Change in Construction Industry Net Earnings by 
State Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-
Katrina 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 2.058 
(11.99) 
n = 22 
9.349 
(22.58) 
n = 50 
0.597 
4.946 
(21.51) 
n = 33 
 -.510 
(24.21) 
n = 75 
0.169 
Louisiana** 5.728 
(18.36) 
n = 59 
2.486 
(6.93) 
n = 58 
0.296 
21.377 
(53.36) 
n = 89 
4.285 
(14.43) 
n = 85 
0.024 
Mississippi** -.893 
(12.31) 
n = 84 
1.759 
(6.95) 
n = 63 
0.485 
4.913 
(17.68) 
n = 132 
-1.005 
(10.00) 
n = 90 
0.153 
Total 1.868 
(14.96) 
N = 165 
4.225 
(13.85) 
N = 171 
0.008 
10.687 
(35.67) 
N = 254 
.942 
(16.91) 
N = 250 
0.001 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AK 
 
Average Annual County Change in Manufacturing Industry Net Earnings by 
State Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-
Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama** 3.530 
(24.55) 
n = 22 
13.034 
(29.28) 
n = 47 
0.541 
10.409 
(28.70) 
n = 33 
8.664 
(24.03) 
n = 75 
0.171 
Louisiana** 1.472 
(22.50) 
n = 61 
3.365 
(24.79) 
n = 56 
0.311 
17.663 
(26.10) 
n = 93 
.271 
(15.71) 
n = 82 
0.003 
Mississippi** 5.427 
(28.97) 
n = 88 
.399 
(8.44) 
n = 59 
0.776 
3.454 
(19.38) 
n = 134 
-3.384 
(10.64) 
n = 92 
0.513 
Total 3.772 
(26.19) 
N = 171 
5.09 
(22.54) 
N = 162 
0.353 
9.419 
(24.07) 
N = 260 
1.449 
(17.87) 
N = 249 
0.000 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana.  
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AL 
 
Average Annual County Change in Employment for all Industries by State 
Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-Value* GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-Value* 
Alabama 565.55 
(1203.79) 
n = 22 
637.64 
(1412.80) 
n = 50 
0.136 
1193.82 
(2195.20) 
n = 33 
740.16 
(1439.07) 
n = 75 
0.000 
Louisiana 413.13 
(1398.55) 
n = 62 
208.64 
(606.68) 
n = 66 
0.251 
1251.78 
(7450.51) 
n = 93 
457.55 
(836.73) 
n = 99 
0.812 
Mississippi 165.23 
(1103.57) 
n = 98 
1.80 
(554.39) 
n = 66 
0.355 
393.71 
(1153.74) 
n = 147 
152.24 
(779.45) 
n = 99 
0.884 
Total 298.07 
(1225.87) 
N = 182 
251.49 
(920.59) 
N = 182 
0.965 
782.74 
(4498.27) 
N = 273 
424.47 
(1043.75) 
N = 273 
0.191 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of Jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
 
221 
 
Appendix AM 
 
Average Annual County Change in Construction Employment by State 
Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 63.00 
(246.00) 
n = 22 
124.74 
(232.19) 
n = 50 
0.734 
94.36 
(313.12) 
n = 33 
41.51 
(174.72) 
n = 75 
0.043 
Louisiana** 31.25 
(386.60) 
n = 59 
20.17 
(125.17) 
n = 58 
0.805 
254.75 
(520.63) 
n = 89 
63.08 
(237.85) 
n = 85 
0.084 
Mississippi** -9.51 
(229.92) 
n = 84 
21.35 
(118.57) 
n = 63 
0.880 
93.30 
(264.58) 
n = 132 
25.13 
(84.39) 
n = 90 
0.170 
Total 14.73 
(296.77) 
N = 165 
51.18 
(167.84) 
N = 171 
0.145 
150.01 
(385.84) 
N = 254 
42.95 
(175.94) 
N = 250 
0.001 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of Jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008.  
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix AN 
 
Average Annual County Change in Manufacturing Employment by State 
Comparing GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama -128.73 
(470.79) 
n = 22 
-126.36 
(399.14) 
n = 50 
0.951 
42.67 
(341.54) 
n = 33 
-82.59 
(290.06) 
n = 75 
0.351 
Louisiana** -93.11 
(251.53) 
n = 61 
-39.07 
(130.61) 
n = 56 
0.258 
69.35 
(300.13) 
n = 93 
-32.21 
(225.29) 
n = 82 
0.095 
Mississippi** -8.52 
(481.58) 
n = 88 
-106.32 
(240.65) 
n = 63 
0.737 
-30.33 
(214.68) 
n = 133 
-143.97 
(257.20) 
n = 95 
0.096 
Total -54.16 
(413.21) 
N = 171 
-89.96 
(273.46) 
N = 169 
0.552 
14.76 
(269.05) 
N = 259 
-89.33 
(261.09) 
N = 252 
0.000 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of Jobs. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix AO 
 
Average Annual County Change in Personal Income by State Comparing GO 
Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for 
Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 87.025 
(134.69) 
n = 22 
141.412 
(234.25) 
n = 33 
0.515 
139.363 
(276.47) 
n = 50 
137.765 
(232.58) 
n = 75 
0.697 
Louisiana 111.830 
(171.82) 
n = 62 
208.083 
(446.14) 
n = 93 
0.447 
47.887 
(79.90) 
n = 66 
60.508 
(101.49) 
n = 99 
0.405 
Mississippi 44.211 
(66.35) 
n = 98 
57.150 
(129.56) 
n = 147 
0.391 
32.003 
(37.82) 
n = 66 
31.851 
(48.36) 
n = 99 
0.600 
Total 72.421 
(124.10) 
N = 182 
118.752 
(296.02) 
N = 273 
0.294 
67.258 
(159.76) 
N = 182 
71.340 
(145.25) 
N = 273 
0.985 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AP 
 
Average Annual County Change in Wages Per Job by State Comparing GO 
Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties for 
Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 947.59 
(530.02) 
n = 22 
1174.42 
(709.25) 
n = 33 
0.096 
1004.70 
(366.20) 
n = 50 
1107.36 
(632.40) 
n = 75 
0.387 
Louisiana 1034.35 
(574.57) 
n = 62 
2599.00 
(2018.99) 
n = 93 
0.007 
983.70 
(476.23) 
n = 66 
1430.15 
(1255.88) 
n = 99 
0.181 
Mississippi 1011.96 
(947.13) 
n = 98 
1257.22 
(1319.27) 
n = 147 
0.788 
1006.89 
(601.44) 
n = 66 
832.09 
(587.50) 
n = 99 
0.238 
Total 1011.81 
(790.74) 
N = 182 
1704.30 
(1669.71) 
N = 273 
0.108 
997.88 
(497.77) 
N = 182 
1124.59 
(930.93) 
N = 273 
0.029 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AQ 
 
Average Annual County Change in Per Capita Income by State Comparing 
GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties 
for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 1184.82 
(537.02) 
n = 22 
1252.58 
(573.13) 
n = 33 
0.996 
1215.30 
(524.76) 
n = 50 
1129.11 
(455.71) 
n = 75 
0.188 
Louisiana 894.73 
(454.17) 
n = 62 
2362.22 
(6363.31) 
n = 93 
0.075 
1106.97 
(1017.44) 
n = 66 
1239.04 
(845.04) 
n = 99 
0.017 
Mississippi 1005.26 
(768.69) 
n = 98 
1055.08 
(1415.53) 
n = 147 
0.006 
1217.61 
(1119.15) 
n = 66 
935.25 
(1171.64) 
n = 99 
0.094 
Total 989.31 
(653.82) 
N = 182 
1524.24 
(3895.88) 
N = 273 
0.332 
1176.85 
(948.10) 
N = 182 
1098.67 
(908.58) 
N = 273 
0.001 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AR 
 
Average Annual County Change in Median Household Income by State 
Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 760.18 
(347.12) 
n = 22 
1527.82 
(1271.67) 
n = 33 
0.276 
947.80 
(511.48) 
n = 50 
1374.03 
(1882.26) 
n = 75 
0.501 
Louisiana 764.21 
(519.14) 
n = 62 
2339.65 
(2247.66) 
n = 93 
0.997 
926.33 
(490.37) 
n = 66 
1574.23 
(1688.71) 
n = 99 
0.891 
Mississippi 926.36 
(565.93) 
n = 98 
1301.01 
(1638.39) 
n = 147 
0.632 
969.76 
(430.07) 
n = 66 
1121.29 
(1672.83) 
n = 99 
0.229 
Total 851.03 
(532.07) 
N = 182 
1682.25 
(1889.20) 
N = 273 
0.712 
947.98 
(473.22) 
N = 182 
1354.98 
(1742.71) 
N = 273 
0.976 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.   
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AS 
 
Average Annual County Change in Housing Unit Estimates by State 
Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 517.36 
(943.44) 
n = 22 
779.76 
(1568.36) 
n = 33 
0.451 
350.74 
(653.75) 
n = 50 
381.59 
(752.39) 
n = 75 
0.779 
Louisiana 455.48 
(670.95) 
n = 62 
-826.53 
(12431.41) 
n = 93 
0.457 
141.27 
(223.03) 
n = 66 
197.94 
(277.14) 
n = 99 
0.121 
Mississippi 166.51 
(329.11) 
n = 98 
106.86 
(1443.08) 
n = 147 
0.039 
129.27 
(388.22) 
n = 66 
164.17 
(425.60) 
n = 99 
0.162 
Total 307.36 
(580.21) 
N = 182 
-129.77 
(7346.74) 
N = 273 
0.351 
194.47 
(443.87) 
N = 182 
236.15 
(505.17) 
N = 273 
0.278 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of houses.   
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau.  
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AT 
 
Average Annual County Change in Building Permits Issued by State 
Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 142.41 
(419.48) 
n = 22 
-142.55 
(664.83) 
n = 33 
0.749 
64.80 
(184.07) 
n = 50 
-90.71 
(308.28) 
n = 75 
0.702 
Louisiana 56.18 
(191.76) 
n = 62 
-41.51 
(487.51) 
n = 93 
0.032 
16.38 
(103.33) 
n = 66 
-26.73 
(108.88) 
n = 99 
0.630 
Mississippi 26.82 
(121.01) 
n = 98 
5.90 
(274.02) 
n = 147 
0.094 
9.52 
(69.10) 
n = 66 
-28.65 
(171.86) 
n = 99 
0.598 
Total 50.79 
(204.93) 
N = 182 
-28.19 
(418.29) 
N = 273 
0.009 
27.19 
(123.57) 
N = 182 
-45.00 
(203.87) 
N = 273 
0.647 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of permits.  
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AU 
 
Average Annual County Change in Total Industry Net Earnings by State 
Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 59.979 
(89.59) 
n = 22 
83.137 
(170.93) 
n = 33 
0.276 
102.259 
(207.45) 
n = 50 
74.264 
(158.04) 
n = 75 
0.966 
Louisiana 99.031 
(157.15) 
n = 62 
158.560 
(320.46) 
n = 93 
0.157 
43.505 
(77.12) 
n = 66 
36.743 
(72.24) 
n = 99 
0.838 
Mississippi 40.597 
(69.01) 
n = 98 
33.813 
(73.46) 
n = 147 
0.026 
25.205 
(30.40) 
n = 66 
9.314 
(24.70) 
n = 99 
0.227 
Total 62.846 
(111.91) 
N = 182 
82.272 
(210.54) 
N = 273 
0.185 
53.009 
(122.90) 
N = 182 
37.105 
(97.76) 
N = 273 
0.738 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AV 
 
Average Annual County Change in Construction Industry Net Earnings by 
State Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-
GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 2.058 
(11.99) 
n = 22 
4.946 
(21.51) 
n = 33 
0.106 
9.349 
(22.58) 
n = 50 
 -.510 
(24.21) 
n = 75 
0.391 
Louisiana** 5.728 
(18.36) 
n = 59 
21.377 
(53.36) 
n = 89 
0.008 
2.486 
(6.93) 
n = 58 
4.285 
(14.43) 
n = 85 
0.438 
Mississippi** -.893 
(12.31) 
n = 84 
4.913 
(17.68) 
n = 132 
0.342 
1.759 
(6.95) 
n = 63 
-1.005 
(10.00) 
n = 90 
0.488 
Total 1.868 
(14.96) 
N = 165 
10.687 
(35.67) 
N = 254 
0.000 
4.225 
(13.85) 
N = 171 
.942 
(16.91) 
N = 250 
0.145 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix AW 
 
Average Annual County Change in Manufacturing Industry Net Earnings by 
State Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-
GO Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 3.530 
(24.55) 
n = 22 
10.409 
(28.70) 
n = 33 
0.586 
13.034 
(29.28) 
n = 47 
8.664 
(24.03) 
n = 75 
0.615 
Louisiana** 1.472 
(22.50) 
n = 61 
17.663 
(26.10) 
n = 93 
0.053 
3.365 
(24.79) 
n = 56 
.271 
(15.71) 
n = 82 
0.526 
Mississippi** 5.427 
(28.97) 
n = 88 
3.454 
(19.38) 
n = 134 
0.831 
.399 
(8.44) 
n = 59 
-3.384 
(10.64) 
n = 92 
0.417 
Total 3.772 
(26.19) 
N = 171 
9.419 
(24.07) 
N = 260 
0.138 
5.09 
(22.54) 
N = 162 
1.449 
(17.87) 
N = 249 
0.457 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix AX 
 
Average Annual County Change in Total Employment by State Comparing 
GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO Zone Counties 
for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* 
Alabama 565.55 
(1203.79) 
n = 22 
1193.82 
(2195.20) 
n = 33 
0.381 
637.64 
(1412.80) 
n = 50 
740.16 
(1439.07) 
n = 75 
0.137 
Louisiana 413.13 
(1398.55) 
n = 62 
1251.78 
(7450.51) 
n = 93 
0.580 
208.64 
(606.68) 
n = 66 
457.55 
(836.73) 
n = 99 
0.005 
Mississippi 165.23 
(1103.57) 
n = 98 
393.71 
(1153.74) 
n = 147 
0.826 
1.80 
(554.39) 
n = 66 
152.24 
(779.45) 
n = 99 
0.214 
Total 298.07 
(1225.87) 
N = 182 
782.74 
(4498.27) 
N = 273 
0.522 
251.49 
(920.59) 
N = 182 
424.47 
(1043.75) 
N = 273 
0.338 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of Jobs.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
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Appendix AY 
 
Average Annual County Change in Construction Employment by State 
Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 63.00 
(246.00) 
n = 22 
94.36 
(313.12) 
n = 33 
0.622 
124.74 
(232.19) 
n = 50 
41.51 
(174.72) 
n = 75 
0.494 
Louisiana** 31.25 
(386.60) 
n = 59 
254.75 
(520.63) 
n = 89 
0.000 
20.17 
(125.17) 
n = 58 
63.08 
(237.85) 
n = 85 
0.128 
Mississippi** -9.51 
(229.92) 
n = 84 
93.30 
(264.58) 
n = 132 
0.235 
21.35 
(118.57) 
n = 63 
25.13 
(84.39) 
n = 90 
0.269 
Total 14.73 
(296.77) 
N = 165 
150.01 
(385.84) 
N = 254 
0.000 
51.18 
(167.84) 
N = 171 
42.95 
(175.94) 
N = 250 
0.209 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of Jobs.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix AZ 
 
Average Annual County Change in Manufacturing Employment by State 
Comparing GO Zone to GO Zone Counties and Non-GO Zone to Non-GO 
Zone Counties for Pre- and Post-Katrina 
 
 GO Zone Non-GO Zone  
 Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-Value* Pre-
Katrina  
Post-
Katrina 
P-
Value* 
Alabama -128.73 
(470.79) 
n = 22 
42.67 
(341.54) 
n = 33 
0.234 
-126.36 
(399.14) 
n = 50 
-82.59 
(290.06) 
n = 75 
0.751 
Louisiana** -93.11 
(251.53) 
n = 61 
69.35 
(300.13) 
n = 93 
0.156 
-39.07 
(130.61) 
n = 56 
-32.21 
(225.29) 
n = 82 
0.945 
Mississippi** -8.52 
(481.58) 
n = 88 
-30.33 
(214.68) 
n = 133 
0.737 
-106.32 
(240.65) 
n = 63 
-143.97 
(257.20) 
n = 95 
0.401 
Total -54.16 
(413.21) 
N = 171 
14.76 
(269.05) 
N = 259 
0.284 
-89.96 
(273.46) 
N = 169 
-89.33 
(261.09) 
N = 252 
0.684 
 
*P-value noted is for Katrina (Pre-K vs. Post-K) variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of Jobs.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003, and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 2007, 
and 2008. 
All dependent variables represent average annual change by county for each variable. 
**Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix BA 
 
Average County Annual Total Industry Earnings by State 
 Alabama Louisiana 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
1550.29 
(2664.78) 
n = 11 
2226.28 
(5070.95) 
n = 25 
0.681 
2470.05 
(3984.20) 
n = 31 
748.68 
(1307.61) 
n = 33 
0.022 
2003 
1571.86 
(2664.97) 
n = 11 
2265.40 
(5078.96) 
n = 25 
0.673 
2528.83 
(4051.26) 
n = 31 
788.78 
(1367.18) 
n = 33 
0.023 
2004 
1610.24 
(2710.83) 
n = 11 
2348.53 
(5243.15) 
n = 25 
0.663 
2573.35 
(4129.69) 
n = 31 
810.23 
(1408.80) 
n = 33 
0.024 
2005 
1681.66 
(2832.09) 
n = 11 
2386.59 
(5215.24) 
n = 25 
0.677 
2573.69 
(4001.70) 
n = 31 
826.29 
(1429.26) 
n = 33 
0.022 
2006 
1770.82 
(3008.96) 
n = 11 
2450.68 
(5282.85) 
n = 25 
0.706 
2649.67 
(3931.86) 
n = 31 
850.02 
(1490.00) 
n = 33 
0.017 
2007 
1784.35 
(3031.00) 
n = 11 
2430.65 
(5242.26) 
n = 25 
0.706 
2734.44 
(4034.35) 
n = 31 
853.53 
(1475.49) 
n = 33 
0.015 
2008 
1799.58 
(3079.03) 
n = 11 
2422.76 
(5207.34) 
n = 25 
0.715 
2848.12 
(4168.58) 
n = 31 
871.92 
(1500.92) 
n = 33 
0.013 
 Mississippi Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
803.06 
(1418.68) 
n = 49 
469.21 
(540.23) 
n = 33 
0.201 
1461.26 
(2782.28) 
n = 91 
1053.26 
(2847.85) 
n = 91 
0.330 
2003 
828.17 
(1441.13) 
n = 49 
492.54 
(553.55) 
n = 33 
0.206 
1497.41 
(2824.65) 
n = 91 
1087.02 
(2863.63) 
n = 91 
0.332 
2004 
855.47 
(1463.60) 
n = 49 
503.16 
(568.69) 
n = 33 
0.192 
1531.92 
(2875.27) 
n = 91 
1121.48 
(2957.27) 
n = 91 
0.344 
2005 
863.16 
(1461.03) 
n = 49 
506.92 
(577.27) 
n = 33 
0.187 
1544.81 
(2826.20) 
n = 91 
1139.13 
(2951.70) 
n = 91 
0.345 
2006 
871.26 
(1489.14) 
n = 49 
499.78 
(580.38) 
n = 33 
0.177 
1585.83 
(2830.92) 
n = 91 
1154.51 
(2997.98) 
n = 91 
0.320 
2007 
879.83 
(1495.60) 
n = 49 
502.45 
(584.58) 
n = 33 
0.172 
1620.96 
(2892.83) 
n = 91 
1159.48 
(2977.48) 
n = 91 
0.290 
2008 
897.11 
(1513.49) 
n = 49 
495.23 
(576.97) 
n = 33 
0.150 
1670.83 
(2978.72) 
n = 91 
1161.37 
(2964.08) 
n = 91 
0.249 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Appendix BB 
Average County Annual Manufacturing Industry Earnings by State 
 Alabama Louisiana* 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
261.844 
(369.22) 
n = 11 
308.536 
(416.72) 
n = 25 
0.752 
278.656 
(317.68) 
n = 31 
97.848 
(157.53) 
n = 29 
0.008 
2003 
261.839 
(368.49) 
n = 11 
310.799 
(414.79) 
n = 25 
0.740 
278.519 
(321.03) 
n = 31 
103.968 
(189.07) 
n = 28 
0.015 
2004 
257.172 
(359.13) 
n = 11 
310.237 
(431.82) 
n = 25 
0.724 
277.227 
(309.98) 
n = 30 
96.219 
(177.11) 
n = 30 
0.007 
2005 
260.441 
(368.23) 
n = 11 
317.354 
(439.73) 
n = 25 
0.710 
266.456 
(294.40) 
n = 31 
102.454 
(170.89) 
n = 27 
0.014 
2006 
268.630 
(388.38) 
n = 11 
324.079 
(458.84) 
n = 25 
0.729 
278.359 
(294.48) 
n = 31 
101.161 
(173.82) 
n = 28 
0.007 
2007 
268.941 
(397.68) 
n = 11 
322.639 
(456.13) 
n = 25 
0.738 
289.334 
(299.12) 
n = 31 
99.251 
(166.62) 
n = 28 
0.004 
2008 
271.304 
(406.28) 
n = 11 
318.529 
(454.95) 
n = 25 
0.769 
298.611 
(306.51) 
n = 31 
81.744 
(135.14) 
n = 33 
0.000 
 Mississippi* Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
111.418 
(162.24) 
n = 45 
123.426 
(151.68) 
n = 30 
0.748 
190.028 
(266.92) 
n = 87 
168.014 
(271.23) 
n = 83 
0.595 
2003 
120.218 
(181.86) 
n = 44 
115.070 
(144.89) 
n = 31 
0.896 
195.394 
(274.04) 
n = 86 
167.921 
(275.93) 
n = 83 
0.517 
2004 
113.023 
(183.33) 
n = 47 
116.041 
(147.86) 
n = 30 
0.940 
187.020 
(266.48) 
n = 88 
166.161 
(283.69) 
n = 85 
0.619 
2005 
118.574 
(191.24) 
n = 45 
111.892 
(138.74) 
n = 31 
0.868 
189.205 
(264.80) 
n = 87 
170.708 
(286.87) 
n = 83 
0.663 
2006 
117.633 
(184.88) 
n = 46 
107.493 
(127.41) 
n = 31 
0.791 
193.127 
(266.91) 
n = 88 
169.843 
(294.59) 
n = 84 
0.587 
2007 
120.357 
(197.03) 
n = 45 
101.709 
(120.40) 
n = 31 
0.640 
199.354 
(276.16) 
n = 87 
166.642 
(291.32) 
n = 84 
0.452 
2008 
118.711 
(207.30) 
n = 46 
93.274 
(112.23) 
n = 31 
0.535 
201.159 
(294.95) 
n = 88 
152.273 
(279.87) 
n = 89 
0.251 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana.  
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Appendix BC 
Average County Annual Construction Industry Earnings by State 
 Alabama Louisiana* 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
122.590 
(218.22) 
n = 11 
165.797 
(412.44) 
n = 25 
0.746 
204.642 
(320.15) 
n = 30 
45.075 
(71.93) 
n = 30 
0.010 
2003 
120.398 
(209.59) 
n = 11 
167.952 
(415.75) 
n = 25 
0.723 
207.532 
(327.68) 
n = 30 
46.292 
(71.87) 
n = 29 
0.012 
2004 
121.312 
(212.79) 
n = 11 
178.790 
(434.71) 
n = 25 
0.681 
214.449 
(320.50) 
n = 29 
46.511 
(74.22) 
n = 31 
0.006 
2005 
143.516 
(257.65) 
n = 11 
178.106 
(427.78) 
n = 25 
0.806 
212.818 
(327.62) 
n = 30 
51.161 
(76.86) 
n = 29 
0.012 
2006 
153.463 
(277.29) 
n = 11 
182.789 
(431.26) 
n = 25 
0.838 
257.467 
(383.01) 
n = 29 
57.652 
(91.66) 
n = 29 
0.008 
2007 
155.824 
(279.56) 
n = 11 
180.601 
(418.53) 
n = 25 
0.859 
247.622 
(386.48) 
n = 31 
59.212 
(92.81) 
n = 29 
0.013 
2008 
147.131 
(275.14) 
n = 11 
162.648 
(379.44) 
n = 25 
0.904 
251.695 
(407.99) 
n = 31 
57.750 
(93.00) 
n = 30 
0.014 
 Mississippi* Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
57.259 
(74.51) 
n = 44 
29.860 
(67.03) 
n = 32 
0.103 
117.731 
(220.26) 
n = 85 
74.169 
(233.03) 
n = 87 
0.210 
2003 
55.292 
(72.63) 
n = 43 
31.345 
(73.77) 
n = 32 
0.165 
118.189 
(224.53) 
n = 84 
76.096 
(236.71) 
n = 86 
0.236 
2004 
52.539 
(71.61) 
n = 44 
33.158 
(80.09) 
n = 31 
0.275 
117.442 
(219.74) 
n = 84 
79.764 
(246.83) 
n = 87 
0.294 
2005 
56.887 
(77.16) 
n = 45 
36.408 
(88.41) 
n = 30 
0.292 
122.362 
(229.62) 
n = 86 
83.673 
(247.99) 
n = 84 
0.293 
2006 
64.905 
(89.62) 
n = 44 
35.578 
(83.45) 
n = 31 
0.155 
142.981 
(265.97) 
n = 84 
86.406 
(249.86) 
n = 85 
0.156 
2007 
63.724 
(90.34) 
n = 45 
33.536 
(77.97) 
n = 30 
0.139 
140.895 
(269.48) 
n = 87 
86.170 
(244.18) 
n = 84 
0.166 
2008 
68.055 
(89.57) 
n = 44 
29.872 
(60.30) 
n = 31 
0.043 
144.365 
(280.95) 
n = 86 
78.194 
(219.05) 
n = 86 
0.087 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
238 
 
Appendix BD 
 
Average County Average Wages per Job by State 
 Alabama Louisiana 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
32202 
(6497.26) 
n = 11 
31865 
(4848.95) 
n = 25 
0.864 
35463 
(6506.98) 
n = 31 
28680 
(3524.92) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2003 
32623 
(6592.49) 
n = 11 
32357 
(4969.19) 
n = 25 
0.895 
35607 
(6348.99) 
n = 31 
29109 
(3668.56) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2004 
32778 
(6575.47) 
n = 11 
32586 
(5005.74) 
n = 25 
0.924 
36077 
(6343.83) 
n = 31 
29507 
(3663.78) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2005 
33207 
(6319.94) 
n = 11 
32766 
(5147.53) 
n = 25 
0.827 
36998 
(6499.73) 
n = 31 
29891 
(3601.28) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2006 
33554 
(6238.13) 
n = 11 
32836 
(5349.55) 
n = 25 
0.726 
39433 
(7388.55) 
n = 31 
30507 
(3811.59) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2007 
33679 
(6004.55) 
n = 11 
33208 
(5551.23) 
n = 25 
0.821 
40185 
(7155.39) 
n = 31 
30704 
(3850.76) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2008 
34134 
(6338.78) 
n = 11 
33526 
(5644.96) 
n = 25 
0.776 
41902 
(7397.86) 
n = 31 
31844 
(4013.86) 
n = 33 
0.000 
 Mississippi Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
29011 
(4421.53) 
n = 49 
27955 
(2930.99) 
n = 33 
0.232 
31595 
(6169.55) 
n = 91 
29292 
(4046.51) 
n = 91 
0.003 
2003 
29516 
(4586.77) 
n = 49 
28410 
(3031.18) 
n = 33 
0.227 
31967 
(6113.40) 
n = 91 
29748 
(4163.48) 
n = 91 
0.005 
2004 
29885 
(4671.34) 
n = 49 
28868 
(2799.48) 
n = 33 
0.266 
32344 
(6162.07) 
n = 91 
30121 
(4079.50) 
n = 91 
0.005 
2005 
30384 
(4943.13) 
n = 49 
28872 
(2690.21) 
n = 33 
0.113 
32978 
(6386.61) 
n = 91 
30311 
(4092.58) 
n = 91 
0.001 
2006 
30872 
(5024.39) 
n = 49 
28834 
(2799.27) 
n = 33 
0.037 
34113 
(7175.49) 
n = 91 
30540 
(4256.23) 
n = 91 
0.000 
2007 
30929 
(4769.13) 
n = 49 
28920 
(2741.91) 
n = 33 
0.032 
34415 
(7165.99) 
n = 91 
30745 
(4366.96) 
n = 91 
0.000 
2008 
31779 
(4965.12) 
n = 49 
29111 
(2682.61) 
n = 33 
0.006 
35512 
(7598.53) 
n = 91 
31315 
(4474.91) 
n = 91 
0.000 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Appendix BE 
 
Average County Employment by State 
 Alabama Louisiana 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
39711 
(65576.06) 
n = 11 
49471 
(93671.96) 
n = 25 
0.757 
56748 
(83687.88) 
n = 31 
19535 
(30192.67) 
n = 33 
0.020 
2003 
39936 
(65598.02) 
n = 11 
49553 
(93145.41) 
n = 25 
0.759 
57332 
(84005.51) 
n = 31 
19697 
(30541.91) 
n = 33 
0.019 
2004 
40843 
(66717.53) 
n = 11 
50746 
(94591.95) 
n = 25 
0.756 
57574 
(84062.22) 
n = 31 
19952 
(31096.83) 
n = 33 
0.019 
2005 
42207 
(69006.10) 
n = 11 
51859 
(94811.96) 
n = 25 
0.764 
56392 
(79646.37) 
n = 31 
20215 
(31609.64) 
n = 33 
0.019 
2006 
43743 
(71423.77) 
n = 11 
52865 
(96246.52) 
n = 25 
0.780 
56216 
(76035) 
n = 31 
20893 
(32736.44) 
n = 33 
0.018 
2007 
45282 
(73887.90) 
n = 11 
53984 
(97260.30) 
n = 25 
0.793 
58702 
(78816.04) 
n = 31 
21255 
(33233.64) 
n = 33 
0.015 
2008 
45789 
(75080.03) 
n = 11 
54079 
(97360.02) 
n = 25 
0.803 
60148 
(80364.17) 
n = 31 
21587 
(33740.97) 
n = 33 
0.014 
 Mississippi Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
20671 
(31592.56) 
n = 49 
13400 
(13127.84) 
n = 33 
0.215 
35263 
(60183.18) 
n = 91 
25535 
(54328.58) 
n = 91 
0.254 
2003 
20736 
(31497.61) 
n = 49 
13244 
(13107.31) 
n = 33 
0.200 
35524 
(60372.21) 
n = 91 
25559 
(54171.06) 
n = 91 
0.243 
2004 
21001 
(31701.55) 
n = 49 
13404 
(13412.60) 
n = 33 
0.198 
35859 
(60594.60) 
n = 91 
26038 
(55095.59) 
n = 91 
0.254 
2005 
21149 
(31358.62) 
n = 49 
13607 
(13862.83) 
n = 33 
0.198 
35700 
(58617.42) 
n = 91 
26512 
(55450.91) 
n = 91 
0.279 
2006 
21479 
(31375.09) 
n = 49 
13915 
(14492.04) 
n = 33 
0.200 
36004 
(57287.42) 
n = 91 
27146 
(56464.31) 
n = 91 
0.295 
2007 
22010 
(32240.03) 
n = 49 
14086 
(15113.99) 
n = 33 
0.192 
37323 
(59367.10) 
n = 91 
27647 
(57197.59) 
n = 91 
0.264 
2008 
22330 
(32643.97) 
n = 49 
14063 
(15337.33) 
n = 33 
0.179 
38049 
(60477.47) 
n = 91 
27785 
(57370.02) 
n = 91 
0.242 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs.  
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Appendix BF 
 
Average County Manufacturing Employment by State 
 Alabama Louisiana* 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
4208 
(5620.67) 
n = 11 
5531 
(6678.27) 
n = 25 
0.571 
3784 
(4087.09) 
n = 31 
1569 
(2255.88) 
n = 30 
0.012 
2003 
3975 
(5137.67) 
n = 11 
5282 
(6327.55) 
n = 25 
0.551 
3703 
(4099.53) 
n = 31 
1568 
(2380.44) 
n = 28 
0.019 
2004 
3951 
(5038.67) 
n = 11 
5278 
(6189.86) 
n = 25 
0.537 
3715 
(4053.07) 
n = 30 
1462 
(2348.27) 
n = 30 
0.011 
2005 
3994 
(5214.54) 
n = 11 
5421 
(6319.52) 
n = 25 
0.517 
3553 
(3792.03) 
n = 31 
1626 
(2494.92) 
n = 27 
0.028 
2006 
4126 
(5573.61) 
n = 11 
5488 
(6417.01) 
n = 25 
0.546 
3595 
(3703.79) 
n = 31 
1591 
(2447.59) 
n = 28 
0.019 
2007 
4169 
(5810.04) 
n = 11 
5382 
(6453.28) 
n = 25 
0.596 
3788 
(3834.32) 
n = 31 
1596 
(2439.43) 
n = 28 
0.012 
2008 
4122 
(5812.75) 
n = 11 
5173 
(6224.34) 
n = 25 
0.637 
3761 
(3795.76) 
n = 31 
1329 
(2013.95) 
n = 33 
0.002 
 Mississippi* Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
2307 
(2747.95) 
n = 45 
2630 
(3134.15) 
n = 32 
0.633 
3073 
(3744.09) 
n = 87 
3098 
(4507.78) 
n = 87 
0.969 
2003 
2286 
(2730.06) 
n = 44 
2370 
(2942.98) 
n = 33 
0.897 
3013 
(3657.10) 
n = 86 
2956 
(4327.18) 
n = 86 
0.925 
2004 
2242 
(2935.11) 
n = 46 
2451 
(2949.10) 
n = 31 
0.761 
2966 
(3687.67) 
n = 87 
2928 
(4270.21) 
n = 86 
0.950 
2005 
2320 
(2965.37) 
n = 44 
2479 
(2862.27) 
n = 31 
0.817 
2978 
(3633.34) 
n = 86 
3087 
(4377.53) 
n = 83 
0.860 
2006 
2278 
(2887.49) 
n = 45 
2327 
(2698.13) 
n = 32 
0.940 
2981 
(3636.65) 
n = 87 
3014 
(4365.13) 
n = 85 
0.956 
2007 
2250 
(2883.75) 
n = 45 
2180 
(2524.65) 
n = 32 
0.914 
3040 
(3741.64) 
n = 87 
2930 
(4331.23) 
n = 85 
0.858 
2008 
2189 
(2858.39) 
n = 46 
1981 
(2345.64) 
n = 32 
0.736 
2984 
(3713.67) 
n = 88 
2629 
(4051.79) 
n = 90 
0.543 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix BG 
 
Average County Construction Employment by State 
 Alabama Louisiana* 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
2976 
(5188.34) 
n = 11 
3159 
(5925.08) 
n = 25 
0.930 
4273 
(5900.03) 
n = 30 
1199 
(1687.50) 
n = 30 
0.008 
2003 
2994 
(5118.67) 
n = 11 
3239 
(6042.09) 
n = 25 
0.908 
4401 
(6143.28) 
n = 30 
1210 
(1631.63) 
n = 30 
0.008 
2004 
3102 
(5305.53) 
n = 11 
3409 
(6198.96) 
n = 25 
0.888 
4479 
(5959.73) 
n = 29 
1195 
(1664.05) 
n = 31 
0.005 
2005 
3551 
(6153.87) 
n = 11 
3492 
(6215.94) 
n = 25 
0.979 
4515 
(6181.13) 
n = 30 
1328 
(1744.03) 
n = 29 
0.010 
2006 
3732 
(6446.03) 
n = 11 
3585 
(6181.53) 
n = 25 
0.949 
5246 
(6721.28) 
n = 29 
1478 
(2019.17) 
n = 29 
0.005 
2007 
3857 
(6645.27) 
n = 11 
3673 
(6180.57) 
n = 25 
0.936 
5028 
(6770.91) 
n = 31 
1467 
(1990.84) 
n = 29 
0.009 
2008 
3834 
(6764.52) 
n = 11 
3617 
(6088.02) 
n = 25 
0.925 
5122 
(6876.64) 
n = 31 
1461 
(2014.40) 
n = 30 
0.007 
 Mississippi* Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
1417 
(1709.32) 
n = 44 
715 
(811.85) 
n = 32 
0.035 
2627 
(4297.44) 
n = 85 
1584 
(3471.15) 
n = 87 
0.082 
2003 
1416 
(1715.78) 
n = 43 
726 
(862.21) 
n = 32 
0.041 
2689 
(4443.38) 
n = 84 
1615 
(3531.57) 
n = 87 
0.082 
2004 
1400 
(1729.01) 
n = 44 
776 
(1004.82) 
n = 31 
0.076 
2686 
(4352.66) 
n = 84 
1682 
(3645.50) 
n = 87 
0.103 
2005 
1515 
(1898.79) 
n = 45 
844 
(1098.48) 
n = 30 
0.084 
2822 
(4619.65) 
n = 86 
1799 
(3727.09) 
n = 84 
0.114 
2006 
1697 
(2156.99) 
n = 44 
870 
(1189.04) 
n = 31 
0.057 
3189 
(5035.25) 
n = 84 
1876 
(3752.25) 
n = 85 
0.056 
2007 
1721 
(2230.36) 
n = 45 
876 
(1244.49) 
n = 30 
0.063 
3170 
(5106.50) 
n = 87 
1912 
(3783.64) 
n = 84 
0.070 
2008 
1831 
(2254.74) 
n = 44 
893 
(1198.30) 
n = 31 
0.038 
3273 
(5197.04) 
n = 86 
1883 
(3696.07) 
n = 86 
0.045 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of jobs.   
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix BH 
 
Average County Personal Income by State 
 Alabama Louisiana 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
2200.817 
(3377.50) 
n = 11 
2876.693 
(5211.91) 
n = 25 
0.696 
3206.989 
(4495.40) 
n = 31 
1122.096 
(1635.65) 
n = 33 
0.015 
2003 
2220.726 
(3392.18) 
n = 11 
2924.614 
(5249.21) 
n = 25 
0.686 
3229.299 
(4506.66) 
n = 31 
1140.458 
(1664.69) 
n = 33 
0.016 
2004 
2290.134 
(3477.38) 
n = 11 
3050.865 
(5511.62) 
n = 25 
0.677 
3303.553 
(4621.49) 
n = 31 
1175.52 
(1720.41) 
n = 33 
0.016 
2005 
2389.089 
(3635.87) 
n = 11 
3112.801 
(5561.63) 
n = 25 
0.696 
3434.952 
(4713.89) 
n = 31 
1221.585 
(1792.85) 
n = 33 
0.015 
2006 
2521.263 
(3861.17) 
n = 11 
3201.513 
(5738.44) 
n = 25 
0.723 
3514.043 
(4671.34) 
n = 31 
1258.642 
(1885.17) 
n = 33 
0.013 
2007 
2576.662 
(3927.43) 
n = 11 
3260.892 
(5749.68) 
n = 25 
0.722 
3747.977 
(4991.11) 
n = 31 
1265.708 
(1850.81) 
n = 33 
0.010 
2008 
2626.507 
(4018.62) 
n = 11 
3282.684 
(5730.97) 
n = 25 
0.734 
3790.599 
(4931.89) 
n = 31 
1307.586 
(1897.96) 
n = 33 
0.009 
 Mississippi Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
1106.520 
(1521.83) 
n = 49 
717.911 
(765.71) 
n = 33 
0.180 
1954.342 
(3190.32) 
n = 91 
1457.555 
(3033.93) 
n = 91 
0.283 
2003 
1121.671 
(1544.49) 
n = 49 
737.933 
(781.31) 
n = 33 
0.192 
1972.507 
(3204.14) 
n = 91 
1484.640 
(3061.70) 
n = 91 
0.295 
2004 
1152.451 
(1573.52) 
n = 49 
755.152 
(805.02) 
n = 33 
0.185 
2022.766 
(3281.72) 
n = 91 
1538.284 
(3208.15) 
n = 91 
0.315 
2005 
1198.051 
(1634.02) 
n = 49 
777.889 
(849.54) 
n = 33 
0.179 
2104.044 
(3371.46) 
n = 91 
1580.245 
(3253.24) 
n = 91 
0.288 
2006 
1212.135 
(1668.21) 
n = 49 
783.275 
(877.05) 
n = 33 
0.179 
2154.548 
(3398.70) 
n = 91 
1620.012 
(3364.18) 
n = 91 
0.288 
2007 
1259.075 
(1731.02) 
n = 49 
801.922 
(911.31) 
n = 33 
0.168 
2266.212 
(3596.66) 
n = 91 
1645.649 
(3371.59) 
n = 91 
0.231 
2008 
1275.817 
(1729.18) 
n = 49 
812.612 
(907.06) 
n = 33 
0.162 
2295.771 
(3584.18) 
n = 91 
1670.699 
(3372.23) 
n = 91 
0.227 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Appendix BI 
 
Average County Per Capita Income by State 
 Alabama Louisiana 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
25400 
(3764.79) 
n = 11 
27421 
(5245.89) 
n = 25 
0.258 
28019 
(4445.17) 
n = 31 
24360 
(3345.02) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2003 
25878 
(3473.31) 
n = 11 
27969 
(5018.64) 
n = 25 
0.219 
28211 
(4365.35) 
n = 31 
25093 
(3022.07) 
n = 33 
0.001 
2004 
26835 
(3395.95) 
n = 11 
28827 
(5362.83) 
n = 25 
0.266 
28679 
(4376.30) 
n = 31 
25671 
(3303.83) 
n = 33 
0.003 
2005 
27640 
(3708.70) 
n = 11 
29294 
(5525.73) 
n = 25 
0.373 
30076 
(4556.03) 
n = 31 
26592 
(3510.18) 
n = 33 
0.001 
2006 
28459 
(3962.39) 
n = 11 
29688 
(5634.58) 
n = 25 
0.518 
34090 
(10031.30) 
n = 31 
26770 
(3834.43) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2007 
28886 
(4004.80) 
n = 11 
30156 
(5757.04) 
n = 25 
0.512 
34320 
(6449.85) 
n = 31 
27267 
(3800.09) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2008 
29236 
(3764.38) 
n = 11 
30390 
(5554.05) 
n = 25 
0.535 
34811 
(5321.83) 
n = 31 
28230 
(4102.81) 
n = 33 
0.000 
 Mississippi Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
24480 
(4570.34) 
n = 49 
23663 
(3569.36) 
n = 33 
0.390 
25797 
(4686.85) 
n = 91 
24948 
(4275.20) 
n = 91 
0.203 
2003 
24773 
(4526.21) 
n = 49 
24786 
(2890.36) 
n = 33 
0.989 
26078 
(4595.40) 
n = 91 
25772 
(3847.18) 
n = 91 
0.627 
2004 
25557 
(4561.06) 
n = 49 
25256 
(2804.64) 
n = 33 
0.736 
26775 
(4562.52) 
n = 91 
26387 
(4081.52) 
n = 91 
0.547 
2005 
26327 
(4683.49) 
n = 49 
25995 
(2869.51) 
n = 33 
0.718 
27763 
(4807.75) 
n = 91 
27118 
(4162.87) 
n = 91 
0.335 
2006 
26303 
(5215.86) 
n = 49 
25625 
(3018.92) 
n = 33 
0.503 
29216 
(7916.36) 
n = 91 
27157 
(4430.49) 
n = 91 
0.032 
2007 
26871 
(5866.54) 
n = 49 
26374 
(2891.58) 
n = 33 
0.654 
29652 
(6766.94) 
n = 91 
27737 
(4396.99) 
n = 91 
0.025 
2008 
27433 
(5254.65) 
n = 49 
26768 
(2715.97) 
n = 33 
0.506 
30165 
(6111.03) 
n = 91 
28293 
(4348.50) 
n = 91 
0.018 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Appendix BJ 
 
Average County Median Household Income by State 
 Alabama Louisiana 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
33322 
(7022.10) 
n = 11 
37726 
(9709.08) 
n = 25 
0.185 
40495 
(6931.19) 
n = 31 
31606 
(5122.33) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2003 
33563 
(6967.78) 
n = 11 
37938 
(9349.46) 
n = 25 
0.174 
40878 
(6737.36) 
n = 31 
32164 
(4856.64) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2004 
33425 
(6772.15) 
n = 11 
38038 
(9286.29) 
n = 25 
0.148 
40262 
(6502.43) 
n = 31 
32163 
(5066.61) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2005 
32830 
(6671.43) 
n = 11 
38007 
(9301.58) 
n = 25 
0.106 
40658 
(6660.61) 
n = 31 
32108 
(5034.87) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2006 
33426 
(6988.98) 
n = 11 
38099 
(9712.51) 
n = 25 
0.160 
41096 
(7309.24) 
n = 31 
32306 
(5611.96) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2007 
34590 
(7329.91) 
n = 11 
38741 
(9392.15) 
n = 25 
0.203 
42453 
(7345.73) 
n = 31 
33192 
(5297.46) 
n = 33 
0.000 
2008 
34846 
(8108.05) 
n = 11 
39157 
(10029.51) 
n = 25 
0.219 
44498 
(7242.40) 
n = 31 
34320 
(5329.19) 
n = 33 
0.000 
 Mississippi Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
32957 
(6853.74) 
n = 49 
32532 
(7046.98) 
n = 33 
0.786 
35569 
(7696.43) 
n = 91 
33623 
(7663.40) 
n = 91 
0.089 
2003 
33478 
(7077.08) 
n = 49 
33065 
(6948.17) 
n = 33 
0.795 
36009 
(7721.61) 
n = 91 
34077 
(7397.28) 
n = 91 
0.086 
2004 
33450 
(6896.33) 
n = 49 
33143 
(6807.71) 
n = 33 
0.843 
35768 
(7423.46) 
n = 91 
34132 
(7390.39) 
n = 91 
0.138 
2005 
33546 
(6923.82) 
n = 49 
32300 
(6337.63) 
n = 33 
0.411 
35882 
(7567.67) 
n = 91 
33798 
(7290.79) 
n = 91 
0.060 
2006 
33610 
(7495.57) 
n = 49 
32337 
(6458.72) 
n = 33 
0.428 
36138 
(8126.89) 
n = 91 
33909 
(7609.93) 
n = 91 
0.058 
2007 
34321 
(7304.19) 
n = 49 
33129 
(6814.54) 
n = 33 
0.459 
37124 
(8200.93) 
n = 91 
34694 
(7502.46) 
n = 91 
0.038 
2008 
34826 
(7698.66) 
n = 49 
33138 
(6578.65) 
n = 33 
0.306 
38123 
(8810.77) 
n = 91 
35220 
(7648.57) 
n = 91 
0.019 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Dollars.  All dollar amounts are converted to constant 2008 dollars using the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) price deflator. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Appendix BK 
 
Average County Housing Unit Estimates by State 
 Alabama Louisiana 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
35738 
(52273.31) 
n = 11 
39009 
(57170.63) 
n = 25 
0.872 
41807 
(54288.70) 
n = 31 
17755 
(21461.17) 
n = 33 
0.022 
2003 
36185 
(52888.21) 
n = 11 
39328 
(57621.87) 
n = 25 
0.878 
42209 
(54512.32) 
n = 31 
17883 
(21604.05) 
n = 33 
0.021 
2004 
36773 
(53622.38) 
n = 11 
39710 
(58261.74) 
n = 25 
0.887 
42718 
(54924.64) 
n = 31 
18037 
(21801.26) 
n = 33 
0.020 
2005 
37459 
(54634.02) 
n = 11 
40104 
(58975.89) 
n = 25 
0.900 
43241 
(55306.77) 
n = 31 
18181 
(21995.17) 
n = 33 
0.019 
2006 
38350 
(55802.37) 
n = 11 
40555 
(59641.47) 
n = 25 
0.918 
38901 
(46217.79) 
n = 31 
18439 
(22316.53) 
n = 33 
0.026 
2007 
39271 
(57134.78) 
n = 11 
40940 
(60393.73) 
n = 25 
0.939 
40148 
(47433.87) 
n = 31 
18631 
(22519.82) 
n = 33 
0.022 
2008 
39799 
(57989.12) 
n = 11 
41249 
(60884.49) 
n = 25 
0.947 
40762 
(48078.09) 
n = 31 
18774 
(22691.02) 
n = 33 
0.021 
 Mississippi Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
16665 
(19371.77) 
n = 49 
11502 
(8859.10) 
n = 33 
0.156 
27536 
(40359.47) 
n = 91 
21326 
(34499.03) 
n = 91 
0.266 
2003 
16830 
(19624.73) 
n = 49 
11621 
(9138.17) 
n = 33 
0.159 
27815 
(40649.17) 
n = 91 
21504 
(34783.86) 
n = 91 
0.262 
2004 
16998 
(19914.74) 
n = 49 
11760 
(9455.80) 
n = 33 
0.164 
28150 
(41066.67) 
n = 91 
21715 
(35174.04) 
n = 91 
0.258 
2005 
17199 
(20256.86) 
n = 49 
11894 
(9802.06) 
n = 33 
0.167 
28520 
(41524.76) 
n = 91 
21924 
(35602.14) 
n = 91 
0.252 
2006 
16955 
(19343.31) 
n = 49 
12088 
(10196.53) 
n = 33 
0.189 
27017 
(37108.40) 
n = 91 
22212 
(36039.76) 
n = 91 
0.377 
2007 
17212 
(19729.70) 
n = 49 
12260 
(10615.31) 
n = 33 
0.191 
27692 
(38077.96) 
n = 91 
22449 
(36488.46) 
n = 91 
0.344 
2008 
17520 
(20214.19) 
n = 49 
12387 
(10857.05) 
n = 33 
0.186 
28130 
(38664.70) 
n = 91 
22632 
(36792.75) 
n = 91 
0.327 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of houses.   
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Appendix BL 
 
Average County Building Permits by State 
 Alabama Louisiana 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
483 
(835.12) 
n = 11 
341 
(677.31) 
n = 25 
0.592 
474 
(637.55) 
n = 31 
113 
(206.33) 
n = 33 
0.003 
2003 
627 
(1232.53) 
n = 11 
399 
(881.16) 
n = 25 
0.531 
566 
(772.04) 
n = 31 
141 
(296.33) 
n = 33 
0.005 
2004 
768 
(1525.53) 
n = 11 
471 
(975.77) 
n = 25 
0.485 
586 
(792.69) 
n = 31 
146 
(262.23) 
n = 33 
0.004 
2005 
971 
(2054.39) 
n = 11 
495 
(929.60) 
n = 25 
0.340 
553 
(732.34) 
n = 31 
172 
(336.09) 
n = 33 
0.009 
2006 
1015 
(1873.38) 
n = 11 
464 
(983.57) 
n = 25 
0.252 
751 
(1024.50) 
n = 31 
163 
(275.84) 
n = 33 
0.002 
2007 
620 
(1032.12) 
n = 11 
393 
(701.86) 
n = 25 
0.446 
632 
(903.05) 
n = 31 
114 
(213.83) 
n = 33 
0.002 
2008 
544 
(935.82) 
n = 11 
223 
(472.81) 
n = 25 
0.178 
428 
(587.87) 
n = 31 
92 
(201.57) 
n = 33 
0.003 
 Mississippi Total 
Year GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value GO Zone Non-GO Zone P-Value 
2002 
153 
(349.92) 
n = 49 
114 
(394.42) 
n = 33 
0.638 
302 
(551.81) 
n = 91 
176 
(450.77) 
n = 91 
0.093 
2003 
159 
(388.51) 
n = 49 
128 
(422.90) 
n = 33 
0.732 
354 
(702.35) 
n = 91 
207 
(562.09) 
n = 91 
0.120 
2004 
207 
(467.83) 
n = 49 
133 
(452.09) 
n = 33 
0.480 
404 
(795.94) 
n = 91 
231 
(610.84) 
n = 91 
0.101 
2005 
176 
(389.56) 
n = 49 
145 
(487.11) 
n = 33 
0.752 
400 
(896.64) 
n = 91 
251 
(614.78) 
n = 91 
0.192 
2006 
236 
(537.06) 
n = 49 
153 
(522.79) 
n = 33 
0.485 
506 
(992.81) 
n = 91 
242 
(633.29) 
n = 91 
0.034 
2007 
277 
(705.40) 
n = 49 
99 
(290.65) 
n = 33 
0.175 
439 
(828.73) 
n = 91 
186 
(440.73) 
n = 91 
0.011 
2008 
193 
(476.21) 
n = 49 
59 
(134.24) 
n = 33 
0.119 
316 
(593.54) 
n = 91 
116 
(291.66) 
n = 91 
0.004 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Number of building permits issued annually.   
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Appendix BM 
 
Average Annual County Change in Wages Per Job 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 953.72 
(671.18) 
n = 11 
1009.16 
(340.27) 
n = 25 
0.743 
941.45 
(373.30) 
n = 11 
1000.24 
(397.46) 
n = 25 
0.680 
1371.27 
(702.44) 
n = 11 
1136.68 
(576.60) 
n = 25 
0.300 
Louisiana 773.29 
(424.56) 
n = 31 
895.67 
(562.46) 
n = 33 
0.332 
1295.42 
(591.74) 
n = 31 
1071.73 
(358.24) 
n = 33 
0.070 
1923.26 
(1065.36) 
n = 31 
1232.06 
(867.78) 
n = 33 
0.006 
Mississippi 968.04 
(1040.57) 
n = 49 
905.45 
(551.74) 
n = 33 
0.753 
1055.88 
(852.09) 
n = 49 
1108.33 
(639.63) 
n = 33 
0.764 
1349.08 
(762.96) 
n = 49 
862.88 
(447.81) 
n = 33 
0.001 
Total 899.97 
(834.28) 
N = 91 
930.40 
(503.97) 
N = 91 
0.766 
1123.65 
(732.22) 
N = 91 
1065.36 
(484.87) 
N = 91 
0.527 
1547.36 
(904.14) 
N = 91 
1071.98 
(674.01) 
N = 91 
0.000 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 1327.73.28 
(746.88) 
n = 11 
1050.20 
(541.30) 
n = 25 
0.216 
1036.18 
(693.37) 
n = 11 
1259.52 
(583.71) 
n = 25 
0.325 
1159.36 
(723.88) 
n = 11 
1012.36 
(749.99) 
n = 25 
0.588 
Louisiana 3427.90 
(2895.85) 
n = 31 
1484.00 
(1017.96) 
n = 33 
0.001 
1811.39 
(1322.30) 
n = 31 
1025.06 
(1723.38) 
n = 33 
0.046 
2557.71 
(1006.76) 
n = 31 
1781.40 
(724.27) 
n = 33 
0.001 
Mississippi 1377.33 
(907.50) 
n = 49 
830.45 
(618.34) 
n = 33 
0.003 
897.35 
(808.66) 
n = 49 
870.55 
(531.37) 
n = 33 
0.867 
1496.98 
(1900.22) 
n = 49 
795.27 
(624.03) 
n = 33 
0.044 
Total 2069.88 
(2064.03) 
N = 91 
1127.82 
(814.33) 
N = 91 
0.000 
1225.51 
(1079.93) 
N = 91 
1033.44 
(1127.48) 
N = 91 
0.242 
1817.52 
(1618.47) 
N = 91 
1212.52 
(817.68) 
N = 91 
0.002 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Dollars. 
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Average Annual County Change in Per Capita Income 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 879.27 
(364.35) 
n = 11 
976.96 
(386.46) 
n = 25 
0.482 
1490.36 
(517.18) 
n = 11 
1453.64 
(542.69) 
n = 25 
0.851 
1540.82 
(882.19) 
n = 11 
1288.36 
(622.01) 
n = 25 
0.332 
Louisiana 678.26 
(358.49) 
n = 31 
1081.58 
(1209.30) 
n = 33 
0.079 
1111.19 
(440.51) 
n = 31 
1132.36 
(799.37) 
n = 33 
0.897 
2142.51 
(1417.00) 
n = 31 
1613.61 
(812.76) 
n = 33 
0.070 
Mississippi 701.73 
(753.40) 
n = 49 
1406.12 
(1500.25) 
n = 33 
0.006 
1308.78 
(662.10) 
n = 49 
1029.09 
(469.15) 
n = 33 
0.039 
1470.55 
(635.10) 
n = 49 
1434.00 
(727.23) 
n = 33 
0.810 
Total 715.20 
(603.47) 
N = 91 
1170.53 
(1180.56) 
N = 91 
0.001 
1263.42 
(586.18) 
N = 91 
1183.18 
(643.40) 
N = 91 
0.380 
1707.96 
(1034.43) 
N = 91 
1459.12 
(737.00) 
N = 91 
0.063 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 1609.55 
(733.94) 
n = 11 
1255.08 
(436.66) 
n = 25 
0.080 
1194.09 
(455.32) 
n = 11 
1267.36 
(479.34) 
n = 25 
0.671 
954.09 
(251.41) 
n = 11 
864.88 
(328.74) 
n = 25 
0.429 
Louisiana 4723.10 
(8896.99) 
n = 31 
968.33 
(821.62) 
n = 33 
0.019 
1154.36 
(5617.36) 
n = 31 
1215.82 
(695.16) 
n = 33 
0.950 
1209.19 
(2196.05) 
n = 31 
1532.97 
(929.19) 
n = 33 
0.440 
Mississippi 767.63 
(1146.97) 
n = 49 
428.30 
(1035.92) 
n = 33 
0.176 
1273.27 
(1721.21) 
n = 49 
1431.48 
(1286.85) 
n = 33 
0.654 
1124.35 
(1295.67) 
n = 49 
945.97 
(977.68) 
n = 33 
0.504 
Total 2216.87 
(5522.59) 
N = 91 
851.27 
(888.28) 
N = 91 
0.021 
1223.19 
(3482.01) 
N = 91 
1308.19 
(911.62) 
N = 91 
0.822 
1132.67 
(1586.15) 
N = 91 
1136.56 
(875.84) 
N = 91 
0.984 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Dollars. 
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Appendix BO 
 
Average Annual County Change in Personal Income 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 57.48 
(76.66) 
n = 11 
94.13 
(130.24) 
n = 25 
0.393 
116.57 
(174.06) 
n = 11 
184.60 
(367.19) 
n = 25 
0.564 
159.40 
(252.60) 
n = 11 
147.93 
(233.47) 
n = 25 
0.895 
Louisiana 77.94 
(102.07) 
n = 31 
36.43 
(605.55) 
n = 33 
0.051 
145.72 
(217.33) 
n = 31 
59.35 
(95.03) 
n = 33 
0.042 
219.49 
(289.88) 
n = 31 
77.46 
(120.23) 
n = 33 
0.012 
Mississippi 33.36 
(54.73) 
n = 49 
30.48 
(33.05) 
n = 33 
0.788 
55.06 
(75.23) 
n = 49 
33.52 
(42.52) 
n = 33 
0.140 
76.35 
(112.87) 
n = 49 
43.44 
(69.78) 
n = 33 
0.140 
Total 51.46 
(78.41) 
N = 91 
50.12 
(83.45) 
N = 91 
0.911 
93.38 
(154.72) 
N = 91 
84.39 
(209.23) 
N = 91 
0.742 
135.15 
(215.17) 
N = 91 
84.48 
(152.18) 
N = 91 
0.068 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 197.53 
(327.02) 
n = 11 
177.89 
(338.66) 
n = 25 
0.872 
122.96 
(181.30) 
n = 11 
145.40 
(191.69) 
n = 25 
0.744 
103.74 
(174.30) 
n = 11 
89.99 
(105.97) 
n = 25 
0.772 
Louisiana 178.41 
(561.66) 
n = 31 
71.95 
(144.26) 
n = 33 
0.296 
324.83 
(488.01) 
n = 31 
41.23 
(46.84) 
n = 33 
0.001 
121.01 
(184.29) 
n = 31 
68.35 
(89.23) 
n = 33 
0.147 
Mississippi 49.38 
(121.13) 
n = 49 
28.48 
(54.73) 
n = 33 
0.356 
78.99 
(175.83) 
n = 49 
39.61 
(59.51) 
n = 33 
0.219 
43.08 
(68.66) 
n = 49 
27.46 
(23.01) 
n = 33 
0.212 
Total 111.24 
(359.74) 
N = 91 
85.29 
(206.59) 
N = 91 
0.551 
168.06 
(335.49) 
N = 91 
69.26 
(118.57) 
N = 91 
0.009 
76.96 
(136.35) 
N = 91 
59.47 
(81.72) 
N = 91 
0.295 
 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Unit: Millions of dollars. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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Appendix BP 
 
Average Annual County Change in Median Household Income 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 817.64 
(342.87) 
n = 11 
872.92 
(497.85) 
n = 25 
0.741 
702.73 
(358.07) 
n = 11 
1022.68 
(524.01) 
n = 25 
0.075 
446.64 
(1191.60) 
n = 11 
1104.00 
(1282.56) 
n = 25 
0.157 
Louisiana 1071.94 
(466.36) 
n = 31 
1061.12 
(443.97) 
n = 33 
0.925 
456.48 
(367.14) 
n = 31 
791.55 
(503.84) 
n = 33 
0.004 
1564.16 
(1303.66) 
n = 31 
906.45 
(1014.04) 
n = 33 
0.027 
Mississippi 1053.51 
(552.42) 
n = 49 
1056.52 
(391.50) 
n = 33 
0.979 
799.20 
(555.91) 
n = 49 
883.00 
(454.87) 
n = 33 
0.475 
1084.18 
(965.15) 
n = 49 
210.33 
(919.39) 
n = 33 
0.000 
Total 1031.27 
(504.71) 
N = 91 
1007.75 
(444.57) 
N = 91 
0.739 
670.79 
(498.92) 
N = 91 
888.21 
(495.49) 
N = 91 
0.004 
1170.63 
(1158.69) 
N = 91 
708.29 
(1119.65) 
N = 91 
0.007 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 1553.27 
(946.59) 
n = 11 
1229.40 
(1612.68) 
n = 25 
0.541 
2050.45 
(1294.49) 
n = 11 
1667.00 
(1862.25) 
n = 25 
0.541 
979.72 
(1404.09) 
n = 11 
1225.68 
(2172.80) 
n = 25 
0.733 
Louisiana 1637.26 
(1669.34) 
n = 31 
1152.42 
(1797.86) 
n = 33 
0.269 
2448.84 
(2243.83) 
n = 31 
1748.39 
(1705.80) 
n = 33 
0.163 
2932.84 
(2604.92) 
n = 31 
1821.88 
(1520.97) 
n = 33 
0.040 
Mississippi 1068.18 
(1596.05) 
n = 49 
1004.61 
(1546.60) 
n = 33 
0.858 
1612.31 
(1552.49) 
n = 49 
1657.42 
(1686.45) 
n = 33 
0.901 
1222.55 
(1745.48) 
n = 49 
701.85 
(1685.82) 
n = 33 
0.183 
Total 1320.68 
(1569.36) 
N = 91 
1119.97 
(1643.73) 
N = 91 
0.401 
1950.24 
(1816.30) 
N = 91 
1693.04 
(1724.06) 
N = 91 
0.329 
1775.82 
(2193.41) 
N = 91 
1251.92 
(1822.69) 
N = 91 
0.081 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Unit: Dollars. 
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Appendix BQ 
 
Average Annual County Change in Total Industry Earnings 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 47.03 
(65.65) 
n = 11 
74.61 
(107.71) 
n = 25 
0.439 
72.92 
(110.36) 
n = 11 
129.91 
(273.26) 
n = 25 
0.511 
113.79 
(193.86) 
n = 11 
105.01 
(176.33) 
n = 25 
0.895 
Louisiana 96.11 
(139.99) 
n = 31 
48.47 
(80.19) 
n = 33 
0.097 
101.95 
(174.93) 
n = 31 
38.54 
(74.82) 
n = 33 
0.061 
76.94 
(240.64) 
n = 31 
38.94 
(64.31) 
n = 33 
0.385 
Mississippi 36.46 
(71.51) 
n = 49 
28.82 
(30.10) 
n = 33 
0.564 
44.74 
(66.90) 
n = 49 
21.59 
(30.74) 
n = 33 
0.067 
32.56 
(47.65) 
n = 49 
18.45 
(36.91) 
n = 33 
0.155 
Total 58.06 
(102.50) 
N = 91 
48.52 
(77.68) 
N = 91 
0.480 
67.63 
(120.97) 
N = 91 
57.49 
(155.88) 
N = 91 
0.625 
57.49 
(159.83) 
N = 91 
49.66 
(107.22) 
N = 91 
0.698 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 135.35 
(254.18) 
n = 11 
104.10 
(225.41) 
n = 25 
0.715 
61.52 
(107.09) 
n = 11 
75.74 
(134.19) 
n = 25 
0.759 
52.54 
(113.47) 
n = 11 
42.95 
(79.01) 
n = 25 
0.771 
Louisiana 149.59 
(463.59) 
n = 31 
47.38 
(103.09) 
n = 33 
0.221 
155.22 
(215.55) 
n = 31 
26.61 
(37.52) 
n = 33 
0.001 
170.87 
(230.87) 
n = 31 
36.24 
(61.01) 
n = 33 
0.002 
Mississippi 33.62 
(85.38) 
n = 49 
8.42 
(28.31) 
n = 33 
0.106 
32.14 
(69.39) 
n = 49 
16.24 
(24.90) 
n = 33 
0.211 
35.68 
(65.58) 
n = 49 
3.29 
(18.93) 
n = 33 
0.007 
Total 85.42 
(293.07) 
N = 91 
48.84 
(138.06) 
N = 91 
0.283 
77.62 
(150.20) 
N = 91 
36.35 
(78.34) 
N = 91 
0.021 
83.77 
(159.63) 
N = 91 
26.13 
(58.51) 
N = 91 
0.001 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Millions of Dollars. 
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Average Annual County Change in Construction Industry Earnings 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 0.34 
(9.33) 
n = 11 
4.90 
(12.83) 
n = 25 
0.297 
3.78 
(14.43) 
n = 11 
13.80 
(28.90) 
n = 25 
0.285 
24.08 
(48.42) 
n = 11 
4.69 
(9.08) 
n = 25 
0.058 
Louisiana* 6.25 
(22.30) 
n = 30 
1.71 
(4.71) 
n = 29 
0.289 
5.19 
(13.53) 
n = 29 
3.26 
(8.62) 
n = 29 
0.519 
11.48 
(28.70) 
n = 29 
3.00 
(4.60) 
n = 29 
0.122 
Mississippi* -1.71 
(11.21) 
n = 42 
1.83 
(7.34) 
n = 32 
0.126 
-0.08 
(13.41) 
n = 42 
1.68 
(6.65) 
n = 31 
0.503 
6.51 
(12.36) 
n = 43 
3.01 
(9.14) 
n = 30 
0.191 
Total 1.44 
(16.22) 
N = 83 
2.68 
(8.69) 
N = 86 
0.533 
2.30 
(13.65) 
N = 82 
5.79 
(17.51) 
N = 85 
0.155 
10.57 
(26.05) 
N = 83 
3.51 
(7.80) 
N = 84 
0.018 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 13.78 
(29.06) 
n = 11 
9.80 
(17.31) 
n = 25 
0.612 
6.49 
(10.18) 
n = 11 
2.84 
(10.22) 
n = 25 
0.329 
-5.43 
(18.03) 
n = 11 
-14.18 
(32.96) 
n = 25 
0.416 
Louisiana* 42.29 
(61.79) 
n = 29 
7.94 
(21.92) 
n = 28 
0.007 
13.42 
(43.66) 
n = 29 
3.28 
(7.08) 
n = 28 
0.230 
9.25 
(48.70) 
n = 31 
1.72 
(9.58) 
n = 29 
0.417 
Mississippi* 8.46 
(18.06) 
n = 44 
1.30 
(2.38) 
n = 30 
0.035 
1.88 
(9.27) 
n = 44 
-1.15 
(4.66) 
n = 30 
0.104 
4.41 
(22.74) 
n = 44 
-3.16 
(16.41) 
n = 30 
0.122 
Total 20.84 
(42.51) 
N = 84 
6.10 
(16.18) 
N = 83 
0.004 
6.47 
(26.99) 
N = 84 
1.55 
(7.68) 
N = 83 
0.112 
4.90 
(34.03) 
N = 86 
-4.75 
(21.94) 
N = 84 
0.030 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Millions of Dollars.  
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Appendix BS 
 
Average Annual County Change in Manufacturing Industry Earnings 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama* 4.78 
(34.15) 
n = 11 
7.78 
(25.72) 
n = 23 
0.777 
2.28 
(9.79) 
n = 11 
18.07 
(32.06) 
n = 24 
0.122 
10.67 
(28.21) 
n = 11 
15.80 
(31.65) 
n = 25 
0.647 
Louisiana* 4.97 
(27.78) 
n = 31 
5.17 
(33.87) 
n = 28 
0.980 
-2.14 
(14.90) 
n = 30 
1.56 
(9.94) 
n = 28 
0.274 
6.27 
(22.91) 
n = 30 
-0.35 
(10.97) 
n = 27 
0.177 
Mississippi* 7.63 
(33.66) 
n = 44 
-1.77 
(7.19) 
n = 30 
0.137 
3.23 
(23.57) 
n = 44 
2.64 
(9.16) 
n = 29 
0.899 
4.10 
(15.69) 
n = 45 
1.73 
(6.31) 
n = 30 
0.434 
Total 6.31 
(31.38) 
N = 86 
3.34 
(24.58) 
N = 81 
0.500 
1.21 
(19.46) 
N = 85 
6.84 
(20.30) 
N = 81 
0.070 
5.70 
(20.12) 
N = 86 
5.33 
(19.98) 
N = 82 
0.905 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama* 15.61 
(31.47) 
n = 11 
15.93 
(35.84) 
n = 25 
0.980 
7.63 
(35.35) 
n = 11 
7.42 
(14.16) 
n = 25 
0.980 
7.99 
(18.72) 
n = 11 
2.64 
(14.17) 
n = 25 
0.351 
Louisiana* 19.33 
(22.82) 
n = 31 
5.09 
(12.01) 
n = 27 
0.005 
18.33 
(32.59) 
n = 31 
0.82 
(6.89) 
n = 27 
0.008 
15.33 
(22.30) 
n = 31 
-4.90 
(22.46) 
n = 28 
0.001 
Mississippi* 5.12 
(9.43) 
n = 45 
-1.04 
(11.60) 
n = 30 
0.014 
3.39 
(22.01) 
n = 45 
-2.73 
(8.14) 
n = 31 
0.144 
1.82 
(23.85) 
n = 44 
-6.31 
(11.49) 
n = 31 
0.083 
Total 11.51 
(19.69) 
N = 87 
6.16 
(22.89) 
N = 82 
0.104 
9.25 
(28.49) 
N = 87 
1.48 
(10.75) 
N = 83 
0.021 
7.47 
(23.32) 
N = 86 
-3.18 
(16.88) 
N = 84 
0.001 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Millions of Dollars.  
*Data were missing for a few counties in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Average Annual County Change in Total Employment 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 224.09 
(894.92) 
n = 11 
82.08 
(818.47) 
n = 25 
0.644 
907.00 
(1409.16) 
n = 11 
1193.20 
(1661.99) 
n = 25 
0.622 
1364.55 
(2368.80) 
n = 11 
1112.00 
(2500.40) 
n = 25 
0.779 
Louisiana 584.35 
(1664.97) 
n = 31 
162.06 
(550.48) 
n = 33 
0.173 
241.90 
(1069.90) 
n = 31 
255.21 
(663.41) 
n = 33 
0.952 
-1182.03 
(8102.33) 
n = 31 
262.48 
(707.41) 
n = 33 
0.311 
Mississippi 65.57 
(1251.57) 
n = 49 
-156.39 
(485.47) 
n = 33 
0.335 
264.90 
(935.08) 
n = 49 
160.00 
(580.51) 
n = 33 
0.568 
147.53 
(997.97) 
n = 49 
202.91 
(750.18) 
n = 33 
0.787 
Total 261.45 
(1380.38) 
N = 91 
24.60 
(624.53) 
N = 91 
0.138 
334.68 
(1055.50) 
N = 91 
478.37 
(1100.12) 
N = 91 
0.370 
-158.29 
(4871.61) 
N = 91 
474.26 
(1483.79) 
N = 91 
0.238 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 1536.27 
(2529.79) 
n = 11 
1006.80 
(1617.80) 
n = 25 
0.454 
1539.00 
(2581.82) 
n = 11 
1119.00 
(1695.72) 
n = 25 
0.565 
506.18 
(1254.86) 
n = 11 
94.68 
(484.82) 
n = 25 
0.161 
Louisiana -175.90 
(12279.32) 
n = 31 
678.24 
(1189.45) 
n = 33 
0.692 
2485.35 
(3336.64) 
n = 31 
362.36 
(591.70) 
n = 33 
0.001 
1445.90 
(2144.37) 
n = 31 
332.03 
(550.80) 
n = 33 
0.005 
Mississippi 329.90 
(1423.99) 
n = 49 
308.85 
(913.23) 
n = 33 
0.940 
531.18 
(1274.82) 
n = 49 
170.73 
(911.07) 
n = 33 
0.165 
320.04 
(605.72) 
n = 49 
-22.85 
(373.22) 
n = 33 
0.005 
Total 303.42 
(7233.15) 
N = 91 
634.55 
(1255.23) 
N = 91 
0.668 
1318.71 
(2476.06) 
N = 91 
500.74 
(1157.38) 
N = 91 
0.005 
726.08 
(1475.66) 
N = 91 
138.13 
(493.85) 
N = 91 
0.000 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Number of Jobs. 
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Average Annual County Change in Construction Employment 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 18.00 
(201.89) 
n = 11 
79.92 
(235.24) 
n = 25 
0.454 
108.00 
(286.13) 
n = 11 
169.56 
(224.83) 
n = 25 
0.491 
448.73 
(880.83) 
n = 11 
83.84 
(168.60) 
n = 25 
0.051 
Louisiana* 127.97 
(392.79) 
n = 30 
13.34 
(130.42) 
n = 29 
0.141 
-68.79 
(359.74) 
n = 29 
27.00 
(121.62) 
n = 29 
0.180 
186.52 
(511.83) 
n = 29 
57.83 
(68.82) 
n = 29 
0.185 
Mississippi* -29.24 
(217.75) 
n = 42 
10.25 
(73.14) 
n = 32 
0.329 
10.21 
(242.49) 
n = 42 
32.81 
(152.52) 
n = 31 
0.650 
147.14 
(246.52) 
n = 43 
42.63 
(101.69) 
n = 30 
0.032 
Total 33.84 
(297.58) 
N = 83 
31.55 
(155.41) 
N = 86 
0.950 
-4.61 
(296.51) 
N = 82 
71.05 
(178.27) 
N = 85 
0.046 
200.87 
(474.37) 
N = 83 
60.14 
(117.10) 
N = 84 
0.009 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 181.36 
(399.72) 
n = 11 
92.84 
(147.36) 
n = 25 
0.334 
124.82 
(232.91) 
n = 11 
88.12 
(178.53) 
n = 25 
0.608 
-23.09 
(274.22) 
n = 11 
-56.44 
(159.81) 
n = 25 
0.648 
Louisiana* 580.72 
(588.80) 
n = 29 
156.54 
(374.92) 
n = 28 
0.002 
101.24 
(426.31) 
n = 29 
-8.96 
(87.03) 
n = 28 
0.185 
93.42 
(386.65) 
n = 31 
42.41 
(111.81) 
n = 29 
0.497 
Mississippi* 151.95 
(328.87) 
n = 44 
51.03 
(109.97) 
n = 30 
0.110 
52.64 
(175.98) 
n = 44 
11.13 
(53.52) 
n = 30 
0.215 
75.30 
(261.92) 
n = 44 
13.23 
(76.51) 
n = 30 
0.212 
Total 303.83 
(482.95) 
N = 84 
99.21 
(242.70) 
N = 83 
0.001 
78.87 
(291.05) 
N = 84 
27.54 
(120.45) 
N = 83 
0.139 
69.24 
(312.49) 
N = 86 
2.57 
(123.66) 
N = 84 
0.070 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Number of Jobs.  
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Average Annual County Change in Manufacturing Employment 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama -233.18 
(580.65) 
n = 11 
-248.24 
(481.21) 
n = 25 
0.936 
-24.27 
(322.96) 
n = 11 
-4.48 
(250.52) 
n = 25 
0.843 
43.82 
(385.60) 
n = 11 
142.84 
(449.16) 
n = 25 
0.530 
Louisiana -80.65 
(307.86) 
n = 31 
-70.79 
(152.18) 
n = 28 
0.879 
-106.00 
(180.31) 
n = 30 
-7.36 
(97.50) 
n = 28 
0.013 
-49.93 
(467.68) 
n = 30 
18.59 
(86.41) 
n = 27 
0.457 
Mississippi -69.09 
(484.33) 
n = 44 
-187.97 
(247.38) 
n = 32 
0.208 
52.05 
(476.61) 
n = 44 
-22.03 
(204.93) 
n = 31 
0.419 
-20.20 
(210.32) 
n = 44 
3.90 
(170.91) 
n = 30 
0.604 
Total -94.24 
(441.22) 
N = 86 
-167.09 
(318.44) 
N = 85 
0.218 
-13.61 
(381.11) 
N = 85 
-11.92 
(191.00) 
N = 84 
0.971 
-22.41 
(341.62) 
N = 85 
51.10 
(276.42) 
N = 82 
0.129 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 131.36 
(401.03) 
n = 11 
67.72 
(292.71) 
n = 25 
0.596 
43.18 
(407.82) 
n = 11 
-106.68 
(233.61) 
n = 25 
0.170 
-46.55 
(169.52) 
n = 11 
-208.80 
(280.06) 
n = 25 
0.085 
Louisiana 41.81 
(333.49) 
n = 31 
17.00 
(116.77) 
n = 27 
0.715 
192.94 
(323.90) 
n = 31 
3.33 
(143.68) 
n = 27 
0.007 
-26.68 
(184.44) 
n = 31 
-113.93 
(329.62) 
n = 28 
0.209 
Mississippi 9.02 
(200.00) 
n = 44 
-84.52 
(243.03) 
n = 31 
0.072 
-28.56 
(187.28) 
n = 45 
-146.41 
(257.77) 
n = 32 
0.023 
-71.50 
(249.55) 
n = 44 
-199.13 
(265.15) 
n = 32 
0.035 
Total 36.49 
(282.80) 
N = 86 
-5.64 
(234.88) 
N = 83 
0.295 
59.44 
(290.50) 
N = 87 
-86.45 
(226.26) 
N = 84 
0.000 
-52.15 
(217.54) 
N = 86 
-173.91 
(291.69) 
N = 85 
0.002 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Number of Jobs.  
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Annual County Change in Building Permits Issued 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 143.55 
(522.50) 
n = 11 
57.56 
(231.09) 
n = 25 
0.494 
141.27 
(310.65) 
n = 11 
72.04 
(125.17) 
n = 25 
0.342 
203.27 
(599.16) 
n = 11 
24.72 
(127.94) 
n = 25 
0.158 
Louisiana 92.61 
(186.43) 
n = 31 
28.00 
(108.28) 
n = 33 
0.093 
19.74 
(193.05) 
n = 31 
4.75 
(98.43) 
n = 33 
0.694 
-33.42 
(259.21) 
n = 31 
26.00 
(103.59) 
n = 33 
0.228 
Mississippi 5.73 
(83.59) 
n = 49 
13.73 
(63.83) 
n = 33 
0.643 
47.90 
(147.31) 
n = 49 
5.30 
(74.75) 
n = 33 
0.130 
-31.16 
(155.90) 
n = 49 
11.85 
(48.59) 
n = 33 
0.129 
Total 51.99 
(220.01) 
N = 91 
30.95 
(142.01) 
N = 91 
0.444 
49.59 
(189.88) 
N = 91 
23.44 
(102.54) 
N = 91 
0.249 
-3.59 
(284.95) 
N = 91 
20.52 
(95.20) 
N = 91 
0.445 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 44.00 
(464.78) 
n = 11 
-31.88 
(217.66) 
n = 25 
0.505 
-395.09 
(1022.06) 
n = 11 
-70.16 
(360.77) 
n = 25 
0.164 
-76.55 
(201.41) 
n = 11 
-170.08 
(323.86) 
n = 25 
0.384 
Louisiana 198.74 
(369.12) 
n = 31 
-9.12 
(138.54) 
n = 33 
0.004 
-119.00 
(596.94) 
n = 31 
-48.58 
(88.99) 
n = 33 
0.505 
-204.26 
(378.21) 
n = 31 
-22.48 
(91.47) 
n = 33 
0.009 
Mississippi 60.65 
(235.90) 
n = 49 
7.58 
(45.23) 
n = 33 
0.206 
40.33 
(291.09) 
n = 49 
-53.39 
(239.21) 
n = 33 
0.129 
-83.27 
(275.01) 
n = 49 
-40.12 
(170.48) 
n = 33 
0.425 
Total 105.68 
(321.95) 
N = 91 
-9.32 
(142.94) 
N = 91 
0.002 
-66.58 
(548.08) 
N = 91 
-56.25 
(240.72) 
N = 91 
0.869 
-123.67 
(309.71) 
N = 91 
-69.43 
(212.64) 
N = 91 
0.170 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Unit: Number of Permits. 
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Average Annual County Change in Housing Unit Estimates 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 447.27 
(749.86) 
n = 11 
319.36 
(569.63) 
n = 25 
0.577 
587.45 
(1138.45) 
n = 11 
382.12 
(738.96) 
n = 25 
0.521 
686.73 
(1430.39) 
n = 11 
393.80 
(854.67) 
n = 25 
0.449 
Louisiana 401.48 
(629.82) 
n = 31 
128.06 
(177.17) 
n = 33 
0.020 
509.48 
(715.99) 
n = 31 
154.48 
(263.23) 
n = 33 
0.010 
522.74 
(741.00) 
n = 31 
143.48 
(229.95) 
n = 33 
0.007 
Mississippi 164.51 
(314.78) 
n = 49 
119.79 
(377.23) 
n = 33 
0.562 
168.51 
(346.11) 
n = 49 
138.76 
(404.54) 
n = 33 
0.722 
200.53 
(426.41) 
n = 49 
134.30 
(432.43) 
n = 33 
0.495 
Total 279.42 
(513.14) 
N = 91 
177.62 
(394.96) 
N = 91 
0.135 
335.31 
(641.98) 
N = 91 
211.32 
(489.55) 
N = 91 
0.145 
369.07 
(737.07) 
N = 91 
208.92 
(541.46) 
N = 91 
0.097 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 890.73 
(1963.01) 
n = 11 
450.80 
(822.58) 
n = 25 
0.345 
920.55 
(1757.72) 
n = 11 
384.92 
(846.94) 
n = 25 
0.222 
528.00 
(907.25) 
n = 11 
309.04 
(583.95) 
n = 25 
0.390 
Louisiana -4340.32 
(21145.27) 
n = 31 
258.09 
(346.97) 
n = 33 
0.216 
1246.87 
(2604.64) 
n = 31 
192.39 
(260.12) 
n = 33 
0.024 
613.87 
(819.16) 
n = 31 
143.33 
(200.82) 
n = 33 
0.002 
Mississippi -243.84 
(2329.32) 
n = 49 
193.79 
(472.61) 
n = 33 
0.291 
256.49 
(506.74) 
n = 49 
171.67 
(501.75) 
n = 33 
0.458 
307.94 
(679.67) 
n = 49 
127.06 
(277.91) 
n = 33 
0.152 
Total -1502.20 
(12517.95) 
N = 91 
287.71 
(560.00) 
N = 91 
0.175 
674.14 
(1719.59) 
N = 91 
237.77 
(559.67) 
N = 91 
0.022 
438.76 
(763.12) 
N = 91 
182.96 
(372.65) 
N = 91 
0.005 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Unit: Number of Housing Units. 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Average Wages Per Job 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 3.52% 
(.0191) 
n = 11 
3.71% 
(.0108) 
n = 25 
0.704 
3.36% 
(.0122) 
n = 11 
3.57% 
(.0134) 
n = 25 
0.655 
4.85% 
(.0229) 
n = 11 
3.89% 
(.0173) 
n = 25 
0.175 
Louisiana 2.67% 
(.0154) 
n = 31 
3.67% 
(.0228) 
n = 33 
0.047 
4.28% 
(.0196) 
n = 31 
4.27% 
(.0141) 
n = 33 
0.983 
6.03% 
(.0328) 
n = 31 
4.78% 
(.0357) 
n = 33 
0.150 
Mississippi 3.97% 
(.0414) 
n = 49 
3.82% 
(.0232) 
n = 33 
0.848 
4.18% 
(.0320) 
n = 49 
4.65% 
(.0286) 
n = 33 
0.504 
5.00% 
(.0238) 
n = 49 
3.40% 
(.0176) 
n = 33 
0.001 
Total 3.47% 
(.0327) 
N = 91 
3.73% 
(.0202) 
N = 91 
0.521 
4.12% 
(.0264) 
N = 91 
4.22% 
(.0207) 
N = 91 
0.780 
5.33% 
(.0273) 
N = 91 
4.04% 
(.0260) 
N = 91 
0.001 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 4.43% 
(.0258) 
n = 11 
3.40% 
(.0159) 
n = 25 
0.154 
3.39% 
(.0197) 
n = 11 
3.99% 
(.0167) 
n = 25 
0.351 
3.43% 
(.0152) 
n = 11 
3.13% 
(.0208) 
n = 25 
0.670 
Louisiana 10.04% 
(.0858) 
n = 31 
5.39% 
(.0363) 
n = 33 
0.006 
5.04% 
(.0341) 
n = 31 
3.68% 
(.0535) 
n = 33 
0.232 
6.57% 
(.0236) 
n = 31 
5.94% 
(.0225) 
n = 33 
0.278 
Mississippi 4.96% 
(.0293) 
n = 49 
3.10% 
(.0233) 
n = 33 
0.003 
3.21% 
(.0260) 
n = 49 
3.21% 
(.0201) 
n = 33 
0.992 
5.07% 
(.0671) 
n = 49 
2.86% 
(.0224) 
n = 33 
0.072 
Total 6.63% 
(.0599) 
N = 91 
4.02% 
(.0289) 
N = 91 
0.000 
3.86% 
(.0294) 
N = 91 
3.60% 
(.0353) 
N = 91 
0.592 
5.38% 
(.0521) 
N = 91 
4.05% 
(.0261) 
N = 91 
0.031 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change. 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Personal Income 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 3.78% 
(.0166) 
n = 11 
4.39% 
(.0161) 
n = 25 
0.312 
6.28% 
(.0261) 
n = 11 
6.03% 
(.0237) 
n = 25 
0.780 
6.10% 
(.0430) 
n = 11 
5.32% 
(.0261) 
n = 25 
0.507 
Louisiana 3.16% 
(.0161) 
n = 31 
5.15% 
(.0620) 
n = 33 
0.088 
5.01% 
(.0203) 
n = 31 
4.77% 
(.0409) 
n = 33 
0.776 
8.80% 
(.0587) 
n = 31 
6.65% 
(.0332) 
n = 33 
0.073 
Mississippi 3.56% 
(.0402) 
n = 49 
7.50% 
(.0917) 
n = 33 
0.009 
6.37% 
(.0312) 
n = 49 
4.55% 
(.0281) 
n = 33 
0.009 
6.64% 
(.0304) 
n = 49 
6.11% 
(.0291) 
n = 33 
0.435 
Total 3.45% 
(.0314) 
N = 91 
5.79% 
(.0679) 
N = 91 
0.003 
5.90% 
(.0278) 
N = 91 
5.04% 
(.0326) 
N = 91 
0.058 
7.31% 
(.0443) 
N = 91 
6.09% 
(.0301) 
N = 91 
0.031 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 6.31% 
(.0316) 
n = 11 
5.16% 
(.0203) 
n = 25 
0.200 
4.28% 
(.0182) 
n = 11 
5.18% 
(.0218) 
n = 25 
0.238 
3.47% 
(.0123) 
n = 11 
3.54% 
(.0117) 
n = 25 
0.856 
Louisiana 7.20% 
(.0947) 
n = 31 
4.45% 
(.0290) 
n = 33 
0.116 
10.06% 
(.0727) 
n = 31 
4.52% 
(.0277) 
n = 33 
0.000 
5.48% 
(.0305) 
n = 31 
5.50% 
(.0263) 
n = 33 
0.980 
Mississippi 3.23% 
(.0458) 
n = 49 
2.01% 
(.0519) 
n = 33 
0.264 
5.43% 
(.0606) 
n = 49 
5.83% 
(.0470) 
n = 33 
0.754 
5.25% 
(.0356) 
n = 49 
3.74% 
(.0334) 
n = 33 
0.057 
Total 4.95% 
(.0676) 
N = 91 
3.76% 
(.0394) 
N = 91 
0.147 
6.87% 
(.0656) 
N = 91 
5.17% 
(.0349) 
N = 91 
0.031 
5.11% 
(.0323) 
N = 91 
4.32% 
(.0275) 
N = 91 
0.078 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change. 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Median Household Income 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 2.98% 
(.0126) 
n = 11 
2.91% 
(.0149) 
n = 25 
0.896 
2.50% 
(.0119) 
n = 11 
3.13% 
(.0151) 
n = 25 
0.229 
1.51% 
(.0350) 
n = 11 
3.16% 
(.0341) 
n = 25 
0.194 
Louisiana 3.23% 
(.0149) 
n = 31 
4.18% 
(.0223) 
n = 33 
0.051 
1.34% 
(.0111) 
n = 31 
2.74% 
(.0166) 
n = 33 
0.000 
4.37% 
(.0377) 
n = 31 
3.25% 
(.0373) 
n = 33 
0.238 
Mississippi 3.75% 
(.0164) 
n = 49 
4.02% 
(.0200) 
n = 33 
0.511 
2.87% 
(.0209) 
n = 49 
3.18% 
(.0174) 
n = 33 
0.483 
3.67% 
(.0327) 
n = 49 
.91% 
(.0334) 
n = 33 
0.000 
Total 3.48% 
(.0156) 
N = 91 
3.77% 
(.0202) 
N = 91 
0.277 
2.31% 
(.0184) 
N = 91 
3.01% 
(.0165) 
N = 91 
0.007 
3.65% 
(.0354) 
N = 91 
2.38% 
(.0364) 
N = 91 
0.018 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 5.10% 
(.0277) 
n = 11 
3.45% 
(.0396) 
n = 25 
0.219 
6.43% 
(.0360) 
n = 11 
4.95% 
(.0478) 
n = 25 
0.363 
2.60% 
(.0366) 
n = 11 
3.17% 
(.0563) 
n = 25 
0.757 
Louisiana 4.22% 
(.0422) 
n = 31 
3.78% 
(.0540) 
n = 33 
0.720 
6.53% 
(.0592) 
n = 31 
6.00% 
(.0541) 
n = 33 
0.707 
7.36% 
(.0651) 
n = 31 
5.79% 
(.0500) 
n = 33 
0.284 
Mississippi 3.24% 
(.0482) 
n = 49 
3.42% 
(.0539) 
n = 33 
0.879 
5.39% 
(.0482) 
n = 49 
5.50% 
(.0536) 
n = 33 
0.924 
3.64% 
(.0482) 
n = 49 
2.43% 
(.0536) 
n = 33 
0.293 
Total 3.80% 
(.0443) 
N = 91 
3.56% 
(.0500) 
N = 91 
0.730 
5.91% 
(.0508) 
N = 91 
5.53% 
(.0519) 
N = 91 
0.621 
4.78% 
(.0562) 
N = 91 
3.85% 
(.0546) 
N = 91 
0.263 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change. 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Per Capita Income 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 4.27% 
(.0201) 
n = 11 
4.41% 
(.0207) 
n = 25 
0.857 
6.76% 
(.0251) 
n = 11 
5.91% 
(.0157) 
n = 25 
0.223 
6.38% 
(.0367) 
n = 11 
4.99% 
(.0226) 
n = 25 
0.169 
Louisiana 2.93% 
(.0167) 
n = 31 
5.65% 
(.0698) 
n = 33 
0.038 
4.60% 
(.0190) 
n = 31 
5.16% 
(.0361) 
n = 33 
0.446 
8.53% 
(.0553) 
n = 31 
7.06% 
(.0351) 
n = 33 
0.209 
Mississippi 3.55% 
(.0418) 
n = 49 
7.82% 
(.0973) 
n = 33 
0.008 
6.22% 
(.0309) 
n = 49 
4.86% 
(.0224) 
n = 33 
0.033 
6.49% 
(.0266) 
n = 49 
6.42% 
(.0339) 
n = 33 
0.914 
Total 3.43% 
(.0330) 
N = 91 
6.10% 
(.0735) 
N = 91 
0.002 
5.73% 
(.0277) 
N = 91 
5.26% 
(.0269) 
N = 91 
0.241 
7.17% 
(.0405) 
N = 91 
6.26% 
(.0325) 
N = 91 
0.096 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 6.29% 
(.0261) 
n = 11 
4.66% 
(.0134) 
n = 25 
0.017 
4.43% 
(.0171) 
n = 11 
4.46% 
(.0134) 
n = 25 
0.948 
3.50% 
(.0127) 
n = 11 
3.05% 
(.0135) 
n = 25 
0.356 
Louisiana 17.98% 
(.3770) 
n = 31 
3.86% 
(.0316) 
n = 33 
0.036 
5.80% 
(.1043) 
n = 31 
4.85% 
(.0277) 
n = 33 
0.617 
4.25% 
(.0546) 
n = 31 
5.74% 
(.0306) 
n = 33 
0.180 
Mississippi 2.93% 
(.0420) 
n = 49 
1.80% 
(.0416) 
n = 33 
0.234 
4.88% 
(.0542) 
n = 49 
6.10% 
(.0601) 
n = 33 
0.344 
4.77% 
(.0395) 
n = 49 
3.81% 
(.0379) 
n = 33 
0.273 
Total 8.46% 
(.2307) 
N = 91 
3.33% 
(.0341) 
N = 91 
0.037 
5.14% 
(.0725) 
N = 91 
5.20% 
(.0407) 
N = 91 
0.949 
4.44% 
(.0431) 
N = 91 
4.30% 
(.0319) 
N = 91 
0.802 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change. 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Total Industry Earnings 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 4.92% 
(.0356) 
n = 11 
5.57% 
(.0314) 
n = 25 
0.589 
6.68% 
(.0448) 
n = 11 
5.99% 
(.0317) 
n = 25 
0.602 
6.88% 
(.0473) 
n = 11 
5.96% 
(.0405) 
n = 25 
0.555 
Louisiana 5.42% 
(.0401) 
n = 31 
1.25% 
(.1348) 
n = 33 
0.007 
4.21% 
(.0335) 
n = 31 
3.57% 
(.0714) 
n = 33 
0.656 
4.77% 
(.0695) 
n = 31 
5.20% 
(.0527) 
n = 33 
0.780 
Mississippi 6.20% 
(.1026) 
n = 49 
13.74% 
(.2136) 
n = 33 
0.036 
8.54% 
(.0600) 
n = 49 
4.55% 
(.0470) 
n = 33 
0.002 
4.21% 
(.0331) 
n = 49 
5.02% 
(.0512) 
n = 33 
0.384 
Total 5.78% 
(.0795) 
N = 91 
11.03% 
(.1553) 
N = 91 
0.005 
6.84% 
(.0540) 
N = 91 
4.59% 
(.0544) 
N = 91 
0.006 
4.72% 
(.0502) 
N = 91 
5.35% 
(.0487) 
N = 91 
0.397 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 5.08% 
(.0449) 
n = 11 
3.92% 
(.0280) 
n = 25 
0.351 
1.24% 
(.0431) 
n = 11 
2.74% 
(.0376) 
n = 25 
0.299 
1.29% 
(.0198) 
n = 11 
1.55% 
(.0287) 
n = 25 
0.790 
Louisiana 9.11% 
(.0782) 
n = 31 
4.74% 
(.0531) 
n = 33 
0.011 
6.99% 
(.0362) 
n = 31 
4.11% 
(.0689) 
n = 33 
0.042 
8.18% 
(.0422) 
n = 31 
3.32% 
(.0500) 
n = 33 
0.000 
Mississippi 1.60% 
(.0722) 
n = 49 
-1.49% 
(.0815) 
n = 33 
0.075 
3.41% 
(.0302) 
n = 49 
5.03% 
(.0930) 
n = 33 
0.258 
4.32% 
(.0826) 
n = 49 
-.45% 
(.0626) 
n = 33 
0.006 
Total 4.58% 
(.0790) 
N = 91 
2.26% 
(.0663) 
N = 91 
0.033 
4.37% 
(.0392) 
N = 91 
4.07% 
(.0723) 
N = 91 
0.731 
5.27% 
(.0693) 
N = 91 
1.47% 
(.0521) 
N = 91 
0.000 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change. 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Construction Industry Earnings 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 12.01% 
(.1792) 
n = 11 
5.74% 
(.1100) 
n = 25 
0.204 
4.72% 
(.1459) 
n = 11 
9.91% 
(.1074) 
n = 25 
0.240 
20.34% 
(.3517) 
n = 11 
6.93% 
(.1478) 
n = 25 
0.113 
Louisiana* .26% 
(.1628) 
n = 30 
10.45% 
(.1649) 
n = 29 
0.020 
5.43% 
(.1113) 
n = 29 
5.29% 
(.1435) 
n = 29 
0.968 
7.26% 
(.1247) 
n = 29 
10.81% 
(.1567) 
n = 29 
0.344 
Mississippi* 2.36% 
(.3571) 
n = 42 
4.47% 
(.1443) 
n = 32 
0.753 
2.39% 
(.2142) 
n = 42 
2.20% 
(.0916) 
n = 31 
0.962 
13.68% 
(.1639) 
n = 43 
6.96% 
(.0838) 
n = 30 
0.043 
Total 2.88% 
(.2801) 
N = 83 
6.85% 
(.1437) 
N = 86 
0.245 
3.78% 
(.1742) 
N = 82 
5.52% 
(.1189) 
N = 85 
0.450 
12.32% 
(.1898) 
N = 83 
8.28% 
(.1319) 
N = 84 
0.112 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 7.82% 
(.1464) 
n = 11 
10.07% 
(.0822) 
n = 25 
0.560 
14.99% 
(.2513) 
n = 11 
3.28% 
(.0851) 
n = 25 
0.043 
-10.55% 
(.1431) 
n = 11 
-9.22% 
(.0826) 
n = 25 
0.726 
Louisiana* 23.35% 
(.2636) 
n = 29 
11.32% 
(.3513) 
n = 28 
0.148 
9.42% 
(.1428) 
n = 29 
2.85% 
(.1753) 
n = 28 
0.126 
10.48% 
(.4241) 
n = 31 
2.94% 
(.1942) 
n = 29 
0.385 
Mississippi* 11.74% 
(.3068) 
n = 44 
7.51% 
(.1024) 
n = 30 
0.470 
1.32% 
(.1432) 
n = 44 
1.07% 
(.1646) 
n = 30 
0.945 
14.53% 
(.6309) 
n = 44 
-4.91% 
(.2251) 
n = 30 
0.111 
Total 15.24% 
(.2801) 
N = 84 
9.57% 
(.2158) 
N = 83 
0.145 
5.90% 
(.1665) 
N = 84 
2.33% 
(.1480) 
N = 83 
0.145 
9.86% 
(.5232) 
N = 86 
-3.48% 
(.1868) 
N = 84 
0.029 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change.  
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana. 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Manufacturing Industry Earnings 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama* .83% 
(.0895) 
n = 11 
2.22% 
(.0834) 
n = 23 
0.659 
2.53% 
(.0686) 
n = 11 
5.33% 
(.0743) 
n = 24 
0.297 
4.63% 
(.0542) 
n = 11 
5.85% 
(.0641) 
n = 25 
0.585 
Louisiana* 1.45% 
(.0811) 
n = 31 
-4.86% 
(.1600) 
n = 28 
0.058 
-.70% 
(.0874) 
n = 30 
4.28% 
(.1252) 
n = 28 
0.083 
5.85% 
(.1346) 
n = 30 
2.11% 
(.1105) 
n = 27 
0.260 
Mississippi* 3.48% 
(.2620) 
n = 44 
-3.15% 
(.1386) 
n = 30 
0.209 
2.60% 
(.1654) 
n = 44 
5.55% 
(.1719) 
n = 29 
0.465 
4.15% 
(.1095) 
n = 44 
4.09% 
(.0979) 
n = 30 
0.979 
Total 2.41% 
(.1952) 
N = 86 
-2.22% 
(.1355) 
N = 81 
0.079 
1.43% 
(.1321) 
N = 85 
5.04% 
(.1313) 
N = 81 
0.079 
4.81% 
(.1132) 
N = 85 
3.97% 
(.0938) 
N = 82 
0.604 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 5.39% 
(.0862) 
n = 11 
3.85% 
(.0700) 
n = 25 
0.575 
-1.65% 
(.0714) 
n = 11 
1.96% 
(.0473) 
n = 25 
0.081 
4.00% 
(.1279) 
n = 11 
-1.20% 
(.0660) 
n = 25 
0.115 
Louisiana* 11.23% 
(.1111) 
n = 31 
7.75% 
(.1477) 
n = 27 
0.312 
8.81% 
(.1250) 
n = 31 
2.95% 
(.0901) 
n = 27 
0.048 
4.47% 
(.1827) 
n = 31 
-.22% 
(.2513) 
n = 28 
0.412 
Mississippi* 9.80% 
(.1606) 
n = 44 
-.76% 
(.1067) 
n = 30 
0.002 
-.40% 
(.1309) 
n = 45 
-3.20% 
(.1201) 
n = 31 
0.347 
.24% 
(.1284) 
n = 44 
-5.58% 
(.1137) 
n = 31 
0.047 
Total 9.75% 
(.1364) 
N = 86 
3.45% 
(.1175) 
N = 82 
0.002 
2.72% 
(.1300) 
N = 87 
.36% 
(.0963) 
N = 83 
0.181 
2.25% 
(.1499) 
N = 86 
-2.49% 
(.1645) 
N = 84 
0.051 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change. 
*Data were missing for a few counties in Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Total Employment 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama -.12% 
(.0197) 
n = 11 
.41% 
(.0238) 
n = 25 
0.522 
2.28% 
(.0308) 
n = 11 
2.14% 
(.0219) 
n = 25 
0.875 
1.72% 
(.0205) 
n = 11 
2.36% 
(.0371) 
n = 25 
0.594 
Louisiana 1.07% 
(.0242) 
n = 31 
.05% 
(.0261) 
n = 33 
0.112 
.22% 
(.0226) 
n = 31 
.30% 
(.0245) 
n = 33 
0.896 
-.36% 
(.0533) 
n = 31 
.84% 
(.0260) 
n = 33 
0.254 
Mississippi -.65% 
(.0419) 
n = 49 
-1.58% 
(.0261) 
n = 33 
0.258 
.79% 
(.0298) 
n = 49 
1.11% 
(.0315) 
n = 33 
0.642 
1.25% 
(.0241) 
n = 49 
.93% 
(.0293) 
n = 33 
0.599 
Total .002% 
(.0352) 
N = 91 
-.44% 
(.0267) 
N = 91 
0.340 
.78% 
(.0280) 
N = 91 
1.10% 
(.0273) 
N = 91 
0.434 
.76% 
(.0370) 
N = 91 
1.29% 
(.0309) 
N = 91 
0.293 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 1.90% 
(.0206) 
n = 11 
1.85% 
(.0220) 
n = 25 
0.945 
2.37% 
(.0208) 
n = 11 
1.98% 
(.0247) 
n = 25 
0.649 
-.24% 
(.0182) 
n = 11 
-.18% 
(.0155) 
n = 25 
0.922 
Louisiana 2.44% 
(.0946) 
n = 31 
2.80% 
(.0267) 
n = 33 
0.833 
4.71% 
(.0237) 
n = 31 
1.86% 
(.0250) 
n = 33 
0.000 
3.06% 
(.0197) 
n = 31 
1.64% 
(.0119) 
n = 33 
0.001 
Mississippi 2.18% 
(.0336) 
n = 49 
1.23% 
(.0279) 
n = 33 
0.183 
2.03% 
(.0238) 
n = 49 
.40% 
(.0260) 
n = 33 
0.004 
1.43% 
(.0263) 
n = 49 
-.51% 
(.0232) 
n = 33 
0.001 
Total 2.24% 
(.0603) 
N = 91 
1.97% 
(.0266) 
N = 91 
0.701 
2.98% 
(.0263) 
N = 91 
1.36% 
(.0260) 
N = 91 
0.000 
1.78% 
(.0254) 
N = 91 
.36% 
(.0200) 
N = 91 
0.000 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change in number of jobs. 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Manufacturing Employment 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama -3.88% 
(.0741) 
n = 11 
-4.40% 
(.0630) 
n = 25 
0.830 
.34% 
(.0556) 
n = 11 
-.15% 
(.0603) 
n = 25 
0.822 
-.35% 
(.0653) 
n = 11 
2.24% 
(.0622) 
n = 25 
0.264 
Louisiana* -2.52% 
(.0816) 
n = 31 
-10.59% 
(.1438) 
n = 28 
0.010 
-3.00% 
(.0654) 
n = 30 
-1.18% 
(.1359) 
n = 28 
0.514 
-.81% 
(.1188) 
n = 30 
.12% 
(.0722) 
n = 27 
0.724 
Mississippi* -4.45% 
(.1847) 
n = 44 
-8.94% 
(.1007) 
n = 32 
0.216 
.07% 
(.1361) 
n = 44 
2.57% 
(.1734) 
n = 31 
0.487 
-.28% 
(.0946) 
n = 44 
3.14% 
(.1187) 
n = 30 
0.173 
Total -3.68% 
(.1426) 
N = 86 
-8.15% 
(.1103) 
N = 85 
0.023 
-.98% 
(.1075) 
N = 85 
.51% 
(.1349) 
N = 84 
0.428 
-.48% 
(.0998) 
N = 85 
1.87% 
(.0896) 
N = 82 
0.111 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama -.60% 
(.0843) 
n = 11 
2.17% 
(.0681) 
n = 25 
0.304 
-2.69% 
(.0482) 
n = 11 
-3.05% 
(.0586) 
n = 25 
0.861 
1.40% 
(.1694) 
n = 11 
-4.46% 
(.0416) 
n = 25 
0.108 
Louisiana* 2.67% 
(.0920) 
n = 31 
3.74% 
(.1514) 
n = 27 
0.745 
6.96% 
(.1295) 
n = 31 
2.39% 
(.1055) 
n = 27 
0.150 
-1.63% 
(.1327) 
n = 31 
-3.56% 
(.1849) 
n = 28 
0.644 
Mississippi* 3.59% 
(.1186) 
n = 44 
-3.77% 
(.1180) 
n = 31 
0.010 
-2.52% 
(.1099) 
n = 45 
-6.14% 
(.1028) 
n = 32 
0.148 
-3.56% 
(.0955) 
n = 44 
-8.60% 
(.1151) 
n = 32 
0.041 
Total 2.73% 
(.1054) 
N = 86 
.46% 
(.1218) 
N = 83 
0.198 
.84% 
(.1200) 
N = 87 
-2.48% 
(.0986) 
N = 84 
0.050 
-2.23% 
(.1203) 
N = 86 
-5.72% 
(.1299) 
N = 85 
0.070 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change in number of jobs. 
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana 
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Annual County Percentage Change in Construction Employment 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 6.01% 
(.0980) 
n = 11 
5.40% 
(.0714) 
n = 25 
0.833 
4.75% 
(.1174) 
n = 11 
5.33% 
(.1080) 
n = 25 
0.885 
10.14% 
(.1945) 
n = 11 
5.55% 
(.1126) 
n = 25 
0.376 
Louisiana* .71% 
(.1331) 
n = 30 
6.36% 
(.1121) 
n = 29 
0.084 
1.21% 
(.0976) 
n = 29 
1.01% 
(.1261) 
n = 29 
0.948 
4.88% 
(.0950) 
n = 29 
5.62% 
(.0891) 
n = 29 
0.763 
Mississippi* -1.00% 
(.1736) 
n = 42 
-.01% 
(.0929) 
n = 32 
0.773 
1.70% 
(.1523) 
n = 42 
.76% 
(.0752) 
n = 31 
0.752 
10.58% 
(.0960) 
n = 43 
4.64% 
(.0742) 
n = 30 
0.006 
Total .55% 
(.1518) 
N = 83 
3.71% 
(.0978) 
N = 86 
0.109 
1.94% 
(.1299) 
N = 82 
2.19% 
(.1052) 
N = 85 
0.889 
8.53% 
(.1146) 
N = 83 
5.25% 
(.0911) 
N = 84 
0.042 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 5.58% 
(.1118) 
n = 11 
4.74% 
(.0524) 
n = 25 
0.760 
6.38% 
(.1135) 
n = 11 
3.92% 
(.0528) 
n = 25 
0.376 
-4.44% 
(.0815) 
n = 11 
-1.59% 
(.0440) 
n = 25 
0.180 
Louisiana* 16.40% 
(.1721) 
n = 29 
7.02% 
(.1501) 
n = 28 
0.033 
1.81% 
(.0729) 
n = 29 
-1.78% 
(.0652) 
n = 28 
0.055 
6.25% 
(.2049) 
n = 31 
4.05% 
(.0878) 
n = 29 
0.595 
Mississippi* 6.99% 
(.1477) 
n = 44 
4.85% 
(.0629) 
n = 30 
0.459 
3.01% 
(.0963) 
n = 44 
2.17% 
(.0677) 
n = 30 
0.682 
7.00% 
(.1724) 
n = 44 
2.68% 
(.0900) 
n = 30 
0.212 
Total 10.05% 
(.1580) 
N = 84 
5.55% 
(.0987) 
N = 83 
0.029 
3.03% 
(.0914) 
N = 84 
1.36% 
(.0663) 
N = 83 
0.178 
5.27% 
(.1790) 
N = 86 
1.88% 
(.0809) 
N = 84 
0.115 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: Regional Economic Information System, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Unit: Annual Percentage Change in number of jobs. 
*Data were missing for a few counties in Mississippi and Louisiana 
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Average Annual County Population Change by State 
 
 2003 2004 2005 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 175.00 
(1142.44) 
n = 11 
331.68 
(1237.42) 
n = 25 
0.723 
389.36 
(1522.06) 
n = 11 
311.72 
(1327.05) 
n = 25 
0.878 
707.27 
(1931.13) 
n = 11 
456.28 
(1316.39) 
n = 25 
0.652 
Louisiana 291.55 
(1493.04) 
n = 31 
-21.06 
(304.03) 
n = 33 
0.243 
414.06 
(1726.60) 
n = 31 
43.51 
(430.04) 
n = 33 
0.237 
229.94 
(1865.38) 
n = 31 
20.27 
(370.39) 
n = 33 
0.529 
Mississippi 110.08 
(559.68) 
n = 49 
100.12 
(1066.55) 
n = 33 
0.956 
275.04 
(848.24) 
n = 49 
133.58 
(1147.53) 
n = 33 
0.523 
198.14 
(669.92) 
n = 49 
118.30 
(1084.08) 
n = 33 
0.681 
Total 179.75 
(1030.58) 
N = 91 
119.79 
(930.34) 
N = 91 
0.681 
336.21 
(1280.36) 
N = 91 
149.86 
(1007.52) 
N = 91 
0.277 
270.52 
(1356.59) 
N = 91 
175.60 
(980.14) 
N = 91 
0.589 
Post-Katrina 
 2006 2007 2008 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value 
Alabama 1223.28 
(2336.17) 
n = 11 
811.52 
(1611.39) 
n = 25 
0.543 
660.91 
(1338.77) 
n = 11 
623.24 
(1185.25) 
n = 25 
0.933 
595.09 
(1154.69) 
n = 11 
494.80 
(1097.07) 
n = 25 
0.805 
Louisiana -8640.94 
(45243.09) 
n = 31 
481.09 
(1137.55) 
n = 33 
0.251 
4202.19 
(14358.79) 
n = 31 
-17.94 
(350.30) 
n = 33 
0.096 
1160.94 
(4461.26) 
n = 31 
45.36 
(479.27) 
n = 33 
0.158 
Mississippi -233.08 
(3731.96) 
n = 49 
300.76 
(1382.24) 
n = 33 
0.435 
358.45 
(882.50) 
n = 49 
204.64 
(997.90) 
n = 33 
0.465 
214.29 
(669.34) 
n = 49 
214.79 
(1012.54) 
n = 33 
0.998 
Total -2921.25 
(26601.67) 
N = 91 
506.47 
(1368.73) 
N = 91 
0.221 
1704.42 
(8521.02) 
N = 91 
238.92 
(915.40) 
N = 91 
0.105 
582.80 
(2685.22) 
N = 91 
230.27 
(893.99) 
N = 91 
0.236 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
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Average Annual County Pre-Katrina and Post-Katrina Population Change 
by State 
 
 Pre-Katrina Post-Katrina 
 GO Zone Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
GO 
Zone 
Non-GO 
Zone 
P-
Value* 
Alabama 282.18 
(1317.85) 
n = 22 
321.70 
(1269.90) 
n = 50 
0.905 
826.42 
(1662.60) 
n = 33 
643.19 
(1305.85) 
n = 75 
0.538 
Louisiana 352.81 
(1601.96) 
n = 62 
11.23 
(370.96) 
n = 66 
0.095 
-1092.60 
(27776.9) 
n = 93 
169.51 
(766.37) 
n = 99 
0.651 
Mississippi 192.56 
(719.67) 
n = 98 
116.85 
(1099.36) 
n = 66 
0.595 
113.22 
(2246.36) 
n = 147 
240.06 
(1133.88) 
n = 99 
0.605 
Total 257.98 
(1161.64) 
N = 182 
134.82 
(967.13) 
N = 182 
0.273 
-211.34 
(16262.1) 
N = 273 
325.22 
(1085.40) 
N = 273 
0.586 
 
*P-value noted is for GO Zone variable, not the complete model. 
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to the standard deviations. 
Data Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
Pre-Katrina is comprised of years 2003 and 2004; Post-Katrina is comprised of years 2006, 
2007, and 2008. 
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Subset Sample for Sensitivity Analysis 
  
GO Zone Counties non-GO Zone Counties 
Attala, MS Bolivar, MS 
Choctaw, MS Calhoun, MS 
Clarke, MS Carroll, MS 
Hinds, MS Chickasaw, MS 
Holmes, MS Clay, MS 
Humphreys, MS Grenada, MS 
Kemper, MS Issaquena, MS 
Lauderdale, MS Itawamba, MS 
Leake, MS Lafayette, MS 
Lowndes, MS Lee, MS 
Madison, MS Leflore, MS 
Neshoba, MS Monroe, MS 
Newton, MS Montgomery, MS 
Noxubee, MS Pontotoc, MS 
Oktibbeha, MS Sharkey, MS 
Rankin, MS Sunflower, MS 
Scott, MS Tallahatchie, MS 
Warren, MS Washington, MS 
Winston, MS Webster, MS 
Yazoo, MS Yalobusha, MS 
 
272 
 
VITA 
 
Randall B. Bunker was born in Little Rock, Arkansas, on December 20, 1970, to 
parents Dallas and Nancy Bunker.  He has one older brother, Russell Bunker, and one 
older sister, Jaime Hensley.  He attended elementary school and high school in Cabot, 
Arkansas, and graduated from Cabot High School in 1989.  He attained a Bachelor of 
Science Degree with a major in accounting in 1993 from Arkansas State University.  In 
1998, he received a Master of Business Administration Degree from the University of 
Central Arkansas.  He is a Certified Public Accountant, licensed in the State of 
Arkansas.   
 Mr. Bunker began his career working for an accounting firm as an external 
auditor in 1993.  He then worked as a plant manager for a large manufacturing 
company.  In 1997, he went back to school and worked at the University of Central 
Arkansas while attending classes.  Upon graduation, he accepted a position as a 
financial analyst with Alltel Communications.  During his professional career, Mr. 
Bunker has held numerous accounting and management positions. 
 Mr. Bunker began working on his Doctor of Philosophy Degree at the 
University of Mississippi in August 2007.  He taught accounting classes while 
completing his coursework requirements.  During his time as a graduate assistant, he 
taught sections in Cost Accounting, Managerial Accounting, and Financial Accounting.  
He received the Patterson School of Accountancy Outstanding Doctoral Teacher Award 
in 2009 and 2010.  In 2009, he also received the Graduate Achievement Award for 
Ph.D. Degree in Accountancy from the University of Mississippi. 
273 
 
 Mr. Bunker is a member of the American Accounting Association and the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.  His research interests include areas 
of tax accounting, managerial accounting, and auditing.  He plans on continuing his 
career in academia teaching accounting. 
